Management and Leadership

No sacred cows for NEC’s President Niino

I was reminiscing a couple of days’ ago with a Japanese business person about how in the 1990s there was a Silicon Glen in Scotland hosting many Japanese electronics and semiconductor factories, including NEC’s semiconductor plant in Livingston. After the IT bubble burst in 2000, most of these plants disappeared, including NEC’s. Silicon Glen has remade itself, focusing more on software and semiconductor design and development. NEC has also reinvigorated its presence in the UK with the acquisition of Northgate Public Services in 2018.

NEC is not out of the woods yet, however. In a tough interview in the Nikkei Business, President Niino seems willing to slaughter several sacred cows and even commits to taking responsibility (presumably by resigning) if his revival plan to FY 2020 does not succeed.

He said he was open to merging with rival Fujitsu, even if it meant the NEC name disappeared. I certainly recognised from his descriptions some similar characteristics in the way they operate.

NEC, like Fujitsu, was part of the so-called Den Den Family, where stable, dependable business came from government contracts from what is now NTT. “Customers would make very stringent requests of us and we would always try to respond with the best possible technical solutions, and deliver 100%. This is an important quality, but you cannot survive globally just on this”.

Niino thinks there were many reasons for the halving of NEC’s turnover since 2000. They had relied on introducing new technology in areas such as semiconductors, PCs and mobile phones, but once these became volume businesses with many newcomers, spending far more on R&D, NEC was no longer able to compete.

Niino is focusing on profit targets rather than turnover and sees NEC’s future strength as being in “safer cities” – using AI and software development rather than hardware. Clearly China will be a major competitor in this, but I guess NEC and other Japanese suppliers will be preferred by many who might view China as a threat.

Niino has brought in an HR director from Microsoft Japan to shake up the HR system. He has appointed 31 “change agents” and made evaluations more visible, and the distinction between specialists and managers more clear. Corporate officers on the board have all been asked to step down temporarily and then are being rehired on 1 year contracts. “I won’t be firing them if they don’t meet targets within one year, but if they miss two years’ running, it might be that they are better off working outside NEC”. As Niino is himself a Corporate Officer, no wonder he has to commit to taking personal responsibility for any failure too.

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If the nail sticks out too much, you can’t hammer it down

One of my least favourite and most used expressions about Japan is “the nail which sticks out gets hammered down”. It does however have its use in explaining Japanese risk aversion when it comes to individuals going against the group. Of course many successful business people did well precisely because they were not conformists – and Japan is no exception to this. Tadashi Saegusa, now senior chairman of Misumi and Yoshimitsu Kobayashi, chairman of Mitsubishi Chemicals are both nails which stuck out, despite their senior status in the Japanese business world.

In a conversation moderated by Nikkei Business magazine, Kobayashi talks about how he did not join Mitsubishi Chemical until the age of 28, having spent some time in post graduate study, including in Israel. He therefore missed the usual graduate entry scheme. “I was an outsider from the start” he says. Saegusa initially joined a predecessor company of what is now Mitsui Chemical but then left to join the Boston Consulting Group – the first person to be recruited by them in Japan.

Japan has become complacent

Both worry that Japan has become complacent during the 30 years of the Heisei era. Japan’s GDP has stayed flat, whereas the USA’s GDP has doubled during that time, says Kobayashi. 7 of the world’s top 10 companies were Japanese in 1989 (mostly Japanese banks) whereas not one of them is in the top 10 now. Kobayashi worries that Japanese people are not aware of how this seems from the outside – citing a survey that shows that 83% of young Japanese people are satisfied with the current situation.

Saegusa agrees that there is no sense of crisis in Japanese companies and of understanding what is lacking. For 27 years people have been told not to spend money or invest, which is the same as saying “don’t challenge the status quo”. “Everyone is in the same situation in Japan, so we’re rotting from the inside, if we don’t challenge ourselves.”

It can’t just be about the art of manufacturing, it’s how you design the business too

Even in basic research, China is top, and Japan is somewhere between 4th or 10th depending on the survey, says Kobayashi. “Yes Japan still leads in some sectors globally, but starting with semi conductors, there are many areas where it has lost share. How long can Japan keep its share of the carbon fibre business when Taiwan and South Korea are chasing it? It’s just a question of time. It can’t just be about monozukuri (craftsmanship, manufacturing ability). It’s how you design the business itself.”

Saegusa believes that such a large gap has opened up with the US in some sectors that it’s too late to catch up. “But Japan has just let this situation drag on. You can do something when a company still has life left in it, but when there is no money or resources left, then it’s too late. You have to look at the worst case scenario and focus the business, showing a path to survival, before it happens. That is what a leader needs to do.”

Only 10-20% of people in a group will take action

“Only 10-20% of people will actually take action in any large group of people” says Kobayashi. So many Japanese companies are still sitting on their cash, despite Abenomics. “Companies and their managers have lost the will to fight and just want to avoid doing anything extreme. They’ve lost speed and dynamism.”

“If you look at the US in the 1990s, it was revived by venture capitalists, university researchers and professional managers who would trigger changes. If you took a risk as an individual and succeeded, you would earn big money. But Japanese companies put priority on balance and are group oriented – it’s difficult to develop professionals. If you try to become a professional, you get slapped down. Everyone turned into salarymen, who would not take risks. That’s why we we’ve ended up not being able to develop managers.”

The age of the individual and platformers

Kobayashi believes this model worked in times of high growth and mass production. But now in the age of the individual, it is the platformers like Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple who are using new cultures and innovations as triggers. “Japanese businesses do not realise what a handicap their culture is.”

Japanese companies have become too big, says Saegusa. “There is not that ‘create, build and sell’ mentality you get in the US. Bloated companies don’t give rise to leaders, rather to people who are good at pulling everything together.”

See your predecessors as war criminals

When he was working at Mitsubishi Chemicals, Kobayashi would say “see your predecessors as war criminals” (senpai wa senpan 先輩は戦犯). “If your predecessor did something wrong, you have to say so and do something about it, otherwise it won’t change. And when you become a senior manager, you have to be prepared to be treated like a war criminal.”

“A nail which sticks out too much cannot be hammered down” says Saegusa, noting that Kobayashi is rooted in a strong sense of values. “But such people are rare, even though they are needed right now.” When Saegusa left his Mitsui group company, he was seen as an outsider but now more and more people say that his life choices were the right ones. “If organisations treasure outsiders, they will find the old order breaks apart – but they may fear this kind of revolution.”

When Kobayashi was running Mitsubishi Chemical, he appointed a CTO, CIO and CMO from outside the organisation. “I felt that we could not develop such people inside the company. Now I am an external director of Toshiba, and we appointed a CEO from outside the organisation. Japan will have to change its corporate governance radically in the next five years to deal with the fast pace of change globally. If you make use of an external perspective early on, then you can deal more effectively with changes such as more vocal shareholders.”

Mitsui and Mitsubishi must lead the change away from big company disease

Saegusa worries that it might take 20 or 30 years more, to reach an absolute bottom, before Japanese people understand what their fundamental strengths are. Large groups like Mitsui and Mitsubishi must take responsibility for leading the change away from “big company disease”. “We have the information resources to know that we are losing on a global level.”

“It’s not over for Japan. I also think Japanese people can be great, but we need to reflect on what has happened and realise we have become complacent. We have been totally defeated these past 30 years, but if we can work together to find out spirit to fight back, we can be a strong country once again”, says Kobayashi.

This dialogue seems in strange contrast to the kind of articles we read in the Western press in recent years saying that while Japan is not Number One any more, there are so many good things about the country in terms of civility and a general good standard of living. And this is reflected in how Japan has become such a popular tourist destination. I suppose we recognise there are worse models than becoming a gently stagnating, ageing society where people are polite and kind to each other.

Is Sharp still a Japanese treasure?

Sharp Corporation Chairman and President Tai Jeng-wu was the second in command at Taiwan’s Hon Hai when it acquired Sharp in 2016. His cost cutting organisational reforms have turned the company’s results around in a “V” shaped recovery. He is now hurrying ahead with restructuring the business portfolio. In an interview with Nikkei Business he says Sharp is “Japan’s treasure” and is at pains to point out how influenced he has been by Japanese teachers in the past. Japan and Taiwan continue to have good relations (reinforced by a common threat of China, hinted at in this interview with the dig at unfair competition from state owned companies), and many Taiwanese speak excellent Japanese.

He says that unlike Carlos Ghosn, he did not arrive at Sharp with a posse of executives. He feels that the reforms are still only half way but he wants to work alongside Sharp employees – rather than a top down imposed change.

Asked what was the problem at Sharp, he said “it is not for me to say, but I suppose the crisis occurred when there were problems with management in the 2010s – when people who have only had experience in one particular technical area or business become president. You need to have a general overview to be a top executive, so when there was a crisis they were unable to respond. How I fixed the $2.5bn loss was to cut costs by around $1.7bn and then cut back investments and with some transient profits, we were back in the black.”

Don’t be a big fish

“You have to develop people step by step. When I started at Sharp, I said when announcing my strategy that “Sharp should not be a big fish, but should aim to be a fast swimming fish”. So I kept asking every day for things to speed up. I set some rules for developing successors. I lowered the limit requiring presidential approval to Y3m ($27,000). That was to ensure I would be aware of all the company’s problems. I then increased the limit to Y20m ($184,000) in 2018 when I put the CEO structure in place and this year I increased the limit to Y100m.”

“I will stay on as chairman of Sharp until March 2022. My wife and family want me back in Taiwan though. All the time from 2016 I have been looking for a successor. I even asked a Japanese consultant to help, but I cannot find one. I want the successor to be Japanese – it doesn’t matter if it’s an internal or external appointment. Maybe it could be someone from Hon Hai even. They should be able to manage in the current harsh environment, covering a wide range of businesses and find synergy with Hon Hai. It is the second criterion that makes finding the right person difficult.”

Japanese managers became bureaucrats

“It used to be that Japanese management of factories and businesses were strong, and my teachers were all Japanese. But then Japan went into a recession and the founder managers all disappeared, and managers became bureaucrats. That is why management strength declined. Japan is now only strong in parts and materials. ”

Sharp’s employee levels are back to the same as before the management crisis. “There were two early retirement drives during the crisis, and a lot of good people left. Those who remained when I joined the company in 2016 were one of three types – highly capable and loyal, those who couldn’t find another place to go and those where were waiting to be pushed. I actually never cut employees. In fact we need to increase our employees – we had some influxes from when we took over Toshiba’s PC business and other M&A.”

“I am not a god, I just improved everything step by step”

“I renegotiated the contracts for solar battery procurement and saved around $100m. I have also brought the Sharp brand back in house for the US TV production business. A brand is like a person’s name. Selling it is wrong. During the crisis Sharp sold off its precious buildings for $188m and then spent $30m on out of date computing. I am not a god, I just improved everything step by step. I was taught to do Horenso (keeping bosses in the loop) and check everything thoroughly, not just sign off easily by Japanese teachers.”

I am now promoting management based on data, and a shift to B2B (business to business). B2C (consumer) business is currently 65% of our turnover, I want to make it 50/50. The structure of trade in B2C is unfair – companies like ours in a free trade country have to compete with state owned companies who don’t have to invest or write off so much. That is why Japan’s IT/electronic companies’ share is falling – it’s a structural problem. In B2B it is a fairer fight. W have built a good ecosysytem over many years, so we have a good chance.

A Rising Sun Alliance of Japanese electronics companies

“I think there should be a Rising Sun Alliance of Japanese companies. There are a lot of Japanese electronics manufacturers but I don’t see that they will merge -t here is too much pride. I do have to be careful as Hon Hai is not a Japanese company. I am reflecting every day on how to manage employees. If I am criticised, it is not just my, but Taiwan’s pride at stake.”

“Sharp will last over 100 years. It is a treasure of Japan. I would like the brand to last another 100 years. I come to the office every day before 7:00am and give a bow to the statues of the founders in the front entrance. Sharp is a treasure to me too.”

Nikkei Business comments that there is no doubting his sincerity and dedication – apparently he lives in a single man’s dormitory and walks round the factory at 5am in the morning thinking about Sharp. He is at pains to seem almost more Japanese than the Japanese in this. But, the Nikkei wonders, will this be enough to succeed in the new territory for him and Sharp of B2B platform business.

The successes and failures of Japan’s era of big overseas acquisitions

The era of Japan’s big overseas acquisitions began with domestic mega M&As in the 1990s according to Nikkei Business magazine. Following the bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in 1990, a wave of M&As happened in the financial sector, giving birth to Mizuho from Fuji Bank, Daiichi Kangyo and the Industrial Bank of Japan and Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank producing SMBC. In the steel sector with NKK merging with Kawasaki Steel and becoming JFE and in the pharmaceuticals sector with Yamanouchi and Fujisawa merged to become Astellas.

The key concept for these M&As in the 1990s was “restructuring” – to rationalise the back office and integrate R&D. Then in the second half of the 2000s came a wave of overseas acquisitions, to counter the business impact of the shrinking, ageing population of Japan by growing overseas but also to benefit from further restructuring and rationalisation.

Mega overseas acquisitions of the 2000s

In 2007 Japan Tobacco acquired the UK’s Gallaher from RJR, becoming the third biggest tobacco company in the world. In 2006 SoftBank acquired Vodafone Japan and then the US company Sprint Nextel, then British ARM Holdings in 2016. Takeda acquired US Millennium Pharmaceuticals in 2008, then Swiss Nycomed in 2011, with the biggest M&A ever by a Japanese company, acquiring Ireland’s Shire in 2019.

“Growing overseas means the development of our human resources has become an urgent necessity” said the President of Takeda in 2006, Yasuchika Hasegawa. Hasegawa was seen as “an alien from outerspace” for his dry, rational management style, arising from many years working in the USA. Although Takeda had been the biggest pharmaceutical company in Japan for some years, it only ranked around 17 in the world before its acquisition spree and urgently needed to find new drug development sources. It felt it was lagging competitors.

The need for global management skills

Hasegawa decided to globalise the company internally by recruiting a foreign successor to himself in 2014 – Christophe Weber from GlaxoSmithKline. Three out of the seven current Takeda directors are not Japanese.

Japan Tobacco‘s managers sent overseas after the Gallaher acquisition found themselves caught between overseas executives determined to defend their patch with rational, logical arguments about productivity, logistics and profitability. After years of painful discussion, it was agreed to close the factory in Northern Ireland. Even now, says Masamichi Terabatake, the current President of Japan Tobacco, a Japan based executive needs to be prepared to travel around the world regularly to discuss strategy with local executives. “You need to keep global staff motivated. Investment and marketing cannot be left vague, they have to be quantitative so they can be transparently discussed. That’s probably why executives in the West are a bit younger!” he says.

NSG acquired UK’s Pilkington in 2006, becoming heavily indebted to do so. From being very domestic, it became a company whose sales were 80% overseas. Unfortunately this proved to be terrible timing as the automotive and architectural glass market crashed after the Lehman Shock.

Many of the acquirers also struggled because they did not have managers with experience of managing overseas businesses. As Nikkei Business magazine says, mega M&A means mega complexity for which plenty of preparation and a high level of management know-how, with the ability to spread this know-how horizontally and vertically is needed for success. It’s still not clear how far Japanese companies have progressed in this.

Rudlin Consulting has assisted many European companies acquired by a Japanese parent. Please contact Pernille Rudlin for further details.

The enduring Japanese family firm

I attended a Japan Society talk last month on shinise (Japanese family firms) – given by academics Innan Sasaki and Davide Ravasi. Sasaki and Ravasi argued that shinise have survived over 100 years, by keeping small and focused on traditional crafts like sweet making, sake brewing, and textiles. They are very much embedded in the society and community in which they operate – the highest concentration is in Japan’s old capital, Kyoto. In return for their commitment to the local community, they gain a social status and support from the community. They are meant to have a higher moral purpose than pure profit and therefore do not seek to take risks and grow much beyond their current geography and sector – which means they are more resilient to external economic shocks. When downturns happen locally, they survive through the strength of local support. This contrasts with what Sasaki and Ravasi call “instrumental” firms, who exist for a purely economic purpose.

Even large Japanese multinationals behave like Kyoto shinise

Listening to their descriptions of shinise‘s motivations and behaviours, I realised they were very similar to the way I describe bigger, multinational Japanese firms in my seminars. Even though Japanese multinationals have taken the risk to expand overseas, and are often no longer owned by the founding family, the ethos of having a higher moral purpose than shareholder value, of corporate contribution to society and strong risk aversion to ensure longevity still endures.

And like the shinise, the darker side is the sacrifices needed to be regarded as a proper member of the family firm and the difficulty of becoming a senior manager if you were not born into it – or at least recruited straight from university like Japanese headquarter permanent staff.

Nikkei Business magazine had a feature last month on family firms in Japan showcasing research that family owned firms in Japan perform better than non-family owned firms in terms of Return on Assets. “They don’t hold on to unnecessary assets” says Professor Yasuhiro Ochiai of Shizuoka University.

Japanese family owned multinationals that have performed well

DMG Mori is still owned by the Mori family and has been particularly active recently in M&A overseas since the current Mori took over as President in 1999, most notably in their merger with German machine tool manufacturer DMG. Apparently quite a few of DMG Mori’s employees come from the wider “family” of customers and suppliers.

Of course the most famous Japanese company still managed by a founding family member is Toyota. However the current President Akio Toyoda is adamant that the company name is Toyota, the family name is Toyoda, and Toyota is not a Toyoda family company, “it’s everyone’s company.”

Those that are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and also active in Europe were:

Suntory (Torii family – founded by Shinjiro Torii in 1899) – chairman is from the founding family.
Aisin (automotive parts maker in the Toyota group founded in 1949 – chairman is part of the Toyoda founding family)
Shimano (Founded 1921, president is a Shimano)
DIC (Dainippon Ink) founded in 1908 by Kijiro Kawamura, a Kawamura is on the board of directors

And how to avoid toxic family rows

It’s not all joy in a family of course. Nikkei Business also looks at the family rows that have affected the performance of companies like Idemitsu (petroleum company) founding family shareholders fighting a merger with Showa Shell and the rebellion against founding family member Yoichiro Ushioda and chairman by executives of LIXIL (owners of German bathroom fittings company Grohe).

Nikkei Business’s prescription for avoiding trouble is:

Frequent communication between family members
Treat family members who are employees the same way as other employees in terms of company regulations
Don’t withhold information for family only, be transparent in management
Don’t appoint a successor from the family if there is noone suitable
Keep family assets and company assets separate
When there is a generation changeover, keep criticisms to yourself
Avoid too many family members as employees
Ensure a structure is in place to stop family members going rogue

For more on what being a “family” means for Japanese firms and the non-Japanese employees that work for them, this was one of my most popular articles in recent years.

4 cultures of controlling overseas subsidiaries

During a recent trip to Japan I visited Amazon’s offices to have lunch with an acquaintance who has been working there for 1 year and 3 months. He told me that Amazon has expanded so rapidly this past year that he is now in the upper half of a chart which shows all employees ranked by their length of time working for the company.

He also told me that almost all the non-Japanese people working there were, like him, locally hired and that there were hardly any expatriate staff from the US headquarters. I therefore wondered how Amazon HQ could control a subsidiary which is growing so rapidly without any expatriate managers to keep monitor it.

Amazon also tries to minimize the number of processes and procedures it has, in order to maintain the speedy, fast to market, start up mentality it had when it first began over twenty years’ ago.

The 3 usual ways to control overseas operations

In the various multinationals and their subsidiaries I have worked in or with, you can usually find three types of headquarter control. American, sales focused companies tend to control their subsidiaries by setting numerical targets. If the subsidiary employees and managers hit the targets, they get bonuses, if they miss them, they get fired. Many multinationals who are not American in origin use these systems because numbers are easy for everyone to understand, regardless of language.

Another way of managing subsidiaries which both European and American multinationals also use is to ensure compliance through having strong regulations, processes and systems, and clear hierarchical chains of command, so everyone knows who has responsibility and authority for each part of the business.

A third way, which is more common among Japanese companies and also companies such as the German Mittelstand, family owned companies, is “control by the family” – in other words members of the headquarters family are sent out to subsidiaries to monitor what is going on and promote the corporate culture.

Amazon’s way

My Amazon contact explained that Amazon ensures its employees behave in compliance with Amazon’s core values by having a very rigorous hiring process. Candidates are interviewed several times by multiple employees and asked questions about past experiences, to reveal what kind of mindset they have.

I can imagine, however, that it is difficult for Japanese companies to use this method if their overseas subsidiaries were the result of an acquisition, or if the company has already been operating overseas for several decades. There will already be a substantial legacy of staff who may have rather different values and behaviours to those of the Japanese headquarters.

It would also be a mistake, and damaging to the benefits of having diverse, localised operations that are close to their customers, to impose too rigid a set of behaviours and values on all overseas employees.

Nonetheless, I strongly recommend that Japanese companies who are about to acquire or set up operations overseas ensure they have a clear, globally understandable company mission and values (rinen) and hire or promote their overseas employees accordingly.

This article appears in Pernille Rudlin’s latest book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

Murata – reinjecting enjoyment into corporate philosophy

Murata is one of Japan’s most quietly successful companies, with a 40% share of global sales of the tiny ceramic capacitors that are essential to the electronics industry.

Tsuneo Murata, 3rd president from the founding family, says in an interview in Nikkei Business that the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001 was a turning point for the corporate culture. They had become too arrogant during the IT bubble of the 1990s and had stopped listening to customers. They did not recover as quickly in the early 2000s as rivals did. Tsuneo Murata, who was then EVP, asked board members and employees for their views on the company culture and what was preventing recovery. He was told the company had become conservative, cautious, inflexible, bureaucratic and slow.

So he set up an organisational cultural reform committee It was tasked with ensuring that the culture became one which adapted rapidly to a changing environment, where the genba (shopfloor) had autonomy and people could freely discuss, create and challenge.

The need for persistence in cultural reforms

Murata became President in 2007. Even with the Lehman Shock walloping profits shortly after, he insisted on continuing with cultural reforms. He went back to the founding philosophy of Akira Murata, to rediscover the sense of freedom that Murata used to have. Actually the philosophy does not mention freedom. In translation it says pretty much what many Japanese corporate philosophies say – contributing to society through innovative technology, building trust, working in partnership, etc. The one part that isn’t translated into English is the word “yorokobi“, meaning to enjoy. To me that’s the most important bit – a lot of Japanese companies have lost their sense of fun since the 2000s.

It sounds like the success of Murata is as much to do with Tsuneo Murata’s personality. Since becoming President he continues to eat in the same canteen as workers in the headquarters in Kyoto and does not use the executive elevator (unless in an emergency). “I don’t think there’s a single employee that does not like him” says one employee.

He is asked by Nikkei Business how he ensures a common understanding of corporate culture when Murata acquires other companies – for example, IPDiA in France in 2016. “It takes time, especially when it’s a foreign acquisition, because generally overseas employees are not as loyal to their companies as in Japan anyway. But if we introduce our corporate philosophy to them, they have empathy with it. I think it’s important to communicate it thoroughly.”

Chipping away at the three treasures of Japanese HR

Several Japanese blue chip companies have announced some quite radical changes to their HR systems, just in time for the new Reiwa era. The so called three treasures of lifetime employment, seniority based pay and a company union have been looking a little tarnished for some years now. They seem a legacy not even of the Heisei era but of the post war Showa era of a booming economy and a need to retain a young workforce.

Hitachi had shown the way four years ago (as described in our blog post at the time), abolishing seniority based pay for its managers and replacing it with pay based on job roles. They have made further waves recently with the announcement of the first ever Hitachi subsidiary President to be in their forties. The newly formed Hitachi Global Life Solutions will be led by Jun Taniguchi, born in 1972.

Hitachi claim that this new system is needed for the company to be truly global and able to appoint and transfer managers around the world, regardless of where they were recruited. Beer and soft drink manufacturer Asahi Group Holdings has also been shifting to global standards. Around half their employees are non-Japanese, as a result of their acquisitions of European brands such as Peroni, Grolsch and Fullers. They have said their Presidents and CEOs will be evaluated on return on equity from now on, and given the boot if it is not maintained above 13%.

Japanese megabank MUFG says it will reduce new hires in Japan by 45% to 530 next spring, and will cut the 6000 employees in its Tokyo headquarters by half. Not all Japanese HR traditions are being thrown out of the window, however, as the surplus 3000 will not be made redundant, but rather redeployed to sales functions or sent overseas to areas where MUFG is expanding like the USA and Asia (but not it seems, Europe). MUFG is automating the functions that these staff performed, as well as cutting many of its retail branches in Japan. It will instead be beefing up its overseas compliance and digital payment systems divisions.

Some Japanese politicians and commentators have said that the “rei” of Reiwa sounds rather cold, as it can sometimes mean “order” or “command”. It also, when combined with the radical for water, becomes a character meaning chilly or freezing. It certainly feels like some icy winds will be blasting through Japanese cosy HR traditions in the new era.

Hitachi acquisition of ABB power grid business is a “Black Ship” to push globalization

It’s been 10 years since Hitachi made its record breaking loss and Takashi Kawamura became Chairman and President. Kawamura was chairman when Hitachi decided to buy Horizon Nuclear Power in the UK in 2012, and he now says he was one of the more cautious faction. “Costs pile up long before you’ve even produced one kilowatt of energy so I made it clear that we needed to set various points at which we will decide whether to proceed or not with the project”. Takashi Kawamura is now chairman of Tokyo Electric Power, so has not managed to escape the nuclear power industry despite his cautiousness.

Hiroaki Nakanishi lasted 4 years as President from 2010 to 2014, when Toshiaki Higashihara, also interviewed in the same Nikkei article, became President. Higashihara has not only frozen the Horizon project but acquired Swiss company ABB’s power grid business in 2018. “Globalization has not been achieved yet” for Hitachi he believes. He tells employees that the ABB acquisition is a Black Ship he has invited in, just like the foreign pressure to open up Japan in the Meiji Revolution, to change Hitachi and push globalization further.

Hitachi is shifting more into services and believes it has the right product and solution mix to for the “Internet of Things”. Sales may not grow much – for services business the point is to improve profitability, rather than sales volume, Higashihara points out.

Kawamura also says the old ways, of life time employment and being a generalist have to come to an end. Hitachi offered retraining for people employed in the businesses he shut down or spun out, like the semi conductor business, but many of them had expected to stay at Hitachi all their life, and not to have to find work elsewhere.

Higashihara goes on to say the next leader needs to be able to manage globally, in particular, to be able to communicate, across generations, nationalities, sexuality and gender. “If they seem to have the right balance of qualities, it would not be a surprise if it was a foreigner” who succeeds him. That is likely to be soon, as Higashihara has been president for 5 years now, and 6 years is usually considered to be the maximum for Presidents in companies such as Hitachi. Maybe the Black Ship has brought some potential candidates with it, or Hitachi Rail’s former CEO Alistair Dormer, now Representative Executive Officer, Executive Vice President and Executive Officer of Hitachi Ltd is being lined up for the job.

Nissan and Ghosn – the cycle of coups d’état reaches back to the 1960s

I always prefer coincidence or cock-up to conspiracy, and former journalist and PR consultant Masaki Kubota clearly feels the same way, judging by the first few paragraphs of his article on Carlos Ghosn and Nissan in Diamond magazine.

As he says, in his years as a journalist, it was the standard defence of any Japanese executive caught up in a scandal that it was a conspiracy of people out to get him.

With Ghosn, you could easily claim, as many have, that this was a conspiracy, born of some kind of alliance between insiders at Nissan who wanted to get rid of Ghosn, his ex-wife and the Japanese government, and this kind of accusation is handy both for Ghosn and the French government or Renault who might have wanted Ghosn to continue to be influential.

But then Kubota does a classic kishotenketsu twist, pointing out the history of Nissan, going back to Ghosn’s installation and even before, is one of a cycle of coup d’etats.

Starting with the most recent history, of the inspection scandals – the exposure of the problem was a way of resisting the inspection system that Ghosn’s management team had introduced, shortly after Saikawa (identified as one of Ghosn’s team) became the new President of Nissan. It was in effect an abortive coup d’état.

Going further back to 1999 the then President Yoshikazu Hanawa was in negotiations with Daimler Chrysler and Ford but instead installed three Renault executives, without even consulting the previous Presidents who were advisors to the company at the time. “It was a kind of a coup d’état” the Nikkei said at the time.

Purging the Don

Even further back, to the 1980s, when the Chairman and former President for 16 years from 1957 was Katsuji Kawamata, there was a coup which led to the purge of union power at Nissan in Japan. It was well known that Kawamata gained his power through cooperating with the Nissan group labour union leader Ichiro Shioji. But then in 1984, Shioji, who was seen as the main obstacle to Nissan opening its factory in Sunderland UK and before that in the US, was hit by a scandal – photos appeared in the weekly magazine Focus, of Shioji on a yacht with a beautiful young woman. Criticism of Shioji, as “the Don”, mounted and he resigned on 22^nd February 1986. The Nikkei reported on this as “the 2.22 coup d’état” a reference to the 26^th February Incident, a failed coup attempt in Japan in 1936. It was said that the power behind the 2.22 coup was Takashi Ishihara who was in favour of global expansion, and was the President at the time.

Ishihara had been involved in an earlier coup, when he was still at managing director level in 1969. Documents were leaked to the media about an incident involving a Nissan microbus. It became clear that this was done in order to purge the upper ranks of the company.

As Kubota says, when there is a fraud in a company, this is often results in a clear out of those in the upper levels of management who are to blame. In fact, this kind of incident has been quite rare at Nissan, so when it happens, it is likely that it is part of a major change in strategic direction. So, Kubota asserts, it is definitely a coup d’état. In Kubota’s experience, it is hard to change a corporate culture that easily, so if Nissan is used to changing strategies by coup d’état, then it will continue to use this mechanism.

Corporate culture will not change just because foreign executives are put in place

Corporate culture will not change just because foreign executives are put in place. Kubota reminds us that for Saikawa to criticize Ghosn so strongly, when Ghosn has not yet been put on trial, is certainly a change from the usual crisis management of Japanese companies.

Kubota sees this singling out of Ghosn by Saikawa, who worked so closely with Ghosn for many years, as a kind of personal insurance.

So where does Saikawa fit in? Kubota has dug out the fact that Saikawa was executive assistant to the President from 1992, Yoshifumi Tsuji. Tsuji had taken over from Yutaka Kume, who had succeeded Ishihara, the instigator of the coup against union Don Shioji. Saikawa was therefore part of the team that survived the Renault coup.

So it goes round. As Kubota puts it, even in the midst of this coup d’état, there will be people wondering whether they will be the next to be stabbed.

Category: Management and Leadership