Category: Foreign Direct Investment

  • 10 Years on from Brexit – Japanese Nationals in the UK

    10 Years on from Brexit – Japanese Nationals in the UK

    What do the trends in Japanese residents overseas tell us about Japan’s relations with the UK and the rest of the world?

    Headline findings

    • The headline number for Japanese nationals in the UK is deceptively stable concealing a rise in permanent residents, overtaking those on long term visas as the majority
    • The UK has shifted from being a posting destination for corporate Japan and a place to study for Japanese students towards being a settlement destination for individual Japanese
    • Brexit accelerated trends in the UK that were already there, globally, since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-9
    • The number of students who were Japanese nationals on degree courses in the UK of over a year declined due to financial issues, and the number of students who were Japanese nationals on shorter courses declined due to student visa regulations tightening
    • The decline in Japanese corporate expatriation is explained by cost (exchange rate and visa costs), access to the EU market and growth prospects

    Overview

    The headline number for Japanese nationals in the UK is deceptively stable: 63,011 Japanese nationals lived in the UK in 2011 and 62,270 in 2025. Underneath, the population has been transformed.

    Long-term residents – the category that contains students enrolled in degree courses and corporate rotational staff and their families – peaked at 50,016 in 2013 and has fallen almost every year since the Brexit referendum, to 32,315 in 2025, a decline of 35% from the peak.

    Permanent residents have moved in exactly the opposite direction, nearly doubling from 15,325 in 2011 to 29,955 in 2025. The UK has shifted from being a posting destination for corporate Japan and a place to study for Japanese students towards being a settlement destination for individual Japanese.

    Between 2015 and 2018 – after the Brexit referendum was called, through the vote and the Article 50 uncertainty, but before COVID – UK long-term Japanese residents fell 25.9%, from 49,066 to 36,351. Over the same three years the equivalent population rose 3.5% in Germany, 8.7% in France, 31.8% in the Netherlands, 6.0% in Australia and was flat in the USA. The UK was the only major host country losing Japanese long-term residents in that window.

    The UK continues to be the sixth largest host globally of Japanese nationals but the Japanese population in other large host countries such as Australia, Canada and Germany has grown by double figures over the same period. Overall, the number of Japanese living overseas has declined by only 1.4% from 2015-2025.

    Is Brexit the cause of Japanese nationals working or studying elsewhere? As we shall see, Brexit accelerated trends that were already there. The UK government was trying to restrain the number of foreign students coming to the UK even before the referendum, as a means to reduce total immigration numbers. These new restrictions undoubtedly impacted Japanese students, along with a weak yen in 2014-5.

    The repeat of a weakening yen since 2021 and the rising expense and stricter criteria for working visas, added to the reduced attraction of investing in a post-Brexit UK as a gateway to the EU. This has undoubtedly caused the further decline in corporate long term visa holders.

    Something impacted the UK more than the rest of the world 2015-2019

    The total number of Japanese nationals in the UK shows a slow, bumpy decline of around 9% over the past 10 years. There was growth from 2012 to a peak of 68,000 in 2015, falling to just over 62,000 in 2025. There was some recovery around 2019 and again after the pandemic, but not back to previous levels.

    Figure 1. Japanese nationals in the UK, 2012–2025 (total, with trend line). Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Rudlin Consulting.

    Looking at the global picture, there are some similar patterns to the UK, suggesting that there are global or at least Japanese domestic trends at play – such as its shrinking, ageing population and the weakening yen. The total of Japanese nationals living overseas grew every year to a peak in 2019 of 1.4 million, and then declined to 2024, only slightly recovering in 2025, to 1.3 million. This represented an 8% decline from 2019 to 2025, but only a 1.4% decline 2015-2025, compared to -9% in the UK over the same 2015-25 period.

    The UK continues to be the 6th biggest host of Japanese nationals worldwide, but the total number of 60,000 or so is dwarfed by the USA, which has over 416,000 Japanese nationals, a decline from a peak in 2018 of 447,000 – a trend which is very similar to the trends in overall global totals.

    The other major contributor to the global decline since 2019 in Japanese nationals overseas is the significant drop in Japanese nationals living in China. This has been in steady decline since 2012.

    The decline in Japanese resident in China may be a combination of two factors – a maturity after the initial China boom, when Japanese manufacturing invested heavily in setting up operations in China, and also a sign of the deteriorating relationship between China and Japan, starting from when Japanese businesses were targets of demonstrations in 2012, and Japanese people, including women and children, being attacked in Chinese cities as recently as this year.

    Figure 2. Japanese nationals in Europe, 2012–2025: leading host countries and their change over the period.

    There has been consistent growth in resident Japanese nationals throughout the 2012-2025 period in Australia (+34%), Canada (+35%) and Germany (+15%).

    Understanding why the UK has fared differently to fellow Anglophone countries such as the USA, Australia and Canada, and also other European countries such as Germany and France requires closer examination of the two major categories of residency.

    Figure 3. Japanese nationals overseas, 2012–2025: the largest host countries.

    Long term visa holders versus permanent residents

    The two main categories used by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for tracking Japanese nationals overseas are permanent resident and long term visa holder. Long-term visa holders mainly consist of corporate expatriates and students, academics and researchers and include anyone with a visa of 3 months or more in duration.

    This latter category does not map directly onto UK visas, however. Academics coming to the UK to research, teach or attend conferences can get a standard visa of up to 12 months. Students coming for courses of under 6 months can enter the UK on a standard visitor visa, as can academics and researchers.

    If we break down the total into these two categories, a strong trend emerges for Japanese nationals in the UK, which is that on current projections, the number of permanent residents will outstrip the number of long term visa holders in the near future.

    Figure 4. Japanese permanent residents vs long-term visa holders in the UK, 2012–2025, with linear projections.

    Looking back to 2002, it also becomes clear that the bumpiness in trends over the past twenty years are mostly due to changes in the numbers of long term visa holders, versus steady growth in permanent residents.

    Figure 5. Japanese permanent residents and long-term visa holders in the UK, 2002–2025.

    Again this reflects global trends for Japanese nationals – in 1991, 38% (251,000) of Japanese nationals overseas (663,000) were permanent residents. By 2025, 45% (588,000 – a record high) of Japanese nationals overseas were permanent residents.

    Within Europe, the larger countries that now have more permanent resident than long term visa holding Japanese nationals are Sweden (since at least 1997), Switzerland (since 1999 ) and Italy (since 2023).

    Globally, amongst the larger countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and the USA all have a majority of permanent residents amongst the Japanese nationals they host. This is partly down to historical factors – countries such as Brazil, Argentina and the USA were recipients of large numbers of migrants from Japan in the late nineteenth and early 20th centuries.

    Many of the descendants of these migrants have retained their Japanese nationality and passports by birthright and only have permanent resident status in the country of their birth. Japan is one of the few countries in the world that does not allow dual nationality.

    Conversely, the number of long term visa holders globally has declined from a peak in 2019 of 891,000 to 710,000 in 2025. This decline is apparent across all the major hosts of Japanese nationals, but the onset of the decline and the degree of recovery from the pandemic varies from country to country.

    Long term visa holders are affected by exchange rate related expense, safety concerns and visa regulations.

    For the USA there has been a 27% fall in the number of long term visa holders since 2012 and no signs of recovery since the pandemic.

    For China, the fall is even more precipitous – 42% since 2012 , and the trend continued after the pandemic.

    The number of long term visa holders in Thailand grew 27% overall since 2012, presumably as an alternative base to China, but has not grown since the 11% drop during the pandemic. Australia is the most positive story – growing 18% overall, and recovering since the pandemic with a 10% growth in long term visa holders over 2023-2025.

    The decline in the number of long term visa holders in the UK is nearly as stark as China’s – an overall decline of 34% since 2012 including a 15% drop after the pandemic.

    Why did the number of Japanese long term visa holders in the UK start to decline from 2015?

    The number of long term visa holders in the UK held fairly steady from 2012 to 2015, at around 50,000. It then fell to 45,000 in 2016 and continued to fall to 2019, when there was a brief recovery, only to fall during the pandemic, with a continuing decline since.

    For other European countries, however, the number of long term visa holders stayed stable or even grew 2015-2019 in Europe overall. Again, there was a drop during the pandemic, but some signs of recovery 2023-2025.

    Figure 6. Japanese long-term visa holders in Europe (excluding the UK), 2012–2025.

    Corporate expatriates vs student and academic visas

    To analyse this difference between European countries further, we need to look at the two largest categories for long term visa holders – corporate expatriates and student and academic visas.

    Unfortunately the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs data only shows these categories by country for 2005 to 2017. We have added in a trend line for the UK charts below, and as can be seen, there was a significant drop in the number of academic visas from 2015 (preceded by a sudden rise the year before) and after a decline around the time of the Lehman Shock, corporate expatriate visas remained fairly steady to 2017.

    The UK had been the second largest host of Japanese nationals with academic, research or student visas in 2011, after the USA. It lost the number two spot to Australia over the 2015 to 2017 period, when visa holders in that category in the UK fell by a third – from 16,636 to 11,189 (not including dependants). The UK was the only country out of the major hosts of academic visas to experience such a major decline in Japanese student numbers. Canada was not far behind the UK in 2017 and may well have overtaken it in the years after. France and Germany held steady.

    Figure 7. Japanese nationals in the UK on corporate or academic visas (excluding family), 2005–2017, with trend lines.

    If we add in the dependents and family they bring with them, then the picture looks like this:

    Figure 8. The same categories including accompanying family.

    The gender balance and dependants

    One point to note is that around 66% of those Japanese nationals on academic or student visas were female in 2005 and 64% in 2017. 21% of those on corporate expatriate visas were female in 2005 and 26% in 2017.

    There was only one dependant for every eight student or academic visa holders in 2005, and around one dependant for every five student/academic visa holders in 2017. This was significantly lower than for other nationals such as students from Nigeria (more than one dependant per student) or India – around 1 dependant for every three students. Whereas there was around one dependant per Japanese corporate expatriate visa holder throughout the same period.

    It is also worth noting that around 70% of the dependants of corporate expatriates were female, reflecting the traditional pattern of the wife being the trailing spouse – or if the woman was herself on a corporate expatriate visa, being a younger, single woman.

    For the academic and student visas, around 60% of the dependants were female, again perhaps reflecting that women students and academics tend to be single, whereas the male academics and students are often accompanied by their female partners and children. This may well have fed into the rise in Japanese permanent residents – single women coming to the UK to study, meeting a romantic partner and deciding to settle in the UK.

    So what happened around 2015 to impact Japanese student, researcher and academic visa holders in the UK?

    The changes to student visas introduced in 2015 would have had a strong negative impact on Japanese students who were looking to join English language school courses, foundation years or A-level or pathway programmes, as a Secure English Language Test was introduced – which had to be taken at a UK Visas and Immigration-approved test centre. There were only two such centres in Japan – in Tokyo and Osaka. Biometric identification was also required. Ordinary IELTS tests taken outside a UKVI-approved centre were no longer accepted for visa purposes; only the ‘IELTS for UKVI’ test counted.

    The British Council’s research and JASSO analysis subsequently pointed to these changes as a contributing factor to the roughly 13% fall in Japanese exchange students to the UK between 2015/16 and 2016/17, a drop that the US and Australia — which did not impose equivalent restrictions — did not experience.

    There was a transitional window, which might explain the upward blip in visas obtained in 2014 – to avoid the new regulations in 2015.

    For degree level students there were no changes to the previous regime but the financial requirements were tightened. Students were required to demonstrate they held sufficient maintenance funds — tuition fees plus £1,020/month for London or £820/month elsewhere (for up to 9 months), held continuously for 28 days before the visa application. The abolition of the “established presence” provision meant students who had been in the UK for some time could no longer use a more relaxed evidential standard; everyone had to show the full funds upfront.

    This would have impacted the Japanese nationals who had come over with their parents on a corporate expatriate visa, gone through the British education system and now wanted to study at a British university. A child of a Japanese and British parents can have dual nationality until they are 20, but would have to choose which one to keep at that point. Given the expense of international student fees, this may have motivated some of them to register with UK universities as a domestic British student.

    To add to the financial requirements, the Japanese yen had been weakening and approached ¥195 to the £ in 2015. It then strengthened against the £ in 2016-2020, but has since weakened again. It is notable that the yen did not weaken as much against the Canadian or Australian dollar.

    Figure 9. The yen against the pound, dollar, Australian and Canadian dollars, 2012–2025 (annual averages; right-hand panel indexed to 2012 = 100).

    It seems highly likely then that the number of students who were Japanese nationals on degree courses of over a year declined due to financial issues, and the number of students who were Japanese nationals on shorter courses declined due to student visa regulations tightening – or that those students may have switched to a standard visitor visa instead. Many students went to cheaper countries and courses.

    What explains the decline in corporate expatriates?

    While corporate expatriate numbers held steady from 2015 to 2017 at around 8,500 (principals only, not including dependants) or so, over the 2005 to 2017 period there was a 16% decline – compared to the 35% decline for academic and student visas – which mainly related to the 2015-2017 period. The peak for Japanese corporate expatriates in the UK was in 2007, at 11,000, dropping to 9,200 in 2008 and to 8,151 in 2009, then holding steady to 2017. It seems likely then that the first event to have a negative impact on Japanese corporate expatriation to the UK was the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-9.

    As noted above, the publicly available Ministry of Foreign Affairs data stopped splitting long term visa holders into corporate and student/academic categories from 2017. It is hard therefore to estimate to what extent the steady decline in long term visa holders in the UK since 2019 was due to fewer Japanese corporate expatriates.

    A further data source on Japanese corporate expatriates is the annual directory issued by Toyo Keizai. Their data gathering is reliant on companies completing their annual survey, so only shows part of the picture, but the response rate seems to be fairly consistent over the years, so may at least indicate the overall trends.

    There was a decline of around a third across the main European hosts of Japanese nationals from 2015/6 to 2025/6. Germany (28% decline) overtook the UK (29% decline) as the top host in 2019/20 but is converging with the UK again. The decline in expatriate numbers was less steep in the Netherlands and Czechia and significantly higher than average in France, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Belgium.

    Figure 10. Japanese expatriates in Europe, 2015/16–2025/26 (Toyo Keizai / Rudlin Consulting).

    This seems to indicate that the impact of Brexit on the UK in terms of Japanese expatriates was in the context of an overall decline in Japanese expatriates to Europe, and the UK fared quite well. Our hunch is that the UK continued to be an important host for Japanese financial services sector companies and trading companies – who tend to have a large proportion of Japanese expatriates. The Netherlands fared better after Brexit due to the transfer of logistics and European functional hubs to the Netherlands, and Czechia probably attracted expatriates in the automotive sector.

    In conclusion, there were three key factors impacting Japanese corporate expatriate presence:

    Access to the EU market – the Netherlands, which combines EU membership with an English-speaking business environment, doubled its Japanese long-term population over the decade 2015-2025.

    The cost of moving staff – the immigration costs for working visas to the UK rose sharply just as the yen weakened: the Immigration Health Surcharge rose 66% in February 2024 to £1,035 per person per year, the Immigration Skills Charge rose 32% in December 2025 to £1,320 per year for large sponsors, and the combined upfront cost of a five-year UK Skilled Worker visa (around £12,500) has been estimated at roughly ten times the average of comparable countries.

    For a typical Japanese expatriate with a spouse and two children on a five-year posting, upfront immigration costs alone now exceed £30,000 – a real consideration when Tokyo HQ compares London with Amsterdam or Düsseldorf.

    The final factor is economic growth. Japanese multinationals are in search of growth overseas, to compensate for their ageing, declining population at home. The UK is currently in a chicken and egg situation. Japanese foreign direct investment can help the UK to grow, but it needs to be assured that the UK is indeed a growth market.

    Implications for policy makers

    In the interests of attracting further investment from Japan, some kind of special arrangement could be made for reducing the costs of intra-company transfer visas. Any positive impact of this, however, would be dampened by the UK being outside the EU for market access, the overall decline in Japanese corporate expatriation and the UK’s attractiveness in terms of economic growth relative to other European countries and other regions. The major Japanese companies are already in the UK and unlikely to leave – but also unlikely to expand greatly regardless of incentives. The most likely newcomers will be the small to medium size Japanese companies, possibly more recently established and in new, emerging sectors.

    The number of Japanese international students in the UK has always been relatively small compared to those of other nationalities, so it is unlikely that any move to encourage more Japanese students will be particularly controversial in terms of impacting immigration totals significantly. The Japanese government has announced that it is keen to encourage more Japanese students to study abroad, so would be open to such a proposal – and indeed agreements on Japanese scientific researchers transferring to the UK have already been signed. The weak yen is a major factor, however, which is out of the UK government’s control. There is pressure on the Japanese government to provide more funding for Japanese students to go abroad, to mitigate this.

    Implications for suppliers to Japanese companies

    The localization of Japanese companies’ senior management implies that the local decision makers and budget holders are increasingly locally hired Europeans or locally hired Japanese nationals with permanent residency. It may still be the case, however, that the final decision rests in Japan. In which case, having a presence in Japan, or making regular trips to there, will also be necessary part of the sales relationship.

    For a sector by sector analysis of Japanese companies and their employees and the impact of M&A in the UK and Europe over the past 10 years, please see our next report.

    © Rudlin Consulting Ltd 2026 · Source data: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas) and Toyo Keizai, consolidated by Rudlin Consulting.

  • Japan – EMEA business update April 2026

    Japan – EMEA business update April 2026

    NYK on the acquisition trail

    Stolt-Nielsen has confirmed it will sell 50% of its stake in its LNG bunkering and small-scale specialist Avenir LNG to Japanese shipowner NYK. NYK has also expanded its dry bulk business by taking full control of Norway’s Saga Welco, an open-hatch bulker specialist. NYK Holding Europe (NHE) will acquire Westfal-Larsen’s 50% stake in Tongsberg-based Saga Welco.

    Japan-owned National Car Parks collapses

    The UK company National Car Parks has gone into administration. It was acquired by Japanese company Park24 as a majority owner and the Development Bank of Japan in 2017 from Australia’s Macquarie Group. Employee levels peaked in 2018/9 at 1,181 but turnover halved during the pandemic and never recovered to pre-pandemic levels. Park24 is a major parking operator in Japan, most known for its Time brand. Presumably it was hoping National Car Parks was an opportunity for global growth, possibly with a view to expanding EV charging and car clubs to NCP properties. However servicing debt became unsustainable with lower turnover, fixed costs and reduced profit.

    Nippon Sheet Glass in talks to be acquired by US fund Apollo

    NSG acquired the UK’s Pilkington in 2006, spending 3 billion pounds ($3.98 billion at current rates). As Pilkington was larger, and more global than NSG, it was seen as a reverse takeover. Despite restructuring after the 2008 financial crisis, NSG continued to make losses over the past twenty years, due to a sales slump in the European market and competition from China. The interest on the debt incurred from the Pilkington purchase had become a heavy burden on the company. Pilkington had 2,353 employees in the UK in 2016 and now has 1,600, out of around 12,000 employees in the Europe, Middle East and Africa region – a similar level to around 10 years ago.

    Fujitsu to double European defence employees to 2,000

    The search for alternatives to US IT suppliers and the need to increase defence spending across Europe has prompted Fujitsu to plan on sending 1,000 staff (the Nikkei Asia article implies from Japan rather than recruiting locally) to Belgium, Germany and other NATO countries over the next few years.

    SMFG to acquire Jefferies?

    Japanese financial group SMFG considering acquiring US investment bank Jefferies – which has over 1200 employees in its European HQ in London and offices in Abu Dhabi, Amsterdam, Dubai, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Madrid, Milan, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, Warsaw, Zurich

    Japanese style convenience stores may be coming to Europe

    “Consumer sentiment in Europe approaches that of Japanese, with a strong focus on food quality,” said 7-Eleven CEO Dacus + “there is a strong demand to purchase high-quality food at affordable prices” https://asia.nikkei.com/editor-s-picks/interview/7-eleven-parent-eyes-13bn-investment-in-overseas-expansion

    Japanese food sector continues to go global

    Japan’s Zensho Holdings has expanded its European footprint with the acquisition via its UK subsidiary Wonderfield Group of Polish food group Sushi & Food Factor – a leading Polish producer of packaged sushi and convenience food products supplying to 15 countries in Europe. In 2025, Wonderfield opened a new state-of-the-art production facility in West London, to supply sushi and convenience products to retail partners across the UK.

    Nikon divests Mark Roberts Motion Control after 10 years

    Nikon has agreed to sell camera robotics specialist MRMC to UK investment firm Blandford Capital in what looks to be a Management Buy Out. Nikon acquired MRMC in 2016 and it has been struggling to make a profit over the past ten years. It employs just over 100 people in the UK.

    Bridgestone divests Exhaust, Tyres and Batteries

    Bridgestone has sold its 2018 acquisition of UK company Exhaust, Tyres and Batteries to Oak Tyres. The company has 4 warehouses across the UK and employs around 500 people.

  • Japan in the UK – The Brexit Agreement 5 and 10 years on

    Japan in the UK – The Brexit Agreement 5 and 10 years on

    It is five years ago today that David Henig,  director of the UK Trade Policy Project at the think-tank European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) and Pernille Rudlin, Managing Director of Rudlin Consulting, were the speakers for the Japan Society’s webinar – The Brexit Agreement One Month On

    Viewing it again, and looking at the data five years on, have our predictions stood the test of time?

    David Henig‘s 5 key points:

    1. No surprise that it was disruptive – this was the biggest change in international trade for many years, and would inevitably have a disruptive impact, particularly in terms of food and VAT. The disruption would lessen over time, but the barriers to trade and unpredictability of further impacts will not go away.
    2. Long-term economic adjustment will occur  – because of the barriers to trade – this will impact smaller companies particularly, and there will be a loss of manufacturing capability. There will be an absolute decline in goods trade. The impact on services is less clear – they are likely to be less affected, and there may even be an increase in the supply of remote services. There may also be a substitution of UK based production for imports.
    3. The UK government does not understand trade, in particularly the importance of non tariff barriers, and focuses too much on tariff reductions.
    4. Nissan was a national champion of getting a deal rather than a “no deal” – particularly getting a better deal on rules of origin for electric vehicles than might have been expected.
    5. The UK will seek to improve relations with the EU, after some interval – years rather than weeks or months. The UK could join the CPTPP and have deals with Australia and New Zealand. The US deal is likely to be delayed because Biden is not interested. These deals will not, however, have much impact on the British economy, which is likely to continue to be negatively impacted by Brexit.

    Pernille Rudlin’s “Big Theory of Brexit” for Japanese companies in the UK

    Pernille Rudlin described her Big Theory of Brexit as being that it had accelerated trends that were already there for Japanese companies. Japanese companies are highly risk averse, and had been preparing for a hard Brexit for six years already, and this had given them an incentive to undertake consolidation and restructuring which they might have been contemplating already.

    Three trends in Japanese companies in the UK 2016-2021

    Looking over the past five years (2016-2021), some trends were already apparent:

    1. The number of Japanese companies based in the UK has declined
    2. The number of UK based employees of Japanese companies has fallen since 2018
    3. Investment flows from Japan into the UK have decreased, with some disinvestment

    However this is from a high base, and very few Japanese companies are quitting the UK entirely – and it is unlikely they ever will.

    The 2026 update on the above 3 trends:

    1. The number of Japanese companies based in the UK has continued to decline since 2015, whereas there has been an increase in the number of Japanese companies hosted by other major European countries.

    2. The number of UK employees of Japanese companies has stagnated since 2018-9

    …with a small uptick in the past two years – resulting in a 20% net growth since 2015/6. This was lower than the overall growth in employees of Japanese companies in the Europe, Middle East and Africa region since 2015/6 which we estimate as being around 30%.

    3. Investment flows from Japan into the UK have decreased, with some disinvestment, but seem to be picking up again

    and the net flow over 2016-2024 was higher for the UK than for the Netherlands or Germany.

    Pernille then looked at sector by sector trends in the Japan Society webinar, for 2016-2021. Comparing this with what happened in the next five years to each sector will be covered in a later post.

     

     

  • Biggest foreign companies in Japan

    Biggest foreign companies in Japan

    It all depends on what you mean by big, of course. And, it turns out, what you mean by foreign.

    Our favourite way of measuring size and growth at Rudlin Consulting has been by numbers of employees, because ranking by capital or turnover risks comparing apples to oranges. Taking a look at the rankings compiled by Toyo Keizai, the top 10 foreign companies in Japan in terms of numbers of employees are:

    1. Accenture (25,000 employees)
    2. Gibraltar Life Insurance (12,003 – US parent company Prudential)
    3. Mitsubishi Fuso Truck and Bus (10,633 – German parent company Daimler Truck)
    4. Metlife (8,569 US parent company)
    5. Prudential Life Insurance (6,169 US parent company)
    6. AIG (6,064 US parent company)
    7. Proterial (5,759 was Hitachi Metals, now owned by Bain)
    8. Sharp (5,603, now owned by Taiwan’s Foxconn/Hon Hai)
    9. Starbucks (5,505 US parent company)
    10. Bosch (5,254 German parent company)

    It’s interesting to note that the majority of these companies are services sector, particularly insurance companies. Three out of the four manufacturing companies were originally Japanese but have been acquired by foreign companies. Some of the life insurance companies have also built up presence in Japan through acquisition, but are also divesting. Bosch also acquired a few Japan owned businesses but also divested its stake in Denso.

    Toyo Keizai has not designated a nationality or parent company for Accenture, presumably because of being a federation of local partnerships. Similarly, EY and Deloitte should be in the top 10 as both employ over 10,000 but because of the partnership structure are not included in Toyo Keizai Rankings.

    The rankings by capital (not market capitalization) are dominated by financial services sector companies:

    1. Nippon Paint (now majority owned by Singapore based Wuthelam Holdings)
    2. Metlife
    3. IBM Japan
    4. BNP Paribas Securities
    5. Citigroup Securities
    6. Axa Life
    7. Goldman Sachs Securities
    8. Bank of America Securities
    9. Gibraltar Life
    10. JP Morgan Securities

    The rankings by turnover are:

    1. Sharp
    2. Nippon Paint
    3. Microsoft Japan
    4. Chugai (owned by Roche)
    5. Proterial
    6. IBM Japan
    7. Mitsubishi Fuso Truck
    8. NOK (owned by German company Freudenberg)
    9. Accenture
    10. Mercedes Benz

    60% of these companies were originally Japanese.

    Looking at all three rankings, it’s not surprising to see that these companies are long established in Japan.  Looking at the newcomers, and the sectors of the future, there is a clear trend of IT, systems and software companies entering the Japanese market,  primarily from the USA, but also France, Germany, Luxembourg, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the UK. We’ve certainly seen a marked increase in enquiries for our services at Japan Intercultural Consulting from non-Japanese companies in this sector over the past couple of years. Japanese companies are embarking on digital transformation and further globalization, and the organisational change that this entails throws up plenty of cross cultural challenges both for the suppliers of digital technology and their clients.

    Japan Intercultural Consulting holds regular online seminars covering topics such as cross cultural communications, business trips to Japan and what Japanese customers want. 

  • The puzzle of Japanese foreign direct investment in the UK

    The puzzle of Japanese foreign direct investment in the UK

    Something has been puzzling me for a few years about Japanese foreign investment in the UK. The net investment by Japanese companies in the British “communications” sector since 2016 is US$55bn, over three times more than the next largest net investment, which was in the food manufacturing sector.

    chart showing Japanese foreign direct investment by sector in the UK

    There have been various acquisitions and investments over the past few years in British food manufacturers that I am aware of; Zensho acquiring Taiko Foods and Yo! Sushi, Mizkan acquiring various British food brands and factories for Branston, Haywards and Sarsons, Calbee acquiring Seabrook Crisps and various acquisitions in fish processing.

    But what Japanese “communications” companies could have invested billions in the UK? The Japanese term used by the Ministry of Finance for the communications sector is 通信業 (tsuushingyou) and the main players in Japan in this sector (perhaps in the UK we would use the term telecommunications) are considered to be NTT, KDDI and SoftBank. NTT and KDDI have been investing in data centers in the UK in recent years, and NTT placed its global non-Japan HQ in London, but surely this would not have cost tens of billions. Which leaves SoftBank.

    SoftBank spent US$6.5bn on acquiring ARM in 2016, which may account for the amount shown in 2017. But what about the $10bns thereafter, and the large withdrawal of over US$20bn in 2020? I am guessing this must be money moving in and out of SoftBank’s Vision Fund, which is headquartered in London and managed by SoftBank Investment Advisers.

    Another puzzle is what is going on in the services sector – US$33bn was invested in Britain 2016 and then a disinvestment of US$32bn in 2018, leaving a net investment of only US$661m. “Services” is a very large umbrella, and may have covered the shifting of European logistics, warehousing and headquarter services functions out of the UK and the capital to go with it, to the EU in preparation for Brexit.

    There were disinvestments in the finance and insurance sector in 2018, 2019 and 2022 but overall a net investment of US$6.7bn. Judging by the dates, the net positive total is “despite” Brexit and the Truss budget.

    Transportation equipment manufacturing, which would include car manufacturing saw a few instances of disinvestment, primarily related to Honda closing Swindon in 2021 and some of its suppliers shutting up shop in the UK. Overall, despite some tough years, the sector is $3bn in the black, in terms of net investment since 2016, helped by a $2bn investment in 2024. Japanese net investment in almost all other sectors apart from services has outstripped this, however.

    For comparison, the charts for the main investments in Germany and the Netherlands are given below:

    Chart showing Japanese FDI into Germany 2016 to 2024chart showing Japanese FDI into the Netherlands 2016 to 2024

    Comparing by sector, in finance and insurance, the Netherlands has yet again been the clear beneficiary of Brexit, receiving around US$21bn in net investment, with Germany receiving around around US$9bn, compared to US$6.7bn for the UK.

    For transportation equipment manufacturing, Germany is the clear winner with US$9.5bn net investment 2016-2024, compared to US$3.7bn to the UK and US$1.75bn to the Netherlands – even though Germany does not host any Japanese OEM car manufacturing.

    The investment by Japanese companies into the UK “communications” sector at US$55bn dwarfs the US$2.8bn invested in the Netherlands and US$1.5bn invested in Germany – which does reinforce the view that this is a SoftBank Vision Fund driven figure, rather than any actual investment in the British telecommunications infrastructure. You might have expected to see comparable investments from NTT in Germany and the Netherlands if it had been a business decision rather than an investment fund decision.

    Overall, the comparative advantages in trade and investment between the three economies, in Japanese eyes is clear – Britain – digital, services and communications (despite the SoftBank reality distortion effect), Germany – automotive and chemical related manufacturing and corporate banking and the Netherlands – continuing to be strong in food manufacturing, but now also seen as an EU base for financial services headquarters – effective from a tax perspective, but not needing as many employees as manufacturing.

    For further insights on Japanese foreign direct investment in the UK and EMEA financial services sector, our Japanese Financial Services in the UK and EMEA 2025 report and directory can be purchased and downloaded here

  • What is a Japanese company anyway?

    What is a Japanese company anyway?

    One of many jobs I did not get over the years was a board position for an investment trust focused on Japan. In the “any other questions for us?” bit at the end, I raised the issue of “how do you define a Japanese company? Is it enough just to say it is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange? Or headquartered in Japan?” In retrospect, a foolish question to ask at that point and the chair simply shut me down and said that was a topic for debate for another day. Which of course never happened. And a  year or two after that interview, I had a certain amount of schadenfreude watching the fund’s Net Asset Value take a dive.

    Is SoftBank?

    What triggered that question was that the fund had made a lot of money over the years investing in SoftBank, which is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and is headquartered in Japan, but to my mind, not really a Japanese company. This is not some racist point about the founder, Masayoshi Son, being ethnically Korean.  More that, as an investor, rather than just simply thinking of your portfolio as a series of aggregated regional or national risks, with each regional or national economy moving in a particular direction and counterbalancing each other, in the case of Japanese companies, another risk to consider might be the particular way that traditional Japanese companies behave and whether the fund is investing in those traditional Japanese companies, or emerging ones.

    Nissan – run by a Mexican, using Chinese batteries, manufactured in the UK for sale to the US?

    Even some of those traditional Japanese companies are no longer owned by Japanese shareholders. I was reminded of this by the recent coverage in the UK of the British government contributing a substantial part of the £1bn funding for an AESC electric vehicle battery factory to be built in Sunderland, to supply Nissan. AESC is described as “Japan-owned” but actually the controlling majority of shares is owned by Envision, a Shanghai based company. AESC’s headquarters are in Japan, however, and Nissan still owns some shares in it.

    That this news came a day after the announcement of a UK-US trade deal which will (if signed) dramatically reduce tariffs on UK cars being exported to the USA does not seem a coincidence – even though some commentators say this scanty deal was rushed through so as to be announced in time for the 80th anniversary VE day.

    Another announcement the UK government might have wanted to synchronise with was the leaked news that that the new, Mexican CEO of Nissan will announce tomorrow (13th May) plans to cut 20,000 jobs worldwide. Looking at the capacity utilisation and sales data for Nissan, Japan, the USA and China look likely to bear the brunt of this. Production has already ended in Argentina and India. Nissan will also announce that it is not going ahead with building a battery factory in Japan. So, using the Sunderland plant and the AESC factory for batteries for the new Leaf, and exporting to the USA looks like a plausible plan now and one that the UK government is presumably also happy to back.

    Other Nissan suppliers, traditionally Japanese, are also now foreign owned, depending on how you classify this. Marelli (which used to be Calsonic Kansei in the UK) and Vantec (a logistics company) are both now owned by KKR Japan – the Japanese operation of the US owned private equity and investment company, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts.

    Back to SoftBank again

    If you look at our 30 largest Japan-owned companies in the UK, employing around 65,000 people, you’ll see some surprising names such as Kwik-Fit and The Fulham Shore (owners of The Real Greek and Franca Manca), which was acquired by Toridoll, who have other more obviously Japanese brands such as Marugame Udon.  Other companies such as Stapleton’s Tyre Services, the Financial Times, Micheldever Tyre Services, Building Design Partnership and Liberata are also all acquisitions by Japanese companies. And of course, ARM, which was acquired by SoftBank in 2016 An acquisition which, according to the British government at the time, showed Britain’s economy can be successful after leaving the EU. SoftBank then tried to sell ARM to Nvidia, and finally floated it in 2023 – on NASDAQ, rather than the London Stock Exchange.

     

     

  • Hitachi Energy to expand operations in Sweden

    Hitachi Energy to expand operations in Sweden

    Hitachi Energy has announced it will invest $4.5bn in its Swedish and Indian operations over the next three years. Hitachi Energy is the product of Hitachi’s acquisition in 2020 of ABB’s power grids business. ABB was itself the product of the merger of the Swiss Brown, Boveri & Cie and the Swedish Allmänna Svenska Elektriska Aktiebolaget in 1988.

    In Sweden the investment will go towards expanding an existing factory and building a new plant, which will include a research and development center. It is expected the investment in Sweden and India will lead to an additional 3,500 employees. Hitachi Energy already has over 1,000 employees in Sweden.

  • MUFG Bank to invest in Hitachi’s UK based EV bus business

    MUFG Bank to invest in Hitachi’s UK based EV bus business

    Hitachi set up two companies in the UK in 2023 – Hitachi ZeroCarbon Battery Holding and Hitachi ZeroCarbon Ltd – which lease storage batteries for EV buses. The company has expertise in the maintenance and management of storage batteries, and provides storage batteries on a flat-rate subscription basis.

    MUFG Bank has just announced that it will initially invest £7.4m in the business and will further increase its investment in line with Hitachi ZeroCarbon’s business expansion. This is part of its  “business co-creation investment” strategy whereby it is increasing the supply of risk funds through co-investments in companies’ new businesses and investments in startups. So far, it has invested in companies such as Astroscale Holdings, a Japanese company which is working on removing space debris.

  • Japanese companies in “wait and see mode” for 2023 overseas expansion

    Japanese companies in “wait and see mode” for 2023 overseas expansion

    Japanese companies are increasingly in “wait and see” mode with regard to expanding their business overseas, according to a JETRO survey at the end of 2022. Although 43.5% of all those who responded to the survey (3,118) who already had operations outside Japan said they were going to invest further in their global business, this was outstripped by the 49.1% who said they would maintain their investment levels overseas “as is” and 5.2% who said they would reduce or withdraw from overseas business. This compares to 2019 where 66.9% who said they would invest more, 28.5% said they would maintain investment levels and 1.7% who were shrinking or withdrawing from overseas.  This trend is stronger in larger companies than small and medium sized ones. 51% of those respondents who did not have any overseas operations said they were not intending to invest outside Japan in 2022, compared to 40.9% in 2019.

    EU selected by 20.7%, UK by 2.6% for expansion

    Chemicals, foods, electrical machinery and software were the bright spots in terms of overseas expansion.  Top 3 destinations were USA (selected by 29.6%), Vietnam (26.5%) and China (26.4%), with the EU at number 4 (20.7%). The UK was 16th, selected by 2.6%. Product areas most focused on the EU were textiles and clothing and timber products – furniture and pulp.

    Reasons for choosing regions to expand in were primarily around market size and growth potential, that there is a concentration of purchasers there – interestingly there is a clear difference between the USA (most of the sectors being targeted being manufacturing, so presumably Japanese companies B2B sales to other Japanese or US companies) whereas to Vietnam it is non-manufacturing, and more B2C, logistics and construction.

    Onshoring

    13% of respondents with overseas operations have already onshored or are looking at onshoring, particularly in health and beauty products, petrochemical and plastic products and IT equipment and components. Unsurprisingly, the key reason cited by 60% for doing so was the increased cost of manufacturing outside Japan.  Other concerns are the falling yen and the long term the shortage of supplies – however it seems global logistics is becoming easier again.

    Business transformation and hiring non-Japanese employees

    In terms of changing business strategy or business model to deal with global trends, 30.5% said they were already undertaking business transformation, 39% said there was a need to change their strategy or model but they had not done it yet and 26.8% did not see any need for change.

    Those who were transforming their businesses were doing it through acquiring new personnel (both domestic and overseas), or redeploying existing personnel.  51.5% have now hired someone non-Japanese in Japan – the highest level yet.  A shortage of domestic personnel was the top reason for doing so, but not far behind were reasons to do with improving overseas marketing, management and negotiation strength, and also to globalise the HQ.

    33.5% are undertaking digital transformation in 2022, compared to 28% in 2021, particularly in financial services and IT services. Reducing carbon emissions is well advanced in Japan (78.4% of large companies are undertaking zero carbon initiatives) but not so advanced with their overseas supply chains, with 40.6% of large companies having taken any steps and only 11.6% of small and medium sized companies including their overseas supply chains in any initiatives. Japanese customers are more demanding on carbon emission standards than overseas customers – 17% of Japanese have asked for statements of compliance on carbon emissions, but only 12% of overseas customers have done so.

    Only 10% of Japanese companies have been conducting due diligence on human rights, but over 50% intend to do so within the next year. Over 50% of large Japanese companies have been asking for statements of compliance on human rights from their suppliers.

  • UK becoming like Japan in seeing overseas as growth driver

    UK becoming like Japan in seeing overseas as growth driver

    The spring 2022 Santander Bank Trade Barometer survey showed that 33% of UK businesses who were only domestic in focus up until now have ambitions to internationalise in the next three years – a greater proportion than in any previous survey. It was also the first time that overseas markets were seen as the most important driver of business recovery from the pandemic.

    With growth prospects looking dim in the UK and trade with the EU having become more difficult thanks to Brexit, British companies are seeing overseas markets as their main source of growth, just as Japanese businesses did when the economic bubble burst.  

    This conclusion is illustrated in the Santander report with a photograph of a geisha in a taxi, looking at a mobile phone, but according to the survey, the main non-EU overseas markets that British companies are interested in are the US and Australia, EU countries such as Germany and France, and then India and China – ahead of Japan. 

    The survey was of around 1000 UK businesses with a minimum £1m turnover. Those companies who already had business overseas said they are selling more into non-EU markets than before Brexit.  They saw the main operational challenges in most markets as shipping costs and bureaucracy. It was only for Japan that language and culture and having to adapt products and services accordingly were seen as the primary challenges. Perhaps deregulation in Japan and smoothing of inward investment has had an impact – bureaucracy in Japan was far less of a concern than for China, USA, India, Germany, UAE, Spain, Italy and France.  

    Of those British business who are currently domestic only, 42% are expecting to use online marketplaces and 40% are expecting use their own ecommerce site to sell their products. They will no doubt find that language and culture will indeed be an issue, even virtually, if they want to do business with Japanese customers. Their website will not only have to be translated, but their offering needs to be adapted to Japanese customer preferences. My belief is that physical presence in Japan is necessary for success, but only 20% are considering physical presence in the overseas markets.

    Those businesses who are UK domestic but are now looking overseas also say their primary source of advice on overseas business is the internet. Whereas those who already have experience of overseas business say their main source of advice is a business partner in the target market.

    I suspect many of these internet searches for advice will end up on our Japan Intercultural Consulting website, but it is notable that the only serious consulting enquiries we get are from companies who already have a physical presence or are about to set up an office in Japan. They have all been service sector companies – in recruiting, IT, advertising and financial services.

    For them, the key challenge in Japan is recruiting, managing and retaining good quality employees – which may be why partnering with a Japanese company is still a preferred route.

    This article by Pernille Rudlin first appeared in the Teikoku Databank News on 10th August 2022