M&A

Large, stable employers are important for the health of the community, whatever the country of origin

You may remember, though it feels like a lifetime ago given what has happened since, that the front pages of the British business press in early 2014 were full of debate about whether to welcome or be worried by the US pharmaceutical company Pfizer’s bid to take over AstraZeneca, a UK-Swedish company. The £63bn bid would have made it the biggest foreign takeover of a British company in history.

Initially the British government wanted to portray the bid as a vote of confidence in what they had done to make Britain an attractive destination for foreign investment. However, the former CEO of AstraZeneca, Sir David Barnes, said that he was concerned that Pfizer would “act like a praying mantis and suck the lifeblood out of their prey. “ Pfizer wants to move its tax domicile to Britain when it acquires AstraZeneca, to take advantage of the UK’s low corporate tax rate and what is called a “patent box”, which gives tax breaks for research.

If Pfizer want these tax incentives, it should invest in the UK itself, and not attempt to do it via a takeover, Sir David argued. Pfizer last hit the headlines in the UK when it closed down its 60 year old research facilities in the east of England, with the loss of nearly 2000 jobs, in 2011. A few years before that it closed R&D sites in Nagoya, Japan and the US. The reasoning at the time was that research was better outsourced to smaller companies.

I have not heard anyone say that this trend has reversed, yet AstraZeneca committed to investing £500 million in a new research facility and headquarters in Cambridge, which is the main science cluster in the UK. Pfizer say it would honour this investment, and the jobs that depend on it, for five years at least.

The consensus in the UK seemed to be that given Pfizer’s “accounting led” approach, such commitments may not be worth much. The US company Kraft also promised it would not cut jobs when it took over one of the UK’s most famous companies, the chocolate manufacturer Cadburys, in 2010, and then shortly after closed down one of its factories.

This does not mean that the UK is hostile to all foreign takeovers, however. Japanese companies are much more welcome, as they are seen as having long term commitment to their investments. Takeda’s acquisition of Swiss company Nycomed did lead to job losses but this is seen as inevitable after a merger.* It is the wholesale closure of a factory or R&D site with major impact on the community around it which troubles people in Europe.

Many of the British researchers laid off by Pfizer in 2011 have found jobs in small start ups, but not everyone can be an entrepreneur or has the personal resilience to go through the trauma of redundancy. When I ask participants in my training what they like about working in a Japanese company, they almost always mention the stability, the long term view and the loyalty of the company to its staff. Large, stable employers are important for the health of the community, whatever the country of origin.

* Takeda announced it would close its Cambridge Science Park R&D facility in August 2016. R&D activity will be concentrated in the US and Japan, and the UK will move from global coordination activities to European only. I wonder how long that will last if the European Medicines Agency moves out of the UK however.

This article originally appeared in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News on 11th June January 2014 and also appears in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

For more content like this, subscribe to the free Rudlin Consulting Newsletter. 最新の在欧日系企業の状況については無料の月刊Rudlin Consulting ニューズレターにご登録ください。

Brexit business opportunities for Japanese companies

A couple of Japanese expatriate business people with whom I was having lunch with recently both remarked how surprised they were that their British colleagues were quick to recover from the Brexit shock and think positively about the business opportunities it might bring. I too have been trying to be positive and have been doing some further research into how Japanese companies are evolving in the UK. The opportunities I have identified for Japanese companies in the UK are:

1. Africa and the Middle East

The UK has historic ties to Africa and the Middle East, which means that is still a good base for coordinating activities across those regions as there are many expatriates from and experts in those regions, who live in the UK, and are sources of information and management capability.

The UK government is going to be looking to boost trade to non-EU countries, as a counterbalance to any negative impact from Brexit on trade with the EU, so there is likely to be plenty of support for developing business with these regions.

It might even be easier than before to hire people from those regions in the UK. Although a vote for Brexit was partly to stop immigration to the UK, this was very much about preventing lower skilled people from Eastern Europe living in the UK. Most Japanese companies were not hiring such people in the first place, so I doubt any restrictions on this kind of immigration will have much impact.

Japanese financial services companies are already changing the status of non-UK branches to a European Union branch or incorporated subsidiary, and are strengthening their African operations, but it looks like those operations will still be reporting into the London office, which will act as an EMEA coordination function.

Japanese manufacturers have already shifted lower skilled, labour intensive production eastwards in Europe or to Africa and I assume Brexit will accelerate this trend, with the UK being a regional hub for engineering design and development expertise

2. Infrastructure

Despite the fact that manufacturing has moved eastwards or south to Africa, the British government is well aware that British people desperately want well paid, secure manual worker jobs to return to the UK. The most obvious way to do this is through public sector investment in transportation and energy. Hitachi and other such infrastructure companies should still find plenty of business, although it is not clear what will happen to EU funding for energy and transport infrastructure projects.

3. Acquisitions in the UK

As Softbank’s acquisition of ARM proved, there are still companies in the UK which are attractive acquisition targets, not as a gateway to the Single Market but because they are unique in terms of their brand, technology or expertise. For example, food and drink brands unique to the UK, Lloyds underwriters and UK advertising agencies have all recently been acquired by Japanese companies. It seems likely the weak pound and strong yen will continue for a while, so there may be some bargains for the brave.

This article originally appeared in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News on 14th September 2016 and is also published in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

Putting the Softbank/ARM deal in context – an exception in so many ways, is also not

To understand the sheer scale of the proposed £24bn Softbank acquisition of UK based chip designer ARM – we estimate it would increase investment by Japanese companies in the UK by over a half of the current cumulative total. Britain benefits more from Japanese investment than any other country in the world apart from the US and this deal would certainly maintain that claim, despite Brexit. By the end of 2014, the total value of Japanese investment in the UK was £38bn – to which should be added Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance’s acquisition of Amlin for £3.5bn in 2015.

There have been plenty of other acquisitions these past 15 years of UK iconic companies by Japanese companies, such as Nippon Sheet Glass acquiring Pilkington for £2.2bn in 2006 (interesting to note that ARM’s chairman is Stuart Chambers, who was CEO of Pilkington when NSG acquired it). The number of acquisitions probably accounts for the discrepancy between the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimate of the number of Japanese companies in the UK of 879 – rather lower than that of the Teikoku Databank figure of 1380 noted previously. Of these, 470 are classified as incorporated (as opposed to branch offices) and many, as we pointed out previously, cover the whole European region. As well as concerns about losing “financial passporting” and the impact of tariffs on supply chains, a further 158 are R&D or design centres, which may well benefit from EU funds – which may mean relocating should those funds no longer be available post-Brexit.

JETRO, the Japan External Trade Relations Organisation surveyed 54 Japanese companies in the UK just before the EU referendum vote. 64.8% saw Brexit as having a negative impact on their business, with “Don’t know” 25.9% and “no impact” 9.3%. Several responded that they were looking at relocating to Germany, the Netherlands or Ireland. As JETRO points out, all three countries have strong economic links to the UK, so relocation there will not avoid being influenced by what happens to the UK and how Brexit impacts the EU.

The Japanese Chamber of Commerce & Industry in the UK has compiled the UK-Japan trade statistics for the past 15 years and it is noticeable that there is no clear trend in imports of goods from Japan – fluctuating between a high of £9bn in 2001 and a low of £6.7bn in 2009, and currently at £6.9bn for 2015. There has been an upward trend in UK export of goods to Japan, from around £3.5bn 15 years’ ago to over £4.5bn in recent years. A £3bn or so trade surplus in Japan’s favour nonetheless persists. But it is only literally half the story, The UK’s exports to Japan are actually around £9.9bn as of 2012 according to the UKTI. The other half are exports of services, primarily financial, but also legal, advertising, media, consulting etc.

The Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement is supposed to be finalised by the end of the year, and apparently may be worth £5bn a year to the UK. It will mean the elimination of the vast majority of trade tariffs, boosting imports and exports in agriculture, car manufacturing and clothing. There are still issues to be resolved on auto and agricultural tariffs as well as government procurement. And of course, how it will apply to the UK once it leaves the EU is a big unknown.

Looking at the development of Japanese companies in the UK over the past 40 years, apart from the big automotive manufacturers, it is clear that, as I wrote in my history of Mitsubishi Corporation, the UK has become a coordination and financing/marketing hub for Japanese companies in the region. Most of the famous Japanese names, such as Sony, no longer have mass production in the UK. Sony has a manufacturing centre in Wales, but it develops and produces low volume professional audio visual equipment. Even in the automotive sector, if you look closely at parts manufacturers such as Sumitomo Electric Wiring, which acquired Lucas SEI in 1999, or Yazaki, their operations in the UK are mostly development, design and engineering, or regional coordination. Their UK factories were shut down and production moved east or to North Africa years ago.

So Softbank’s acquisition of ARM, an exception in so many ways, is also not. It is buying into the UK’s design and technology expertise, as well as multinational marketing and management skills. Forty plus years of trade in the EU and the development of the Single Market has done exactly what the textbooks would predict, which is to make it clear where the UK’s strengths are – design, engineering, finance, marketing, legal and other services and some high end manufacturing. The revival of mass car production in the UK is because of our membership of the Single Market. The UK on its own is not enough to sustain a car industry (see the paragraph in my blog post here regarding the 100 million market theory).

The Japan-EU FTA is meant to cover services as well as products but the EU single market in services has not progressed for a while and it looks like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which would cover EU-USA services, is faltering. It does seem like the UK is going to end up spending enormous amounts of its resources and energy on unpicking 40 years of trade arrangements which have already had a profound impact on its economy, at a time when those resources would have been better devoted to developing agreements which would help the UK play to its strengths.

Save

Mitsubishi Motors & Nissan – Is Ghosn prepared to try to nail jelly to the wall?

When it comes to the Mitsubishi group of companies (keiretsu), I did almost literally write the book (A History of Mitsubishi Corporation in London: 1915 to Present Day), although my focus was more on the way the pre-war Mitsubishi Goshi evolved into Mitsubishi Corporation, the trading company, and more specifically, its London office.

It’s generally perceived in Japan that the Mitsubishi keiretsu has been the most cohesive and robust of all the keiretsu (Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo being the other main ones) but as you might imagine, the current Mitsubishi Motors fuel economy data manipulation scandal has put this to the test.

According to Nikkei Business magazine (April 22^nd edition, not available online), the cracks are appearing. Whereas in the previous Mitsubishi Motors crises (recalls for various defects in the 2000s) Mitsubishi Heavy, Mitsubishi Corporation and Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ all stepped in and financial support came from Tokio Marine, Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Materials as well, this time seems different.

Even now, having been hit by the commodity price slump, the automotive sector remains an important profit generator for Mitsubishi Corporation as it is involved in the sale and financing of vehicles in Asia and Europe as well as engine manufacture. Mitsubishi Corporation also seconds quite a few employees to Mitsubishi Motors, including the current Chairman and CEO Osamu Masuko.

Other Mitsubishi companies do not have such ties. Even though Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings supplies products to the automotive sector, its main customers are Toyota and Nissan. Mitsubishi Paper also said “we are busy with our own affairs”.

It’s not just about whether the companies have business together, points out the Nikkei. It’s also an issue of corporate governance. The Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group has been reducing cross shareholdings, where appropriate. Mitsubishi Corporation is also checking shareholdings regularly for rationale and yield and disposing of them as necessary. Presumably it is hard to justify “Protecting the Three Diamonds” as the sole reason for support, to external directors and shareholders.

The Nikkei sees this as a chance for the Mitsubishi group to embark on a delayed restructure [the article was written before Nissan stepped in to acquire a 34% share]. In previous restructurings, there was a discussion about selling off the largely domestic ‘mini-car’ business, so this might be finally realised.

A more recent article in the Nikkei Asian Review points out that a key question is whether Nissan’s CEO Carlos Ghosn’s aggressive brand of reform will suit the corporate culture at Mitsubishi Motors “where change is not exactly a buzzword”. The question I have is what the corporate culture of Mitsubishi Motors actually is, other than a reluctance to change. The lack of a clear definition of values and vision may indeed be one of the causes of the repeated scandals. There are the Mitsubishi Three Principles, but not all Mitsubishi companies showcase them, and they lack the strong philosophy and toolkit of something like the Toyota Way.

Along with my official book on Mitsubishi in London I wrote a further unpublishable chapter, called “The Vague Company”. It talked about the benefits and difficulties of having a vague, unspoken corporate culture. Employees can enjoy the sense of being treated like adults, to work out for themselves what the right “way” is, but it makes global expansion – particularly post-merger integration – highly frustrating, when new, hybrid cultures need to develop. As one frustrated American employee at another Mitsubishi group company said to me the other day “I can’t get a handle on what the Mitsubishi Way is”. It is, as we say in British English, like trying to nail jelly to a wall. I suspect Ghosn may quickly tire of this and use his hammer in more brutally effective ways.

For more on Mitsubishi Motors’ future, I recommend this blog post by my old friend and former head of corporate communications at Mitsubishi Motors in the Daimler Chrysler days, Jochen Legewie: http://www.cnc-communications.com/blog/the-future-of-mitsubishi-motors/

For more on Mitsubishi corporate culture, I have gathered some resources on Pinterest here

“Japanese companies are too scared to touch their overseas acquisitions” – Nidec’s Nagamori

Shigenobu Nagamori, the billionaire founder of the world’s biggest manufacturer of micro-motors for hard disks and optical drives, Nidec, has acquired more than 40 companies in Japan and overseas. He comments in a Nikkei Business article that “you cannot just leave foreign acquisitions alone to get on with things by themselves. You need thorough mutual understanding and to even replace management if necessary.”

“Although you no longer hear about Japanese companies sending lots of managers over to their overseas subsidiaries who end up issuing all sorts of misguided directions, you now hear of companies who say ‘we think the same way as the counterpart management’ and so decide to buy the company and then just leave the management as is.”

“This is an illusion. Actually they are being left alone because the Japanese company doesn’t really understand what they are doing. It ends up with compromising on the necessary management reforms and profit targets.”

“I have regrets myself. We acquired 10 or so companies in Europe and North America from about 2010. We were warned by various companies who had M&A experience and financial institutions that we couldn’t restructure foreign companies the way we would Japanese acquisitions and that it was best to ‘leave it up to the foreigners’ otherwise they will quit”

“I thought that was true at the time. I also took on board the advice that Japanese managers needed to be people with Harvard degrees and a network amongst foreign executives.”

“However one company did not make any improvement no matter how often I set profit targets. I thought there must be something wrong with the company management as such a company should as a matter of course achieve profit margins over 15% but I was told that it was the limit for their industry.”

“In Japan you would try to persuade the management to adopt our “kaizen” knowhow (knowledge of how to improve) but we hit a wall with this in the West. So in 2012 we changed the management of the acquired company. But you can’t do it like pulling a trigger. I make a point of visiting each company at least once a year and have dinner not just with the executives but also the managers and discuss things with them. I also encourage them to send emails directly to me and I respond to them. I am trying to understand all the ideas people have for improving profitability.”

“It’s important that people in the company understand my thinking and I understand whether they are capable of understanding. If they are then it doesn’t matter if the CEO is changed. ”

“It’s the same in Japan. Communication is important. If you just cut back costs and improve profit, the company will not survive in the long term. Where is there waste, how can we make the most profitable products – the basics are the same in Japan or elsewhere. If this is understood, then overseas companies can be reformed too.”

“I think Japanese companies are too scared to touch their overseas subsidiaries. They overthink the differences. I used to be like that, but there is no need. The basics of management are the same everywhere.”

Japanese boards in Europe should reflect their customers, employees and community

I have just completed the first phase of research into how diverse the European subsidiary boards of the biggest Japanese companies in Europe are, both in terms of the nationality mix of Japanese and European directors, and also the number of women on the board.

More boards in Japan had women on them than in Europe, which is surprising if you were expecting boards to reflect the employee mix – particularly the pipeline of managers coming through the ranks of an organisation – as there are without doubt more women employees and proportionally more women managers in Japanese companies in Europe than there are in Japan.

The proportion of directors with European nationalities on the board of Japanese subsidiaries varied wildly from none in the case of Toshiba, Sharp and Fast Retailing (the Uniqlo subsidiary in the UK), through to 100% in the case of Asahi Glass, Bridgestone, Canon and Nidec. So national diversity does not seem to be influenced by which industry the company is in. This also means that what to me is the most compelling case for a diverse board, that it should reflect the customers it is serving, is not the key factor I thought it would be.

20 years’ ago, becoming less reliant on Japanese customers abroad as well as in Japan, was the driving force for many Japanese companies embarking on “kokusaika” (“internationalization”). Canon was a pioneer then in appointing Europeans to senior positions in overseas subsidiaries and does as a consequence appear to have fared better than other companies in the consumer electronics sector, both in Japan and in Europe.

The current favoured path to globalization for Japanese companies is through M&A rather than growing international businesses and executives internally, and the major acquisitions of the past decades account for the diverse boards of Asahi Glass (who acquired Glaverbel) and other companies that still have a high proportion of European directors such as Fujitsu (International Computers Ltd), Nomura (Lehman Brothers) and NSG (Pilkington).

There is some sectoral influence. For example, the financial services industry is under intense scrutiny by European regulators who have the power to approve board appointments. They expect directors to have deep understanding and experience of local markets – something which not many Japanese executives can claim.

Both Fujitsu and Hitachi have substantial public sector oriented businesses in the UK (government services, nuclear power and rail) which means that they not only need to meet the diversity requirements of government purchasing but also gain acceptance of the communities in which they operate. For example, the board of a Japan-owned UK utility recently advertised for a director, with a requirement that applicants be a customer of that utility.

For smaller Japanese companies, or those which are just starting in Europe, it is tempting to stick with a small board with just a couple of non-resident Japanese directors, but as boards come under pressure to have greater transparency and better governance in Europe, appointing local directors from the start should lead to better relations with regulators, customers and employees.

(This article first appeared in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News in December 2015 and also appears in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.)

Governance – interview with Yoshimitsu Kobayashi, external director at Toshiba and Tokyo Electric Power

Yoshimitsu Kobayashi, chairman of Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings, seems to be attracted to intractable problems. Not only has he become an external director of Tokyo Electric Power Company, post Fukushima but is now also a director of Toshiba, as it goes through a massive restructuring of its business, following its falsified accounting scandal (see our previous post – Toshiba – where did it all go wrong?). On top of all that he is also the chairman of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives.

Asked by the Nikkei Business magazine why he has taken on both TEPCO and Toshiba, he explains that he regards both as extremely important to the Japanese economy. “Nuclear power is a Japanese national policy, and Toshiba is a national policy company. If it is damaged, then it is damage to the whole Japanese economy” (as we explained in another post Shazai and the art of being a corporate shame magnet). “That doesn’t mean we have to preserve it at whatever cost. We need to be open about all the bad parts of Toshiba, and take responsibility for explaining what happened. Then we can rebuild. Governance needs to have concrete substance, not just on the surface.”

Nikkei Business calls 2015 “Year Zero of Corporate Governance” for Japan. Kobayashi says it will take 10 years to change corporate culture at the roots. Toshiba and TEPCO resemble each other, he thinks, in that TEPCO is learning to be a privately owned company, that looks after public infrastructure, which is similar to Toshiba.

“Aspects of Japan that had been good such as life time employment and seniority based promotion have now become a minus, and Japan has lost its competitiveness. Companies should not rely on politicians. It is not just about deregulating but changing the spirit behind the regulations.”

Kobayashi points out that while Japanese companies have been investing large amounts in overseas M&A, domestic M&A is still a fraction of that. There are 3 nuclear power companies, 8 car companies and yet 20,000 chemical companies. As a consequence, research and development is behind the West and China.

“What’s key is for Japan to keep hold of its traditional technical strength, but work out how to team this up with services.” “Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings is doing this – working on new materials, for the environment and healthcare… and also for light weight cars”.

Kobayashi also believes that top executives in Japanese companies should walk away once they have finished their stint as chairman. However he think that it takes 10 years at the top to really understand a company. The Toshiba system, whereby Presidents only stayed in post for 4 years, but then carried on for many years after as advisors was not healthy. “Maybe it’s because their remuneration is not as high as in the West that they stick around. Dow Chemical’s CEO is earning 50 times what I earn. Although Mitsubishi group companies don’t have so much cross shareholding in common now, we keep an eye on each other’s governance, so oldies are not allowed to hang around”

“Toshiba has a surprising number of businesses. In companies like that where there are many capable people, there are a lot of big fish swimming in small ponds. They think they are the company, and forget the public interest.”

Virtue or vice? “Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil” – Japan HQs in the Year of the Monkey

We have decided to celebrate in 2016 – with a series of lunch seminars for clients – the 12^th anniversary of the founding of our company. The excuse is that we have completed the full cycle of the Japanese/Chinese years, back to the Year of the Monkey.

Reflecting on the trends we have seen evolving over the past 12 years for Japanese companies, the most obvious development has been the increase in major acquisitions by Japanese companies of Europe-based multinationals. Most recently, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group acquired UK Lloyd’s underwriters Amlin for £3.5bn and Hitachi has just finalised the acquisition of AnsaldoBreda and Italian company Finmeccanica’s stake in Ansaldo STS, for around €800m.

Both these acquisitions are representative of a structural change I have seen evolving in quite a few Japanese multinationals. Hitachi has moved the global headquarters of its rail business to the UK and it seems the Japanese insurance majors, who have all now acquired underwriting firms based in the UK, are hoping that their acquisitions will act as pivots for further global expansion.

Clearly Japanese companies are not just buying into a market with their acquisitions, but hoping that they have also acquired global management capability. Whereas in the past there were some examples of Japanese companies using their US subsidiaries to manage the global network, it seems now that Europeans are being asked to manage operations in the US and beyond.

This is partly due to another long term trend in Japan, which is the lack of “global jinzai”, particularly at senior management level, to manage overseas growth, but it also reflects the fact that European multinationals are used to managing companies scattered across many countries, in a virtual matrix structure. This means the heads of various business units or functions may not all be physically located in the same headquarters. European managers need to have strong, globally effective professional expertise but also good cross cultural communication skills to be able to manage teams remotely.

Europeans are comfortable with doing this in Europe and to some extent working with the US too. However working with Japan is still a new experience for most of them. They are often baffled by the fact that their professional expertise and remote communication skills are not enough to persuade or win support from Japan headquarters. Managers in Japan headquarters are only used to communicating with people who are physically present in the office. They tend to be generalists, who do not find arguments grounded solely in expert opinion all that convincing.

Unless conscious effort is made to overcome these communication barriers, Japan headquarters maybe behave like the three monkeys, who see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil. In Japan my understanding is that this is seen as virtuous behaviour. However, in the West this is seen as ignoring problems and misbehaviour until it is too late. I foresee the next twelve years of my business as being about opening eyes, ears and mouths on both sides of the world.

This article originally appeared in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News on 13th January 2016 and iis in the introduction of “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” by Pernille Rudlin, available on Amazon as a paperback and ebook.

The Suntory revolutionary from Mitsubishi Corporation

Takeshi Niinami is probably the most famous alumnus of my alma mater, Mitsubishi Corporation. Born in 1959 and a graduate of Keio (as so many Mitsubishi ‘gentlemen’ are), he started off in sugar trading and after a Mitsubishi Corp sponsored MBA at Harvard, he was involved with the foundation of the Sodexo joint venture in Japan with MC, and then transferred to and ultimately ran the convenience store chain Lawson, which MC had acquired a majority share in.

He was lured to the family run Suntory in 2014 by the grandson of the founder, Nobutada Saji, and has been shaking the place up ever since, much to the consternation of many employees. The revolution was already underway, as Suntory had already announced its $16bn acquisition of US whisky maker Beam and the year before had acquired the UK brands Lucozade and Ribena from GlaxoSmithKline for $1.35bn and in 2009 acquired Orangina Schweppes for $1.97bn.

A former director who worked with him at Lawsons says “there are people who cannot keep up with him. He keeps coming up with new things, and then says do it within a year”. Niinami believes that Suntory will not be able to function well as a global company if it only promotes from within, so has appointed Vincent Ambrosino, formerly CFO of Pepsico Canada as an Executive Officer of Suntory Holdings, in charge of strategy, finance and accounting. He only joined Beam in 2013 as the CFO so this by Japanese standards was seen as meteoric rise to a top position.

Furthermore, Makiko Ono, one of the rare senior Japanese businesswomen in a major company, who had been involved with various collaborations with foreign companies as executive officer of Suntory Food & Beverages, has transferred to Suntory Holdings, to become the GM of global HR. Around 17 people from Suntory Holdings will be seconded to Beam Suntory, with the aim of improving global mobility. Niinami himself announced that he wants to hire more people from outside the company, “including those who have investment experience who were in trading companies” – hiring in his own image, in other words.

Suntory Holdings mid term plan has highly ambitious double digit targets for turnover and profit. It is unlikely this will be reached organically, says Toyo Keizai magazine. More M&A can be expected. Niinami is not likely to slow down.

Japanese companies need to pull up younger burdock roots if they really want to grow globally

Along with “tako tsubo” (octopus pot), another Japanese concept “gobou nuki” (plucking out burdock roots) used in HR has been deemed harmful to corporate Japan’s global prospects.

The term has been used frequently in the Japanese media recently, according to Masahiro Kotosaka, an ex McKinsey consultant now at Ritsumeikan University. In a recent article in Nikkei Business Online he points out that the recent appointments as President of Takuya Hirano at Microsoft Japan, Tatsuo Yasunaga at Mitsui & Co, Koji Arima at Denso, Tatsuya Tanaka at Fujitsu and Takahiro Hachigo at Honda have all been described as plucking burdock roots, as they are in their 40s or 50s, younger than normal for Presidents in corporate Japan. The average age of Japanese Presidents was 62 in 2014 (up from 61 in 2013), around 10 years higher than the global average.

The older age is of course partly explained by the continuation of seniority based pay and promotion in Japan – although Panasonic, Sony and Hitachi have all recently announced they are abolishing or looking to abolish this system.

The average age in Japan for a “kacho” (section head, the first managerial position in Japanese companies) is 38.6 and 44 for a “bucho” (department head, or General Manager) according to Recruitworks. In India, China or Thailand, the average is 9 years lower for kacho and 10 years lower for bucho. Even the US average is 5 years lower for both positions.

Kotosaka asserts that Japanese companies need to start pulling out younger burdock roots, people who might be future executives, and making sure they have early leadership experience. If this does not happen, the younger generations of Japanese will soon feel a big gap with their overseas peers.

Already Kotosaka has heard (as I have) from Japanese companies that they feel the utilisation of non-Japanese or external executives has increased and the presence of Japanese executives has faded.

The most notable example is of course Christophe Weber, President of Takeda Pharma, and his team of 16 executives, of whom 8 are non-Japanese and have come from outside the company and two are non-Japanese who joined through being executives in a Takeda acquisition. Weber had his first leadership experience at the age of 29 when he became a country manager at GSK. Carlos Ghosn of Nissan also became head of a factory at the age of 27.

My former employer Mitsubishi Corporation is mentioned as an honourable exception to the lack of experience given to juniors, along with gaishi (foreign owned) consulting companies and private equity firms. For such companies, people are the main asset, and it’s true I suppose that trading companies such as Mitsubishi that have now moved more towards acquisitions rather than trading, do afford ample opportunity for younger Japanese to take up management positions abroad. In practice though, I have seen many instances where the acquisition is left to manage itself, and the Japanese expat director mostly stays in the regional headquarters, processing paperwork to send back to Japan HQ, rather than hands on managing the business.

Category: M&A