Japanese business blog

“I love Japan but I don’t want to work in a Japanese company”

Japan is more popular than ever amongst young Europeans, who have become familiar with it through anime and manga, or love of Japanese food. Yet “securing human resources” continues to be the key operational challenge for Japanese companies operating in Europe, according to JETRO’s annual survey.

Young people love the playful popular culture of Japan but they assume that this is not going to be the Japan they will experience if they join an engineering and manufacturing oriented Japanese company.

A more serious reason for not wanting to join a Japanese company is the lack of career development opportunities, when it looks like top management reserved for Japanese only. The larger Japanese companies have made efforts to overcome this by having European or global graduate recruitment and training programmes, often involving spending time in Japan.

I suspect it is the medium to small sized Japanese companies who are having the hardest time recruiting the people they need. Their European operations are still basically sales arms of the Japan headquarters. This means when they hire qualified engineers, they are disappointed that the job is more sales than engineering in content.

Japanese companies in Western Europe are most in need of management personnel but are facing already high labour costs. Japanese companies in Central and Eastern Europe are most in need of factory workers and cite the rapid growth of labour costs as their biggest operational challenge. Presumably they are having to compete with better known Western companies who are also facing a tight labour market. The obvious solution is to offer higher salaries, but that of course undermines the economic rationale of have manufacturing in Central and Eastern Europe.

Rather than engage in a price war for scarce management or technical staff, Japanese companies need to offer something different and attractive, which brings us back to the Japanese popular culture loved by young Europeans.

I was surprised recently that the European participants in my seminar who were 15+ year veterans of a Japanese technology company listed “the eccentric, child-like mindset” as one of the positives of working in a Japanese company. My 17-year-old son also noticed this on his first trip to Japan with me last month – and happily joined in by buying a Pokemon Piplup plushy and a Shiba dog pencil case which now have pride of place amongst his philosophy, maths and economics textbooks.

“Strengthening the company’s brand” was the top initiative selected for selling products and services in Europe in the JETRO survey. But this should be less about advertising to customers, and more about having an employee brand that appeals to young people. They will then be able to see a future for themselves where they make, design, manage or sell on behalf of a Japanese company, and have fun at the same time.

A video of Pernille Rudlin’s presentation on this topic is available on the Rudlin Consulting YouTube channel here in English and here in Japanese.

The original version of this article was published in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News. Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” is available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

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It’s not over yet for Honda in the UK

“Don’t be ordinary, Honda” urges a 20 page special feature in Nikkei Business magazine. It points out that Honda occupies a similar space to Sony in Japanese people’s hearts. They both had maverick founders, produced quirky, innovative products for decades, lost their edge and then had to undergo deep restructuring to survive.

The loss of face for Swindon

Part 1 of the special feature starts in Swindon, lamenting that it has come to a point where Honda, “the face of Swindon”, is having to shut down. “Falling European sales and the chaos of Brexit are not the only reasons”. Honda says it is because of the need to respond to the rise of electric vehicles, a recognition that it had not set up the necessary structure in Europe to deal with the EU’s strict environmental regulations and supply electric and hybrid vehicles.

Going it alone made it difficult to innovate

This lack of preparedness may have been because Honda was going it alone, in contrast to Toyota working with Mazda, Suzuki, Subaru and Daihatsu and Nissan’s alliance with Mitsubishi and Renault. Even adding in Honda suppliers like TS Tech, Keihin, Showa, Musashi and Nisshin, its total supply chain sales amount to a tenth of Toyota’s. Toyota’s supply chain includes other large multinationals like Denso, Aisin, Toyota Industries, JTEKT and Toyota Boshoku. R&D expenditure is similarly tiny compared to Toyota’s spend.

Honda is not in Boston Consulting Group’s Top 50 most innovative companies of the world – whereas Toyota is at #37. It’s not even in the top 50 of Japan’s own ranking of most innovative domestic companies. Toyota is at #2, Honda at #105.

Only 70% of Honda’s sales are 4 wheel vehicles however – 13% are motorbikes, 2.2% power products like lawnmower engines and 14.9% is financial services. Honda has been innovating in these areas as well as becoming active in Mobility as a Service, investing in electric vehicle charging, including in the UK and Sweden.

Honda still has roots in the UK

In fact it’s not over for Honda in the UK by any means. Nikkei Business’s special feature takes a nostalgic look at whether Honda can grab back the “speed” and “challenge” spirit that Honda showed in the Isle of Man TT races, illustrated by a headline from the Daily Mirror in 1961 “The Japs are Laps in Front”. It described the 3 times Honda has left Formula One, only to come back again. Honda R&D and Honda Motor Europe are still based in the UK, and Honda has mainly supplied engines to UK based Formula One teams over the years – most recently to Red Bull in Milton Keynes.

The special feature finishes with an interview with Honda’s President Hachigo Takahiro – who was himself posted to the UK during his career. He shows no interest in merging with Toyota or Nissan in order to achieve scale. “We are not thinking about making a bid for Nissan…We are innovative when we face challenges, like we did with Formula One. As for Toyota, we won’t get very friendly, we will have a fight occasionally. Otherwise the Japanese car industry would be very dull. We have different personalities. We should be good rivals, and help Japan rise up. We have no intention of taking Toyota’s money.”

Even if Honda is shutting down its manufacturing in the UK, the hope seems to be that the UK can play a part in recharging its innovative spirit.

I love Japan but I don’t want to work in a Japanese company

I’ve done a screencast (around 11 minutes long) of my talk at the Centre People Appointments HR seminar earlier this year, on why people love Japan, but don’t want to work for a Japanese company, and what Japanese companies can do about it.

If you want to know more about working in a Japanese company, you can find our Japan Intercultural Consulting e-learning modules on Teachable, starting from £39 https://japan-intercultural-emea.teachable.com/

Is Sharp still a Japanese treasure?

Sharp Corporation Chairman and President Tai Jeng-wu was the second in command at Taiwan’s Hon Hai when it acquired Sharp in 2016. His cost cutting organisational reforms have turned the company’s results around in a “V” shaped recovery. He is now hurrying ahead with restructuring the business portfolio. In an interview with Nikkei Business he says Sharp is “Japan’s treasure” and is at pains to point out how influenced he has been by Japanese teachers in the past. Japan and Taiwan continue to have good relations (reinforced by a common threat of China, hinted at in this interview with the dig at unfair competition from state owned companies), and many Taiwanese speak excellent Japanese.

He says that unlike Carlos Ghosn, he did not arrive at Sharp with a posse of executives. He feels that the reforms are still only half way but he wants to work alongside Sharp employees – rather than a top down imposed change.

Asked what was the problem at Sharp, he said “it is not for me to say, but I suppose the crisis occurred when there were problems with management in the 2010s – when people who have only had experience in one particular technical area or business become president. You need to have a general overview to be a top executive, so when there was a crisis they were unable to respond. How I fixed the $2.5bn loss was to cut costs by around $1.7bn and then cut back investments and with some transient profits, we were back in the black.”

Don’t be a big fish

“You have to develop people step by step. When I started at Sharp, I said when announcing my strategy that “Sharp should not be a big fish, but should aim to be a fast swimming fish”. So I kept asking every day for things to speed up. I set some rules for developing successors. I lowered the limit requiring presidential approval to Y3m ($27,000). That was to ensure I would be aware of all the company’s problems. I then increased the limit to Y20m ($184,000) in 2018 when I put the CEO structure in place and this year I increased the limit to Y100m.”

“I will stay on as chairman of Sharp until March 2022. My wife and family want me back in Taiwan though. All the time from 2016 I have been looking for a successor. I even asked a Japanese consultant to help, but I cannot find one. I want the successor to be Japanese – it doesn’t matter if it’s an internal or external appointment. Maybe it could be someone from Hon Hai even. They should be able to manage in the current harsh environment, covering a wide range of businesses and find synergy with Hon Hai. It is the second criterion that makes finding the right person difficult.”

Japanese managers became bureaucrats

“It used to be that Japanese management of factories and businesses were strong, and my teachers were all Japanese. But then Japan went into a recession and the founder managers all disappeared, and managers became bureaucrats. That is why management strength declined. Japan is now only strong in parts and materials. ”

Sharp’s employee levels are back to the same as before the management crisis. “There were two early retirement drives during the crisis, and a lot of good people left. Those who remained when I joined the company in 2016 were one of three types – highly capable and loyal, those who couldn’t find another place to go and those where were waiting to be pushed. I actually never cut employees. In fact we need to increase our employees – we had some influxes from when we took over Toshiba’s PC business and other M&A.”

“I am not a god, I just improved everything step by step”

“I renegotiated the contracts for solar battery procurement and saved around $100m. I have also brought the Sharp brand back in house for the US TV production business. A brand is like a person’s name. Selling it is wrong. During the crisis Sharp sold off its precious buildings for $188m and then spent $30m on out of date computing. I am not a god, I just improved everything step by step. I was taught to do Horenso (keeping bosses in the loop) and check everything thoroughly, not just sign off easily by Japanese teachers.”

I am now promoting management based on data, and a shift to B2B (business to business). B2C (consumer) business is currently 65% of our turnover, I want to make it 50/50. The structure of trade in B2C is unfair – companies like ours in a free trade country have to compete with state owned companies who don’t have to invest or write off so much. That is why Japan’s IT/electronic companies’ share is falling – it’s a structural problem. In B2B it is a fairer fight. W have built a good ecosysytem over many years, so we have a good chance.

A Rising Sun Alliance of Japanese electronics companies

“I think there should be a Rising Sun Alliance of Japanese companies. There are a lot of Japanese electronics manufacturers but I don’t see that they will merge -t here is too much pride. I do have to be careful as Hon Hai is not a Japanese company. I am reflecting every day on how to manage employees. If I am criticised, it is not just my, but Taiwan’s pride at stake.”

“Sharp will last over 100 years. It is a treasure of Japan. I would like the brand to last another 100 years. I come to the office every day before 7:00am and give a bow to the statues of the founders in the front entrance. Sharp is a treasure to me too.”

Nikkei Business comments that there is no doubting his sincerity and dedication – apparently he lives in a single man’s dormitory and walks round the factory at 5am in the morning thinking about Sharp. He is at pains to seem almost more Japanese than the Japanese in this. But, the Nikkei wonders, will this be enough to succeed in the new territory for him and Sharp of B2B platform business.

The enduring Japanese family firm

I attended a Japan Society talk last month on shinise (Japanese family firms) – given by academics Innan Sasaki and Davide Ravasi. Sasaki and Ravasi argued that shinise have survived over 100 years, by keeping small and focused on traditional crafts like sweet making, sake brewing, and textiles. They are very much embedded in the society and community in which they operate – the highest concentration is in Japan’s old capital, Kyoto. In return for their commitment to the local community, they gain a social status and support from the community. They are meant to have a higher moral purpose than pure profit and therefore do not seek to take risks and grow much beyond their current geography and sector – which means they are more resilient to external economic shocks. When downturns happen locally, they survive through the strength of local support. This contrasts with what Sasaki and Ravasi call “instrumental” firms, who exist for a purely economic purpose.

Even large Japanese multinationals behave like Kyoto shinise

Listening to their descriptions of shinise‘s motivations and behaviours, I realised they were very similar to the way I describe bigger, multinational Japanese firms in my seminars. Even though Japanese multinationals have taken the risk to expand overseas, and are often no longer owned by the founding family, the ethos of having a higher moral purpose than shareholder value, of corporate contribution to society and strong risk aversion to ensure longevity still endures.

And like the shinise, the darker side is the sacrifices needed to be regarded as a proper member of the family firm and the difficulty of becoming a senior manager if you were not born into it – or at least recruited straight from university like Japanese headquarter permanent staff.

Nikkei Business magazine had a feature last month on family firms in Japan showcasing research that family owned firms in Japan perform better than non-family owned firms in terms of Return on Assets. “They don’t hold on to unnecessary assets” says Professor Yasuhiro Ochiai of Shizuoka University.

Japanese family owned multinationals that have performed well

DMG Mori is still owned by the Mori family and has been particularly active recently in M&A overseas since the current Mori took over as President in 1999, most notably in their merger with German machine tool manufacturer DMG. Apparently quite a few of DMG Mori’s employees come from the wider “family” of customers and suppliers.

Of course the most famous Japanese company still managed by a founding family member is Toyota. However the current President Akio Toyoda is adamant that the company name is Toyota, the family name is Toyoda, and Toyota is not a Toyoda family company, “it’s everyone’s company.”

Those that are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and also active in Europe were:

Suntory (Torii family – founded by Shinjiro Torii in 1899) – chairman is from the founding family.
Aisin (automotive parts maker in the Toyota group founded in 1949 – chairman is part of the Toyoda founding family)
Shimano (Founded 1921, president is a Shimano)
DIC (Dainippon Ink) founded in 1908 by Kijiro Kawamura, a Kawamura is on the board of directors

And how to avoid toxic family rows

It’s not all joy in a family of course. Nikkei Business also looks at the family rows that have affected the performance of companies like Idemitsu (petroleum company) founding family shareholders fighting a merger with Showa Shell and the rebellion against founding family member Yoichiro Ushioda and chairman by executives of LIXIL (owners of German bathroom fittings company Grohe).

Nikkei Business’s prescription for avoiding trouble is:

Frequent communication between family members
Treat family members who are employees the same way as other employees in terms of company regulations
Don’t withhold information for family only, be transparent in management
Don’t appoint a successor from the family if there is noone suitable
Keep family assets and company assets separate
When there is a generation changeover, keep criticisms to yourself
Avoid too many family members as employees
Ensure a structure is in place to stop family members going rogue

For more on what being a “family” means for Japanese firms and the non-Japanese employees that work for them, this was one of my most popular articles in recent years.

4 cultures of controlling overseas subsidiaries

During a recent trip to Japan I visited Amazon’s offices to have lunch with an acquaintance who has been working there for 1 year and 3 months. He told me that Amazon has expanded so rapidly this past year that he is now in the upper half of a chart which shows all employees ranked by their length of time working for the company.

He also told me that almost all the non-Japanese people working there were, like him, locally hired and that there were hardly any expatriate staff from the US headquarters. I therefore wondered how Amazon HQ could control a subsidiary which is growing so rapidly without any expatriate managers to keep monitor it.

Amazon also tries to minimize the number of processes and procedures it has, in order to maintain the speedy, fast to market, start up mentality it had when it first began over twenty years’ ago.

The 3 usual ways to control overseas operations

In the various multinationals and their subsidiaries I have worked in or with, you can usually find three types of headquarter control. American, sales focused companies tend to control their subsidiaries by setting numerical targets. If the subsidiary employees and managers hit the targets, they get bonuses, if they miss them, they get fired. Many multinationals who are not American in origin use these systems because numbers are easy for everyone to understand, regardless of language.

Another way of managing subsidiaries which both European and American multinationals also use is to ensure compliance through having strong regulations, processes and systems, and clear hierarchical chains of command, so everyone knows who has responsibility and authority for each part of the business.

A third way, which is more common among Japanese companies and also companies such as the German Mittelstand, family owned companies, is “control by the family” – in other words members of the headquarters family are sent out to subsidiaries to monitor what is going on and promote the corporate culture.

Amazon’s way

My Amazon contact explained that Amazon ensures its employees behave in compliance with Amazon’s core values by having a very rigorous hiring process. Candidates are interviewed several times by multiple employees and asked questions about past experiences, to reveal what kind of mindset they have.

I can imagine, however, that it is difficult for Japanese companies to use this method if their overseas subsidiaries were the result of an acquisition, or if the company has already been operating overseas for several decades. There will already be a substantial legacy of staff who may have rather different values and behaviours to those of the Japanese headquarters.

It would also be a mistake, and damaging to the benefits of having diverse, localised operations that are close to their customers, to impose too rigid a set of behaviours and values on all overseas employees.

Nonetheless, I strongly recommend that Japanese companies who are about to acquire or set up operations overseas ensure they have a clear, globally understandable company mission and values (rinen) and hire or promote their overseas employees accordingly.

This article appears in Pernille Rudlin’s latest book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

Murata – reinjecting enjoyment into corporate philosophy

Murata is one of Japan’s most quietly successful companies, with a 40% share of global sales of the tiny ceramic capacitors that are essential to the electronics industry.

Tsuneo Murata, 3rd president from the founding family, says in an interview in Nikkei Business that the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001 was a turning point for the corporate culture. They had become too arrogant during the IT bubble of the 1990s and had stopped listening to customers. They did not recover as quickly in the early 2000s as rivals did. Tsuneo Murata, who was then EVP, asked board members and employees for their views on the company culture and what was preventing recovery. He was told the company had become conservative, cautious, inflexible, bureaucratic and slow.

So he set up an organisational cultural reform committee It was tasked with ensuring that the culture became one which adapted rapidly to a changing environment, where the genba (shopfloor) had autonomy and people could freely discuss, create and challenge.

The need for persistence in cultural reforms

Murata became President in 2007. Even with the Lehman Shock walloping profits shortly after, he insisted on continuing with cultural reforms. He went back to the founding philosophy of Akira Murata, to rediscover the sense of freedom that Murata used to have. Actually the philosophy does not mention freedom. In translation it says pretty much what many Japanese corporate philosophies say – contributing to society through innovative technology, building trust, working in partnership, etc. The one part that isn’t translated into English is the word “yorokobi“, meaning to enjoy. To me that’s the most important bit – a lot of Japanese companies have lost their sense of fun since the 2000s.

It sounds like the success of Murata is as much to do with Tsuneo Murata’s personality. Since becoming President he continues to eat in the same canteen as workers in the headquarters in Kyoto and does not use the executive elevator (unless in an emergency). “I don’t think there’s a single employee that does not like him” says one employee.

He is asked by Nikkei Business how he ensures a common understanding of corporate culture when Murata acquires other companies – for example, IPDiA in France in 2016. “It takes time, especially when it’s a foreign acquisition, because generally overseas employees are not as loyal to their companies as in Japan anyway. But if we introduce our corporate philosophy to them, they have empathy with it. I think it’s important to communicate it thoroughly.”

Five elements of building trust between Japanese and European business cultures

If I were to capture what I try to do in my work in one phrase, it would be “build trust between Japanese and European business cultures.” This of course leads to questions of how trust is defined, and therefore how it is built.

The title of my new book, Shinrai, is the Japanese word for “trust”. It is composed of two characters, shin, meaning “believe”, and rai, which means “to request”. In other words, if you trust someone, you believe they will do what you request. The character for shin can be broken down further into components which mean “person” and “word” and the character for rai can be broken down into “bundle” and “leaves or pages”. It implies communication between people is a fundamental part of building trust, but also getting things done and pulling together.

Analysing the work I have done with clients over the past fifteen years, I would say there are five components of building trust in multinational companies. In sequential order they are communication, mutual interests, processes and regulations, reliability and accountability and vision and values – and then back to communication again in a virtuous circle.

1. Communication

Having a common language is critical – this is why any initiative to help immigrants integrate into a society usually starts with language lessons. The problem for Japan is that for native speakers of European languages, Japanese is one of the most difficult languages to learn and Japanese feel similarly about English. Japanese companies can do more to help Westerners learn Japanese – an intensive course in Japan is one of the most effective ways to do this. Japanese companies can also communicate better than they do in English – it’s not enough to make English the common language or force a minimum English level on employees, management needs to communicate vision, strategy and plans in English more effectively than it currently does.

2. Mutual interests

The Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the EU is a classic example of common interests helping to build trust. People have differing degrees of interests, but finding mutual interests means that there is a stable basis for negotiation. Japan wants to sell more cars in Europe, European consumers are happy to have cheaper, good quality Japanese cars. Europe wants to sell more food and drink to Japan, Japanese consumers are happy to have cheaper, good quality European wine and cheese. On a micro level, this is why I always encourage Japanese expatriates in Europe to engage in small talk with their European colleagues – it’s a way of discovering mutual interests, which means mutual understanding, compromises and agreements are more easily gained.

3. Processes and regulations

Once you have discovered your mutual interests, you can come to an agreement, but it needs mutually recognised standards to work well. What are the quality and safety standards expected of a car, or a cheese in your respective countries?

When there is a low level of trust, laws, regulations and processes are needed as a fall back. However, both Japanese companies and the European Union are sometimes guilty of becoming bogged down in bureaucracy and process. You have to show you are obeying regulations and following processes in order to be trusted, but ultimately, this is not sufficient. How you do something in terms of your intentions and behaviour towards others is as important as carrying out the process correctly and obeying the law.

4. Reliability & accountability

When you trust someone, it is not only because you believe they will obey the law, but also that they will do what they say they will do. For Japanese companies, this can be hard to define, as the culture is often a family style one, where everyone’s roles are vague, with no job descriptions and rely on a seniority-based hierarchy. It’s assumed everyone will do whatever necessary, in the best interests of the family. Rules can be bent for family members but this vagueness does not work well in more diverse organisations.

The current fight between Carlos Ghosn and Nissan is focused on processes and regulations. Nissan will try to prove Ghosn flouted Japanese law, but will have to answer questions about its own internal rules. Ghosn will try to prove that he followed both internal and external regulations. But what really seems to be at stake is a loss of mutual trust between Saikawa and other Japanese executives and Ghosn. If you are an insider in a Japanese company, you are trusted as a family member to act in the best interests of the family, and rules can be bent accordingly. But once you are seen as an outsider and acting in your own interests, possibly harming the company, then the rules are applied rigidly – just as the UK is finding out as it negotiates to leave the EU.

5. Vision & Values

This is why you need a clear vision of where the company is going and how you want it to be seen. The vision and values have to be discussed with and shared with employees so they feel they belong. The values will guide them as to how they should behave in order to achieve that vision. If the vision is simply to hit various targets, within the boundaries of rigid rules and processes, without employees engaged with the company values, then the kinds of corporate scandals we have seen in both Japanese and European companies will continue, with catastrophic consequences for trust across societies and cultures.

This article is in the introduction of “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” by Pernille Rudlin, available on Amazon as a paperback and ebook.

The skills shortage in Europe

Seven in ten British employers have been having difficulties in filling vacancies, and 40% say it has become harder over the past year to find the staff they need, according to a 2018 survey of 1000 companies by the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development and Adecco, a staffing company.

The situation has been exacerbated by Brexit. The numbers of workers born abroad in Britain fell by 58,000 year on year, whereas it had increased 263,000 over the previous 12-month period. This was mainly due to a drop in the number of workers coming to the UK from the EU.

It’s not just a UK problem, however. According to a JETRO survey at the end of 2017, “securing human resources” was the number one operational challenge for Japanese companies in Europe. This includes Germany, the Netherlands and even Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic.

So how can Japanese companies compete with local employers chasing the same skilled workforce?

I like to use a model developed by Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner to explain to Japanese companies where they can win as an employee brand.[1] It’s a matrix, based on degree of hierarchy and degree of task versus relationship orientation, resulting in four corporate cultures – the Guided Missile, The Eiffel Tower, the Incubator and the Family.

Guided Missiles are typical American, sales-oriented organisations where the employees are motivated by targets, achievement and reward.

The Eiffel Tower organisation is more hierarchical, focused on structure. People are motivated by their status in the organisational hierarchy and promises of promotion.

Many people in Europe are used to the Eiffel Tower style of company and when they join a Japanese company, they are concerned by the lack of defined paths to progress their career and also an absence of clear, strategic direction.

Other Europeans, particularly in the R&D, creative, IT, design engineering sectors, are more used to the Incubator type of company. Here the main motivation is not money or status, but rather developing and using one’s skills to innovate.

Most Japanese companies belong to the Family style company. Employees want to contribute to the longevity and good reputation of the family, as a respected family member. It is difficult for Family style companies to motivate employees with money or status, as these are dependent on seniority, rather than performance.

Japanese companies in Europe have a reputation for good benefits, but only average pay. There is also a sense that there is a limit to how far you can be promoted if you are not Japanese, in other words, a family member.

Japanese companies are appealing to Europeans because they are “different” and “interesting” and also because they are seen as good corporate citizens. But Europeans also need to be made to feel it is possible to become a family member, by helping them understand the company’s vision and values – including through secondments to Japan headquarters – if you want to retain them.

[1]Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business, Fons Trompenaars & Charles Hampden Turner, (Nicholas Brearley: 2003), 159

The original version of this article can be found in “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

What role did Carlos Ghosn’s status as a foreigner have in terms of his downfall?

And what does this mean for any other foreigner leading or looking to reach the top of a Japanese company? Obviously the Nissan story is evolving hour by hour, so what follows is based on my current understanding as of 20th November 2018.

The specific accusations are that Carlos Ghosn received share price-related compensation and the Dutch holding company of which he was a director along with Greg Kelly, as part of the Nissan-Renault alliance, used its funds to acquire and refurbish houses which were his residences. These were not declared, not as an income tax issue, but as a fiduciary/governance issue, in terms of declarations to the Japanese securities and exchange commission.

Is the way this possible misuse of funds was exposed specifically because Ghosn was not Japanese? Actually a lot of Japanese Presidents and Chairmen are allowed to use company funds for personal reasons, and because of the blurring of personal/private and employer in Japanese companies, it is quite common for companies to provide housing and other benefits far beyond the norm in the West, particularly to senior executives, who are not, on paper, paid that well. This is particularly true of companies where the President is also the founder or has a high degree of autonomy.

Terrie Lloyd, a long term resident and entrepreneur in Japan wrote an interesting piece on this recently – https://www.terrielloyd.com/terries-take/tt-970-imploding-one-man-shacho-listed-companies-e-biz-news-from-japan/

You also can’t help wondering what had been going on over the years in terms of internal checks and corporate governance at Nissan if they did not know and challenge what kind of “benefits” and compensation Ghosn was getting – as illustrated by this blog post from a Japanese corporate insider https://bdti.or.jp/en/blog/en/nissanltr/?77

So the next question is, as it often is with Japanese corporate scandals, why is this particular accusation being exposed and why now? The official story is that it was made by a whistleblower, which necessitated an internal investigation, and then this led to a plea bargain which would reduce the penalties to Nissan.* There is only one other instance of this happening – with Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems and a Thai bribery case – and it was a Japanese manager who was involved.

But I suspect, as do other analysts, that Nissan chose to pursue this and publicly expose it because they didn’t like the direction Ghosn was taking the company in and couldn’t work out another way to get rid of him. There was undoubtedly a long running worry about the degree of control/interference by Renault and the French government and Ghosn’s intention to make the alliance irreversible by the time he finally stepped down in 2022. I also just read a story in the Nikkei Business magazine that Ghosn was very keen for the alliance to partner with Google, Microsoft and Daimler and Chinese companies to create a CASE (Connected, Autonomous, Shared, Electric) strategy. That degree of “foreignness” and with the US, and China, and Daimler with whom Mitsubishi Motors already had a failed alliance might have elicited an allergic reaction from Japanese executives at Nissan and Mitsubishi Motors.

But also, which accounts for the strong words from current President Saikawa, indulgence of senior executives is tolerated so long as they still seem to be working for the good of the company, and Ghosn not turning up for the public apology after the inspection scandal, and the sense that it was his corporate culture of imposing aggressive targets on employees that might have caused that scandal – and yet he blamed Saikawa, might have tipped Nissan executives further into exposing the issue publicly rather than dealing with it in the usual way.

The usual way (see Fujitsu/President Nozoe resignation in 2009), when other executives decide that a President has to go sooner than the usual carousel of 6 years as President and another 6 years as Chairman because they think he’s gone beyond what is morally acceptable and/or they don’t like his strategy, is that they try to let the executive exit honourably, by getting him to resign due to illness or some similar blamefree excuse.

Maybe this option was offered to Ghosn – who had after all been leading Nissan as President and Chairman for nearly 20 years, so way beyond the norm for Japan. But I can imagine that he refused it – and this could be attributed to him being “foreign” – instead of understanding Japan’s “shame” culture, he would have gone down the Judaeo-Christian and legalistic route of saying he had a contract until 2022 and as far as he was concerned he had done nothing wrong, innocent until proven guilty, so bring it on.

There may also be a political aspect – again nothing specifically to do with Ghosn being foreign – but Nissan may have got the hint from Japanese government agencies that they would be supported in taking Ghosn down because they were not politically in favour of the direction he was taking the alliance in – see what happened to Horiemon/Livedoor.

So in summary, I doubt Ghosn was treated differently because he was foreign per se, but because he was foreign he probably reacted differently, just as Michael Woodford did when asked to resign after uncovering scandals at Olympus, believing his own innocence and not fearing public exposure.

But underlying this there could be a resistance in Nissan and beyond, to any further globalizing, whether it results in French or Chinese or American or German control or influence. If I was a foreign executive, particularly if I was Christophe Weber at Takeda, I would be watching further developments in this case like a hawk and making sure I built as many strong, trusting relationships with my Japanese executives as possible.

*The story has indeed evolved – it now turns out that Nissan itself was not part of the plea bargaining deal, it was the two officials, one non-Japanese SVP who managed the Dutch subsidiary and one Japanese who was Ghosn’s chief of staff, who agreed to cooperate with the investigation under a plea bargain.

I was also quoted in the New York Times on this subject.

Last updated by Pernille Rudlin at 2022-12-13.

Category: Japanese business blog