Japanese business blog

Nissan and Ghosn – the cycle of coups d’état reaches back to the 1960s

I always prefer coincidence or cock-up to conspiracy, and former journalist and PR consultant Masaki Kubota clearly feels the same way, judging by the first few paragraphs of his article on Carlos Ghosn and Nissan in Diamond magazine.

As he says, in his years as a journalist, it was the standard defence of any Japanese executive caught up in a scandal that it was a conspiracy of people out to get him.

With Ghosn, you could easily claim, as many have, that this was a conspiracy, born of some kind of alliance between insiders at Nissan who wanted to get rid of Ghosn, his ex-wife and the Japanese government, and this kind of accusation is handy both for Ghosn and the French government or Renault who might have wanted Ghosn to continue to be influential.

But then Kubota does a classic kishotenketsu twist, pointing out the history of Nissan, going back to Ghosn’s installation and even before, is one of a cycle of coup d’etats.

Starting with the most recent history, of the inspection scandals – the exposure of the problem was a way of resisting the inspection system that Ghosn’s management team had introduced, shortly after Saikawa (identified as one of Ghosn’s team) became the new President of Nissan. It was in effect an abortive coup d’état.

Going further back to 1999 the then President Yoshikazu Hanawa was in negotiations with Daimler Chrysler and Ford but instead installed three Renault executives, without even consulting the previous Presidents who were advisors to the company at the time. “It was a kind of a coup d’état” the Nikkei said at the time.

Purging the Don

Even further back, to the 1980s, when the Chairman and former President for 16 years from 1957 was Katsuji Kawamata, there was a coup which led to the purge of union power at Nissan in Japan. It was well known that Kawamata gained his power through cooperating with the Nissan group labour union leader Ichiro Shioji. But then in 1984, Shioji, who was seen as the main obstacle to Nissan opening its factory in Sunderland UK and before that in the US, was hit by a scandal – photos appeared in the weekly magazine Focus, of Shioji on a yacht with a beautiful young woman. Criticism of Shioji, as “the Don”, mounted and he resigned on 22^nd February 1986. The Nikkei reported on this as “the 2.22 coup d’état” a reference to the 26^th February Incident, a failed coup attempt in Japan in 1936. It was said that the power behind the 2.22 coup was Takashi Ishihara who was in favour of global expansion, and was the President at the time.

Ishihara had been involved in an earlier coup, when he was still at managing director level in 1969. Documents were leaked to the media about an incident involving a Nissan microbus. It became clear that this was done in order to purge the upper ranks of the company.

As Kubota says, when there is a fraud in a company, this is often results in a clear out of those in the upper levels of management who are to blame. In fact, this kind of incident has been quite rare at Nissan, so when it happens, it is likely that it is part of a major change in strategic direction. So, Kubota asserts, it is definitely a coup d’état. In Kubota’s experience, it is hard to change a corporate culture that easily, so if Nissan is used to changing strategies by coup d’état, then it will continue to use this mechanism.

Corporate culture will not change just because foreign executives are put in place

Corporate culture will not change just because foreign executives are put in place. Kubota reminds us that for Saikawa to criticize Ghosn so strongly, when Ghosn has not yet been put on trial, is certainly a change from the usual crisis management of Japanese companies.

Kubota sees this singling out of Ghosn by Saikawa, who worked so closely with Ghosn for many years, as a kind of personal insurance.

So where does Saikawa fit in? Kubota has dug out the fact that Saikawa was executive assistant to the President from 1992, Yoshifumi Tsuji. Tsuji had taken over from Yutaka Kume, who had succeeded Ishihara, the instigator of the coup against union Don Shioji. Saikawa was therefore part of the team that survived the Renault coup.

So it goes round. As Kubota puts it, even in the midst of this coup d’état, there will be people wondering whether they will be the next to be stabbed.

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What is a Japanese company? An investment perspective

Ryohei Yanagi is a self-styled untypical Japanese business person – not only is he holding down several jobs – as CFO of Eisai pharmaceutical company and also a Visiting Professor at Toyo University and a Visiting Lecturer at Waseda University, but he has changed employers in his career, even more unusually switching from a foreign company (UBS) to a Japanese company, rather than the other way round.

ROE of 8% was not plucked from nowhere

He is also a very dynamic speaker, and not low on ego. In his talk to the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation earlier this month he claimed credit for setting the ROE target of 8% in the Ito Review instigated by Prime Minister Abe as part of his Abenomics structural and governance reforms. Yanagi was criticised for plucking this figure out of nowhere, which was seen as unrealistic given that ROE in Japan had been averaging at just over 5% over the past 30 years.

He took us through his research, to point out that the Price Book Ratio only moves into positive territory (in other words the company is valued on the stock market at a higher rate than the cash and assets it has) when ROE is 8% in Japan. Apparently investors are discounting cash held by Japanese companies by 50%, because they fear that the company might make a stupid investment, and overpay, or just sleep on the cash instead of using it productively. By contrast, US companies’ average ROE over the past 28 years has been around 14%.

Shareholder value destruction rooted in Japan’s main bank governance system

Yanagi sees the root cause of this shareholder value destruction as being the main-bank governance system that used to dominate Japanese blue chip companies – whereby each major company had a “main bank” from one of the keiretsu, who provided most of their funding, governance and cross shareholding along with other keiretsu members. This main bank system was crumbling even before the Ito Review set the ROE target and other corporate governance reforms. Foreign shareholders now represent the largest shareholder group on average – owning around 30.8% of listed Japanese companies’ shares, up from less than 10% 30 years’ ago. Since the governance reforms of 2012-2015, Japanese companies’ ROE has increased to 9% and the Price Book Ratio has become positive.

Of course this analysis provoked quite a lot of questioning from the audience – many of whom were investing in Japanese companies, and had qualms about any notion that Japan should adopt wholesale the Anglo Saxon short term shareholder value maximization model. Yanagi was not saying that Japanese companies should drop their commitment to the environmental and social elements of ESG, but should look at the return on equity of such initiatives too.

An investment in a Japanese company is not just an investment in the Japanese economy

He gave the example of Eisai’s commitment to manufacturing – for free – medicine to eliminate the neglected tropical disease lymphatic filariasis. He believes Eisai will see a return to the cost of this, as it will increase the capacity utilization of Eisai’s factory in India, and improve their skills, and this factory then has the capability to produce other profit making drugs which can be exported to Europe.

There are quite a few investment funds in the West focused on Japan, and also several funds that exclude Japan because of its historically low returns. Most emphasise that they are aiming for long term capital growth, rather than quick returns. Usually they define a “Japanese company” as listed in Japan, or if listed elsewhere, having the majority of their business in Japan. As mentioned in another post, looking at companies like Takeda or SoftBank, or at this increase in foreign shareholdings, and more emphasis on return on equity – I do wonder whether the definition needs to be refined further.

An investment in a Japanese company is not just an investment in the Japanese economy. Many Japanese companies have the majority of their revenues from outside Japan. Takeda has more non-Japanese than Japanese executives. Whilst no shareholder should tolerate value destruction, the Japanese company’s traditional long term perspective, with emphasis on positive environmental and social contribution, rooted in specifics of the Japanese market and society, and now with added improved corporate governance, is surely an attractive one.

What is a Japanese company?

I had anticipated the “do you have any questions for us?” at a recent final interview for a non-executive directorship for an investment trust focused on Japan. I was advised by another experienced non-executive director to think of a thought provoking question, to show the board I was capable of bringing a different perspective, something they had not thought of before.

On reflection, I probably erred too far on the “thought provoking”. It was a genuine question, however, and I was genuinely interested in their answer. As the fund’s strategy was to invest only in Japanese companies, how do you define a Japanese company?

Listed in Japan or majority of business in Japan?

The fund defined it as being listed on a Japanese stock exchange. This may seem a clear enough definition, but does this mean Sharp, now owned by a Taiwanese company, Hon Hai, is a still a Japanese company? How about Hitachi Power Tools and Calsonic Kansei, now both owned by American buyout firm KKR?

Other Japan focused funds also invest in companies that are listed outside Japan, so long as a significant majority of their business is in Japan. But if percentage of sales in Japan is the criterion, then there are plenty of Japanese companies who are listed in Japan, for whom a majority of their business is outside Japan – Takeuchi for example exports 95% of its diggers to overseas markets and 68% of Sony’s business is outside Japan.

Avoiding ‘country risk’

Why does it matter? It matters to the boards of such funds, because if they define “Japanese” as Japan listed or majority of business in Japan, then clearly they need to consider the “country risk” of Japan and ensure the strategy is adjusted, or mitigation is put in place accordingly.

They need an expert in Japanese economics or politics to read the entrails on whether Prime Minister Abe will be re-elected as leader of the LDP in September, and if so whether he will be in a strong enough position to carry on with his “Three Arrows” of reform. They need to be able to judge whether the recent dip in Japan’s GDP growth is temporary, or likely to be revised upwards in June, as often happens. They might need some inside track on trade friction around the world and how this might affect the Yen.

But if the strategy is to invest in specific Japanese companies with long term growth potential, then this is not the same as investing in the Japanese economy or a Japanese index tracker. The aim should be to look for companies that will succeed no matter what happens to the Yen or Abe.

Managed by Japanese executives?

Specifying that those companies should be Japanese indicates to me that there is thought to be something unique to Japanese companies that makes them worthy of special attention. So should it be that the management of the company is Japanese? In which case, how should Takeda be classified – likely to become even more dominated by non-Japanese executives after the acquisition of Shire?

What about other companies who, like Takeda, have substantial overseas business acquired through acquisition, but manage it mostly through an international HQ based outside Japan, such as Japan Tobacco (Swiss HQ) or Dentsu (Dentsu Aegis Network in the UK)?

Or how about SoftBank, founded and run by Masayoshi Son, ethnically Korean and educated in the USA? The original telecoms business is clearly Japanese, but what about ARM in the UK and Sprint in the US – not to mention Softbank’s massive Vision Fund which notably is not investing much into Japanese companies at all?

Where Japanese companies have the edge…

I propose some further, admittedly fuzzier definitions of “Japanese”. Firstly, the business should reflect an aspect where Japan has an “edge” – a comparative advantage. For example, any business that is focused on the elderly, as Japan has the most rapidly ageing population in the world, with over 25% over the age of 65. Or a business which has evolved from Japan’s traditional manufacturing and craftsmanship strengths, what is known as monozukuri in Japanese – highly sophisticated machine tools, robotics and components.

But I think there is something more than that to being “Japanese”. It’s about the corporate culture and governance – a different model to the Anglo-Saxon shareholder value maximization model. Investing in a Japanese company should be for long term capital growth rather than a quick dividend, as well as some satisfaction that the investment is going into a company which does not engage in creative destruction type capitalism.

…is also where the risks lie

And this is where the risks also lie. Japan’s stakeholder capitalist model means job security, but also hidden underemployment and low productivity. Jealous guarding of corporate reputation can mean cover ups when something goes wrong. Strong loyalty to other members of the corporate family can mean deference to seniors without questioning or challenging orders given. Extreme risk aversion can mean opportunities missed.

Understanding and mitigating these risks is not something that can be resolved by an informal chat with a contact in a ministry, nor by looking at exchange rate forecasts and putting some hedges in place.

This was the conversation I wanted to have, and where I thought I could add value, but that’s the trouble with the “any questions for us” coming at the end of the interview. As the board chair said – fascinating question, but you’d need a whole afternoon or a seminar to thrash it out. And no, I did not get the job.

Mitsubishi Corp alumnus toasts the Suntory spirit

When I left Mitsubishi Corporation after 9 years, I felt guilty that I had not found a way to repay (in business development rather than money) the MBA they sponsored me through and worried that the wonderful sempai (mentors) who had supported my career would now be angry with me. I was delighted and relieved therefore, when one of the sempai, very senior in the company, invited me for a drink when I was in Japan on a business trip, and explained to me and the other team members at the table that Mitsubishi Corporation should regard people who leave as alumni, just as McKinsey do. “We may end up doing business together one day,” he predicted.

Indeed Mitsubishi Corporation is now a valued customer of mine, and I have seen many other MC alumni rise to some of the top positions in the Japanese business world. Probably the most well known one is Takeshi Niinami. A graduate of Keio University, as so many MC people are, he was sponsored by MC through a Harvard MBA. He eventually became President of Lawson, the convenience store chain that MC had invested in, leading its turn around.

He is now the President of Suntory Holdings and was interviewed in Nikkei Business magazine about recent developments there, including the acquisition of Beam Inc (but not its acquisitions in Europe of Lucozade, Ribena and Orangina) and the “Suntory Way”.

What Beam got from Suntory

“The Suntory Way means that we develop products that our competitors do not have”, says Niinami. “When I explained this to the Jim Beam factory in Kentucky they were very supportive. Beam Inc headquarters people all had MBAs. American marketers get a sense of consumer trends from consultant’s reports and decided their strategy based on that, they never went to the gemba (shopfloor) the way we do in Japan. They just told the Kentucky factory what to do, top down, from afar. If you told them to go to the gemba they’d probably quit. There wasn’t one single person in the executive team who came from manufacturing and they weren’t investing in the factory. But the Kentucky people loved making things. So when we told them we saw manufacturing as the most important thing and appointed someone from manufacturing to the board, their motivation shot up.”

“When they came to see our factories in Japan, they became aware of the need to improve their Kentucky factory. Beam is even older than Suntory – more than 200 years of history. We were able to revive their DNA.”

What Suntory learnt from Beam

“Beam are really good at managing profitability. Suntory got heavily into debt to buy Beam and we are all focused on reducing this debt. Suntory was not as good at managing cash flow as Beam but we have learnt.”

What’s next for Suntory and Niinami

Niinami was brought in by the previous President and now CEO and Chairman, Nobutada Saji (also from the founding family) in 2014. Niinami thinks his successor is likely to be another member of the founding family – current COO NobuhiroTorii – and seems in favour of this, as a way of maintaining Suntory’s spirit. He also expects Suntory to remain a privately held company, despite discussions to the contrary when he first became President. The advantage, he says, is that Suntory is able to contribute to society, through the Suntory Hall (a famous concert venue in Tokyo) and also a water sustainability initiative, without having to justify this to shareholders.

As an outsider, Niinami feels he was able to see objectively how good the Suntory spirit was, and how to roll it out globally. He has set up a Suntory University to help with this. Although Niinami is only 59, he says he is willing to finish his career at Suntory. “I am already “of age” and I don’t think anyone will be asking this “odd fish” to join them.”

What we can learn from Airbnb about how to manage a multinational business

There was a backlash in the summer of 2017 in Europe against Airbnb and more widely against the impact of tourism on cities such as Venice and Barcelona. With the new minpaku (guesthouse) law being enacted in Japan, and Japan having its own tourism boom, there is much to learn for Japan and Europe from the “sharing economy” and its impact not just on the tourism industry but communities and global business.

I have used Airbnb both as a guest and also to rent out our spare room. All our guests have been friendly, tidy and responsible and have ranged from a Pakistani PhD student through to a comedian duo from Canada. My initial concerns about allowing strangers into our home have not been justified.

Airbnb helps with this by verifying identities – of host and guest – and encouraging people to upload personal details such as photos of themselves, their interests and the reason for their visit. Airbnb also provides a very user-friendly platform and plenty of support and advice to enable good communication and high standards of behaviour and facilities.

What is becoming clear, however, is that Airbnb has a lot more work to do at the local level. As disruptive companies mature, their business becomes more mainstream. There are more and more professional holiday letting companies appearing on Airbnb and whole houses and apartments – not just spare rooms – can be booked via the site. This is raising concerns about whether the appropriate taxes are being paid, whether the accommodation is sufficiently regulated in terms of safety and potential nuisance to neighbours and whether the bigger profits to be gained from putting properties on Airbnb rather than traditional renting is exacerbating housing shortages for local residents.

Theories of how to manage multinational businesses tend to focus on balancing local and global needs – for example the matrix structure of vertical businesses and horizontal functions, or making sure that brands are “glocal” – globally recognisable but with a local flavour – like a McDonald’s teriyaki burger.

What I have learnt from Airbnb is that the “personal” is also important. To be able to verify, trust and feel empathy with the customer/guest or supplier/host as a person, even if they come from a different culture to you.

Japanese multinationals are usually quite good at the local aspect – they pay their taxes and are good corporate citizens. At the global level, Japanese car brands in particular are making the transition towards becoming a “platform” – they provide the globally assured brand, design and quality standards in assembling parts from multiple regional suppliers.

The next challenge is the personal level. Japanese executives are self-effacing (mostly) and Japanese social media users prefer to stay anonymous and not reveal which companies they work for. But in order to ensure your company is “verifiable” and “trusted” by your customers, it will be necessary for the local face of your company to be more personal.

This article was originally published in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News and also appears Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

European pride + global standardization = long debates

The European senior management team of a business which had been newly acquired by a Japanese company complained to me about being treated as if Europe was one homogenous country, when in fact they only had offices in 5 very different countries in Europe, with a headquarters in Germany. “It’s true, we know how to work with each other in Europe – after all Europeans have been living and working together for hundreds of years, but it seems strange that on paper we’re supposed to be a tri-regional structure of Europe, North America and Asia, and yet North America has only two employees and Asia has no regional headquarters, with Taiwan, China, Korea and Japan being managed separately”

This was just a small company, but actually I have seen similar situations in many other much larger Japanese multinationals. It’s partly that Europeans are very sensitive to their status –and want to be treated on a par with other regional heads – and this means the European definition of regions, with Asia as one region.

But it’s also due to a justifiable concern that if the company is meant to be offering global products and services, it needs to have a well-balanced global structure operating off common platforms, systems and processes. If the company grows by acquisition, you often end up with very different portfolios of services and products from country to country, incompatible processes and systems and no clear idea of how revenue and costs should be shared across the regions which are contributing to the global offering.

This can cause huge, long running arguments, partly because standardizing trade, production processes and technology are interrelated issues. Once you decide what products and services are global and what are local, you have the basis for splitting revenue accordingly. But you have to be careful this does not lead to regional organisations focusing on their local products and services, refusing to participate in global contracts because they make more profit out of local contracts.

Once you know what you are offering globally, you can standardise the technology – such as having all the company’s websites running off the same content management system, or production running off the same platforms or sales and purchasing using the same global accounting system.

Sometimes Japan headquarters has to swallow their pride for the sake of speed and efficiency. I was impressed that Nomura, when it acquired Lehman Brothers, decided to move their dealing onto the Lehman platform, because they judged it to be technically superior and faster than trying to integrate platforms or shift everyone onto the Japanese system.

Nobody wants to deal with these problems because they are so complex and lead to fights and easy resistance by those claiming that the global standard is not going to work in their markets. But unfortunately, if you do not deal with these issues soon after an acquisition, they fester and become even more difficult to resolve.

This article was originally published in Japanese for the Teikoku Databank News and appears in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

Mitsubishi Motors & Nissan – Is Ghosn prepared to try to nail jelly to the wall?

When it comes to the Mitsubishi group of companies (keiretsu), I did almost literally write the book (A History of Mitsubishi Corporation in London: 1915 to Present Day), although my focus was more on the way the pre-war Mitsubishi Goshi evolved into Mitsubishi Corporation, the trading company, and more specifically, its London office.

It’s generally perceived in Japan that the Mitsubishi keiretsu has been the most cohesive and robust of all the keiretsu (Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo being the other main ones) but as you might imagine, the current Mitsubishi Motors fuel economy data manipulation scandal has put this to the test.

According to Nikkei Business magazine (April 22^nd edition, not available online), the cracks are appearing. Whereas in the previous Mitsubishi Motors crises (recalls for various defects in the 2000s) Mitsubishi Heavy, Mitsubishi Corporation and Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ all stepped in and financial support came from Tokio Marine, Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Materials as well, this time seems different.

Even now, having been hit by the commodity price slump, the automotive sector remains an important profit generator for Mitsubishi Corporation as it is involved in the sale and financing of vehicles in Asia and Europe as well as engine manufacture. Mitsubishi Corporation also seconds quite a few employees to Mitsubishi Motors, including the current Chairman and CEO Osamu Masuko.

Other Mitsubishi companies do not have such ties. Even though Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings supplies products to the automotive sector, its main customers are Toyota and Nissan. Mitsubishi Paper also said “we are busy with our own affairs”.

It’s not just about whether the companies have business together, points out the Nikkei. It’s also an issue of corporate governance. The Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group has been reducing cross shareholdings, where appropriate. Mitsubishi Corporation is also checking shareholdings regularly for rationale and yield and disposing of them as necessary. Presumably it is hard to justify “Protecting the Three Diamonds” as the sole reason for support, to external directors and shareholders.

The Nikkei sees this as a chance for the Mitsubishi group to embark on a delayed restructure [the article was written before Nissan stepped in to acquire a 34% share]. In previous restructurings, there was a discussion about selling off the largely domestic ‘mini-car’ business, so this might be finally realised.

A more recent article in the Nikkei Asian Review points out that a key question is whether Nissan’s CEO Carlos Ghosn’s aggressive brand of reform will suit the corporate culture at Mitsubishi Motors “where change is not exactly a buzzword”. The question I have is what the corporate culture of Mitsubishi Motors actually is, other than a reluctance to change. The lack of a clear definition of values and vision may indeed be one of the causes of the repeated scandals. There are the Mitsubishi Three Principles, but not all Mitsubishi companies showcase them, and they lack the strong philosophy and toolkit of something like the Toyota Way.

Along with my official book on Mitsubishi in London I wrote a further unpublishable chapter, called “The Vague Company”. It talked about the benefits and difficulties of having a vague, unspoken corporate culture. Employees can enjoy the sense of being treated like adults, to work out for themselves what the right “way” is, but it makes global expansion – particularly post-merger integration – highly frustrating, when new, hybrid cultures need to develop. As one frustrated American employee at another Mitsubishi group company said to me the other day “I can’t get a handle on what the Mitsubishi Way is”. It is, as we say in British English, like trying to nail jelly to a wall. I suspect Ghosn may quickly tire of this and use his hammer in more brutally effective ways.

For more on Mitsubishi Motors’ future, I recommend this blog post by my old friend and former head of corporate communications at Mitsubishi Motors in the Daimler Chrysler days, Jochen Legewie: http://www.cnc-communications.com/blog/the-future-of-mitsubishi-motors/

For more on Mitsubishi corporate culture, I have gathered some resources on Pinterest here

“It’s a black hole. We send information to Japan and never get anything back”

One of the German consultants on our team in Europe is a Toyota Production System expert. I asked her what she recommends to mixed Japanese and European teams in the companies she advises, if they are not communicating well. To my surprise, instead of talking about concepts and processes such as gembashugi (going to the place where the work is happening) or visualisation, she replied that first of all she gets them to agree on a vision for the team.

I discussed in previous articles in this series that in order for Japan headquarters to coordinate effectively with their European subsidiaries, they need first of all to look at the people concerned, and make sure there are clearly understood counterparts, madoguchi (window into an organisation) and tantousha (person in charge).

It may seem that the obvious next step is to set up communication processes between these people, but I think my German colleague is right, that without a vision for the end goal of this communication, many of these processes will become ineffective or die out.
For example, a British company I advise, who have a subsidiary in Japan, told me that they hold regular global teleconferences for certain business and research areas. However they recently discovered that the representative from one of the teams in Japan merely attends the teleconference and does not share what was learned with the rest of their team members. Clearly the Japanese representative does not see the value in cascading further what they heard.

Similarly, the Japanese expatriates at a Japanese manufacturer in the UK told me they all send weekly hokoku (1 pager reports) back to Japan (in Japanese of course), but when in the past they tried to get the British managers involved, the British soon lost interest, seeing it as an additional bureaucratic burden. “It’s a black hole”, one of the British managers told me. “We send information to Japan but never get anything back”. Again, they could not see the benefit to being involved in the communication process. In both this case and the previous case, employees need to feel they are getting information back in return for their input, which is relevant to their jobs.

Many Japanese companies say they have a vision, but in my experience these are often too vague to be actionable. By actionable, I mean that the vision has enough substance that you can make decisions based on it. Most visions for Japanese B2B manufacturers can be summarised as “contributing to society through innovation” which is actionable to some extent, but means that the company cannot really differentiate itself from its competitors who are saying the same thing. So customers also cannot see the benefit of choosing one supplier over another.

The vision that the company, and the teams within the company have should be differentiated from its competitors, and be actionable. The benefit to behaving in accordance with the vision has to be clear and understood by employees. Once that is in place, the processes for communication and compliance between the headquarters and its subsidiaries will almost take care of themselves.

This article was originally published in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News and also appears in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

If you can’t find a counterpart in Japan HQ, you might need a window

I concluded in my previous article that Japanese headquarters looking to coordinate effectively with their European subsidiaries needed to consider “people” in addition to having clear communication processes and ensuring there are shared vision and values about how the company should behave.

In the past, many multinationals, not only Japanese companies, relied on a network of expatriate staff to disseminate corporate culture and keep the headquarters informed about what was happening abroad.

Now, Japanese companies are finding that they do not have enough ‘global jinzai’ (globally experienced personnel) at senior levels who are capable of managing their overseas operations, so are having to rely on locally hired senior executives.

These locally hired senior executives often become very frustrated if the communication processes are not clear, and the values and vision are not shared. They find themselves answering the same questions over and over again from multiple divisions in Japan and begin to feel they are not trusted. They are unable to make decisions or propose change and yet do not know who in Japan to ask for support or how to ask them.

This problem does not occur so frequently in Western multinationals because the compliance, authorisation and reporting processes are usually made very clear from the moment a company is acquired or set up. Also, the organisation of people tends to be similar across most Western companies. It’s therefore easy for a manager in an overseas subsidiary to work out who their counterpart is, or who the key decision maker might be.

In the European marketing department of one of the Japanese companies I worked for, we had a proposal that needed us to identify and build relationships with many different people in Japan to gain support. In a Western company this would have been easy – there would have been a marketing department, headed by a senior executive (probably EVP level) in the headquarters who would have responsibility for the strategy, vision and brand of the company.

However in this Japanese company there was no recognisable marketing department. The corporate brand office was more like the compliance part of the PR department – checking that the logo was used correctly. The advertising department simply did whatever each business unit told it to. There was a corporate strategy department but it did not seem to have any relation to the kind of marketing strategy that Europeans are used to.

I hesitate to say that my conclusion is that Japanese companies have to reorganise their headquarters along Western lines in order to succeed globally, but I do recommend that plenty of attention is given to finding counterparts and making it explicit what the tantousha (person in charge of the daily work) and madoguchi (window into an organisation, single point of contact) concepts mean, and identifying who those people should be in the headquarters. This should help reduce the burden of requests going to the local managers and help them build trusting relationships with key people in Japan. Once that is done, attention can be paid to shared values and communication processes.

This article was originally published in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News and appears in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

What Japanese companies can learn from HSBC’s compliance struggles

Descriptions of the difficulties faced by the UK multinational bank HSBC in 2015 reminded me strongly of the challenges faced by Japanese companies which are trying to globalise through acquisition. 2015 should have been the year in which HSBC celebrated 150 years since being founded in Hong Kong by British and Anglo-Indian merchants as a trade finance bank. Unfortunately this was marred by a tax evasion scandal at its Swiss private banking arm.

HSBC acquired a Swiss private bank in 1999, a few years after it acquired Midland Bank, one of the UK’s “Big Four” retail banks. Then in 2003 it acquired Household Finance, a US consumer finance operation. Up until this diversification of the business, HSBC managed its network of operations through a tight knit group of expatriates (all male until 1989) who were generalists, who had been trained like army officers in a Hong Kong “mess” (similar to a Japanese company dormitories), and were therefore trusted enough to be sent around the world to be the “man on the spot”.

This group of generalist managers found it difficult to control businesses that they knew nothing about, in countries they were not familiar with, so local executives from the acquired company were allowed to continue controlling those businesses. Unfortunately the scandal at the Swiss private banking arm was not the only failure of this approach. Two years ago HSBC had to pay a US$1.9bn fine to US authorities for failing to stop the laundering of drug money through its Mexican operation – the banking and financial services company Bital that it acquired in 2002.

If leaving control to local managers is too risky, should Japanese companies who are acquiring overseas subsidiaries continue to try to exert control through Japanese expatriates? This is neither practical, nor the solution. There seems to be a shortage of suitably experienced Japanese managers who can be sent overseas. And like the HSBC expatriates, they are generalists, and will therefore find it hard to understand what is going on in specialist areas of the business in a foreign country.

Without the Japanese expatriate acting as a liaison, conduit and interpreter however, the foreign executives soon find themselves swamped by endless requests for information from the Japan headquarters, supposedly for compliance and risk management purposes. They try to respond to as best they can, but get nothing back in return. It can lead to a sense of not being trusted, and confusion as to the right direction to take.

For HSBC, the solution proposed by many commentators and the CEO himself is to do with having a strong corporate culture and values, and processes for communicating them globally, along with rigorously implemented compliance policies. If this is in place, then a certain degree of autonomy can be given to local managers.

For Japanese companies, where human relationships are so important, to ‘process’ and ‘values’ I would add ‘people’. In future articles I will look in more detail at these three elements and suggest some practical steps to take.

This article originally published in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News also appears in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

Category: Japanese business blog