Acquire or be acquired – predictions on the future of Japanese mergers and acquisitions

Japanese companies used to be seen as very reluctant to acquire and merge with other companies, but the record breaking £46bn acquisition, finalised in January 2019, of Irish pharmaceuticals company Shire by Japan’s Takeda may not even be the peak of what has been at least 10 years’ of an overseas spending spree by Japanese companies. Faced with a declining, ageing domestic market, Nikkei Business magazine expects Japanese companies to continue their spending spree in 2019, even if there is not a big ticket purchase like Takeda/Shire.

Autonomous vehicles, Internet of Things and other new technologies are likely to be the focus of future M&A. For example Japan’s tyre maker Bridgestone has acquired the telematics business of Dutch company TomTom. “Tyre companies are also entering the era of CASE (Connected, Autonomous, Sharing Electric)” says Bridgestone’s CEO Masaaki Tsuya. Sensors can be placed in tyres to understand driving conditions, for example.

In the IT sector, NEC has acquired the UK company Northgate Public Services in January 2019 and in December of the previous year acquired Denmark’s KMD Holding and is looking to acquire a stake in India’s Mindtree.

Food and drink companies are also active – Mizkan, Ajinomoto and Asahi Beer have all made acquisitions recently in Europe.

In the financial sector, Nikkei Business speculates that a Japanese company like SMFG or Orix might be interested in acquiring GE’s aircraft leasing business GECAS, headquartered in Ireland – although GE has since denied GECAS is for sale. MUFG might be interested in the US Bank of the West.

Most of the acquisitions of Japanese companies have been by Chinese companies, but Nikkei Business also wonders whether some of the big Western automotive suppliers such as Bosch, Continental, ZF, or Magna might not be interested in acquiring Japanese automotive suppliers.

Declutter and dispose

M&A is also an opportunity for Japan’s keiretsus (conglomerates and company groupings) to do a bit of tidying up. The trendsetter in this has been Hitachi, who have been pursuing a rigorous policy of “selection and focus” in rearranging their business portfolio. Over the past 10 years or so they have sold off Hitachi Global Storage Technologies to Western Digital, Hitachi Logistics to SG Holdings, sold a 27% share in Hitachi Capital to MUFG, sold Hitachi Power Tools and Hitachi Kokusai Electric to KKR and Clarion to Faurecia.

Japanese investors and banks are keeping a watch on Hitachi High Technologies, Hitachi Chemical, Hitachi Automotive Systems, Hitachi Construction Machinery and Hitachi Metals as the next possible candidates. Hitachi Chemical and Hitachi Metals were supposed to be two of the “Three Branches” of Hitachi along with Hitachi Cable, so the idea that they could be sold off would be heresy to some Hitachi old timers. As the Nikkei Business magazine says, Hitachi is trying to compete as a global company, so any business that has no synergy with its “social innovation” vision is likely to be dropped.

Panasonic already sold off its security camera business and foreign funds are eyeing up Panasonic Avionics – an inflight entertainment company – as a likely next candidate. “It has nothing to do with Panasonic’s main business”, one investor commented.

Takeda seems to be preparing to dispose of its consumer healthcare business to help fund its acquisition of Shire, as it has spun off its vitamin drinks and other products into a separate company.

Fujitsu has also been disposing of its hardware businesses – mobile phones, car electronics and PCs and Sony‘s mobile phone business is still struggling, and rumours that it could be sold continue.

Spark surprise

Nikkei Business concludes with some surprise predictions from the experts it spoke to:

Astellas and Daiichi Sankyo merging
Pioneer and JVCKenwood merging
SoftBank acquiring NEC
Fast Retailing acquiring Gap
Google acquiring Recruit
Amazon acquiring 7&i (7-11 convenience store chain)

Unsettling though it may be for the employees concerned, if clarity in the focus and business of Japan’s iconic companies results from these M&As, ultimately it should make for a more confident Japan Inc.

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Size matters when choosing a Japanese company

Whether you’re looking to work for or supply to a Japanese company, size matters. The most obvious reason being, as bank robber Willie Sutton apparently never said, “that’s where the money is”. That’s why we started our Top 30 Japanese Employers rankings – we’ve found them useful in understanding our customer base and the likely concerns of participants in our seminars.

We use the number of employees as a proxy for size rather than turnover or profit, and although there is a degree of correlation between employee numbers globally and in Europe and overall profit, there are some exceptions.

Toyo Keizai have recently listed up the companies* who made the biggest cumulative profit in the past 10 years and it’s absolutely no surprise that Toyota, one of the biggest companies in Japan and #9 amongst Japanese companies in Europe, made a whopping Y11 trillion ($99bn) cumulative profit from 2007 to 2017, far outstripping NTT and NTT Docomo at #2 and #3 who made less than half that amount. NTT and NTT Docomo are not in our Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe, although another group company, NTT Data, is.

However NTT and NTT Docomo never made a loss, whereas Toyota did go into the red – with a loss of $.8.6bn in 2008/9. Honda, who has had a tough time in Europe (and is #23 in our rankings), has also never made a loss, and accumulated a $36bn profit over the decade. Nissan, who made a loss but was famously turned round by Carlos Ghosn, is 10th largest in Europe in our rankings and has the 6th largest cumulative profit.

I was surprised to see my old employer Mitsubishi Corporation at #5, as they too had some rough patches particularly with losses in the commodity side, but clearly overall the Japanese trading companies have been very profitable, despite their death being heralded every decade – Mitsui is at #9, Itochu at #11, Sumitomo Corp at #14 and Marubeni at #21.

Unsurprisingly, almost none of the Japanese electronics companies feature in the top 30, apart from Canon at #10 and Mitsubishi Electric at #25. Other industries in the top 50 most profitable are automotive (Denso, Bridgestone) and pharmaceutical (Takeda, Astellas) related, and also heavily domestic businesses such as telecommunications (KDDI, SoftBank as well as NTT mentioned above), rail and retail (7&I, Fast Retailing).

Two of the largest Japanese companies in Europe – Fujitsu and Hitachi – are at #69 and #70 – Hitachi’s cumulative profit was heavily dented by the historic loss of $8bn in 2008/9. The largest company in the Europe and Africa region – Sumitomo Electric Industries (due to its labour intensive automotive manufacturing operations) is at #38, with a $6bn cumulative profit.

*Excludes banks, insurance and other financial services companies

Large, stable employers are important for the health of the community, whatever the country of origin

You may remember, though it feels like a lifetime ago given what has happened since, that the front pages of the British business press in early 2014 were full of debate about whether to welcome or be worried by the US pharmaceutical company Pfizer’s bid to take over AstraZeneca, a UK-Swedish company. The £63bn bid would have made it the biggest foreign takeover of a British company in history.

Initially the British government wanted to portray the bid as a vote of confidence in what they had done to make Britain an attractive destination for foreign investment. However, the former CEO of AstraZeneca, Sir David Barnes, said that he was concerned that Pfizer would “act like a praying mantis and suck the lifeblood out of their prey. “ Pfizer wants to move its tax domicile to Britain when it acquires AstraZeneca, to take advantage of the UK’s low corporate tax rate and what is called a “patent box”, which gives tax breaks for research.

If Pfizer want these tax incentives, it should invest in the UK itself, and not attempt to do it via a takeover, Sir David argued. Pfizer last hit the headlines in the UK when it closed down its 60 year old research facilities in the east of England, with the loss of nearly 2000 jobs, in 2011. A few years before that it closed R&D sites in Nagoya, Japan and the US. The reasoning at the time was that research was better outsourced to smaller companies.

I have not heard anyone say that this trend has reversed, yet AstraZeneca committed to investing £500 million in a new research facility and headquarters in Cambridge, which is the main science cluster in the UK. Pfizer say it would honour this investment, and the jobs that depend on it, for five years at least.

The consensus in the UK seemed to be that given Pfizer’s “accounting led” approach, such commitments may not be worth much. The US company Kraft also promised it would not cut jobs when it took over one of the UK’s most famous companies, the chocolate manufacturer Cadburys, in 2010, and then shortly after closed down one of its factories.

This does not mean that the UK is hostile to all foreign takeovers, however. Japanese companies are much more welcome, as they are seen as having long term commitment to their investments. Takeda’s acquisition of Swiss company Nycomed did lead to job losses but this is seen as inevitable after a merger.* It is the wholesale closure of a factory or R&D site with major impact on the community around it which troubles people in Europe.

Many of the British researchers laid off by Pfizer in 2011 have found jobs in small start ups, but not everyone can be an entrepreneur or has the personal resilience to go through the trauma of redundancy. When I ask participants in my training what they like about working in a Japanese company, they almost always mention the stability, the long term view and the loyalty of the company to its staff. Large, stable employers are important for the health of the community, whatever the country of origin.

* Takeda announced it would close its Cambridge Science Park R&D facility in August 2016. R&D activity will be concentrated in the US and Japan, and the UK will move from global coordination activities to European only. I wonder how long that will last if the European Medicines Agency moves out of the UK however.

This article originally appeared in Japanese in the Teikoku Databank News on 11th June January 2014 and also appears in Pernille Rudlin’s new book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

Japanese companies move into sort-of reassurance mode re Brexit

Both Nomura and Toyota have moved to reassure their employees their jobs in the UK are safe – for the time being. The devil is in the detail of course – Toyota says plans through to 6 or 7 years from now have already been made, after which, no one can predict anyway, and Nomura’s new COO says London will remain the main brokerage in Europe and there are no plans to move jobs to elsewhere in Europe in the next two years.

Both companies are in our Top 30 Japanese companies in the UK, employing around 5,500 between them. Toyo Keizai magazine’s recent article on whether Japanese companies will move away from the UK has helped us update the ranking further, and we can now say just under 100,000 people are employed by the Top 30. The article goes on to speculate what Hitachi might do about its rail business if the UK was to leave the single market and default to tariffs of 10%. The global headquarters were moved to the UK in 2014 and a factory has been built in Newton Aycliffe. Hitachi is competing with Bombardier (Canada), Siemens (Germany) and Alsthom (France) – the latter two being in the European Union and the eurozone of course.

“Japanese car manufacturers underpin the UK automotive industry”, says Toyo Keizai. Honda, Nissan and Toyota represent half of the 1,590,000 cars that were produced in the UK in 2015, with Nissan being the second largest manufacturer in the UK after Jaguar Land Rover. Around 80% of Nissan’s cars, manufactured in Sunderland, are exported to the EU and elsewhere. NIssan directly employs around 8000 people across the UK, and indirectly a further 32,000.

Yet 61% of Sunderland voters supported Leave, despite the fact that if access to the EU market is restricted, they are likely to lose their jobs. For Honda and Toyota, the UK only represents 2% of their total production, compared to 10% for Nissan. As the utilisation of Nissan partner Renault’s factories is not high, it’s likely production will shift to France.

However it takes time to shift production. “What sort of deal Carlos Ghosn can get from the UK government will influence how the rest of the Japanese car manufacturers will view production in the UK” says Takaki Nakanishi of the Nakanishi Research Institute.

Other issues for Japanese companies are whether the UK retains financial passporting, and for Takeda and other pharmaceutical companies, whether the European Medicines Agency stays in the UK or not.

Japanese companies in the UK

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Octopus balls to Tokyo – why it matters where your company is from in Japan

Most countries have rival cities – usually the official capital city versus other cities which consider themselves to be the real business, historical or cultural heart of the country – think London versus Manchester or Birmingham, Berlin versus Dusseldorf or Frankfurt, Rome versus Milan, Madrid versus Barcelona. Japan is no exception and the rivalries go way back into history.

Kyoto used to be the capital of Japan, before Tokyo (or Edo as it was then) began to usurp it in the 17th century. If you ask Japanese people today about Kyoto, they joke that Kyotoites still think Kyoto is the real capital of Japan, and the Emperor is just temporarily visiting Tokyo (he moved there in 1868, when Tokyo became the official capital) – and will return one day.

Tokyo literally means the Eastern Capital and is part of the Kanto region, where the ruling feudal Tokugawa shogunate was based from the 17th century. Kanto means East of the Barrier (usually considered to be the Hakone checkpoint) and Kansai – the region where Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto are based – means the West of the Barrier (originally the Osaka Tollgate).

Before Kyoto’s reign as capital for a 1000 years, Nara (also in the Kansai region) was the capital and seat of the Emperor but is now a quiet backwater, more visited by tourists than business people. Kobe is the other main city in the Kansai region – a port with a strongly cosmopolitan feel and very close to Osaka geographically. Whilst Kyoto remains aloof and quietly superior (and has some very successful high tech companies of its own such as Kyocera and Nidec), the real battle now in business culture is between Osaka and Tokyo.

Osakans see Tokyo as standardizing, dull and full of bureaucrats and view Osaka (which historically had very few samurai but plenty of merchants) as the real money maker, with vastly superior food. Many of Japan’s celebrities, comedians and musicians come from the Kansai region too.

So what does this mean for corporate cultures? Osaka companies often have merchant roots – the joke goes, when you meet an Osakan, you don’t ask “how are you” (ogenki desuka) but “how’s business” (moukarimakka). To which the correct response is “bochi bochi denna” – a wonderfully vague way of giving nothing away, like saying “plodding along nicely thank you”. Osaka companies are brash, tough negotiators and mean with the money. “They’d skin the fleece off a gnat” said one British engineer to me, describing his colleagues in the Osaka HQ of a consumer electronics company.

Tokyo companies are gentlemanly but at the same time highly political. You need to have a good understanding of their organisation, the factions and the individual relationships to understand how to get things done. Mitsui and Mitsubishi, both Tokyo based corporate groups, are distinguished by the saying “Mitsui is people – Mitsubishi is the organisation”. It’s hard sometimes to understand how exactly this is different, but it seems to boil down to the idea that if an individual is powerful enough at a Mitsui group company, they can get things done, whereas at a Mitsubishi group company, the whole organisation has to support an action.

The other main corporate groups, Sumitomo and Itochu, are Kansai based companies. Both have strong “mercantile” roots – Sumitomo in metals trading, hard-nut, conservative and domestically focused and Itochu – strong in fashion and consumer goods, and seen as the more maverick, progressive and international in outlook. The regional cultural differences don’t seem to have been that strong between Sumitomo and Mitsui as various mergers have taken place between their respective member companies, particularly in financial services. However regional cultural differences have definitely had an impact on Astellas Pharma, the product of a merger between Yamanouchi (Tokyo) and Fujisawa (Osaka). Apparently many Fujisawa employees were horrified that Yamanouchi was going to be the dominant partner in the merger. Fujisawa had a strong tradition of innovation and had regarded Yamanouchi as “Mane-nouchi” (Mane = imitation) – a bunch of play-safe Tokyo bureaucrats.

Those who know Japan well will have spotted that there is an important region missing from this analysis – Chubu. Literally and metaphorically this is the midlands of Japan. Just like the Midlands in the UK it is the historic heart of the car industry. Nagoya is the main city, and teased just as Birmingham in the UK is for being ugly and soullessly modern. The area has the last laugh though, as it is the most wealthy in Japan – thanks to the enduring success of Toyota (so mighty their home town was renamed Toyota City) and its corporate group of suppliers such as Denso.

So, where are the top 30 Japanese companies in Europe from?

Kanto/Tokyo based companies:

• Asahi Glass
• Astellas (but Fujisawa originally Osaka)
• Canon
• Daiichi Sankyo
• Fujifilm
• Fujitsu
• Hitachi
• Honda
• Kao Corporation
• Mitsubishi group
• Mitsui group
• Nissan
• Nomura (but was Osaka originally)
• NTT group
• NYK group
• Olympus
• Ricoh
• Sony
• Toshiba

Kansai based companies:
• Horiba (Kyoto)
• Nidec (Kyoto)
• Nippon Sheet Glass (Sumitomo Group)
• Omron (Kyoto)
• Panasonic (Osaka)
• Sharp (Osaka)
• Sumitomo group (Osaka)
• Takeda Pharma (Osaka)

Chubu based companies:
• Denso
• Seiko Epson
• Toyota

Chugoku (Hiroshima etc) based companies:

• Fast Retailing/Uniqlo

Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe 2021

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Japanese companies need to pull up younger burdock roots if they really want to grow globally

Along with “tako tsubo” (octopus pot), another Japanese concept “gobou nuki” (plucking out burdock roots) used in HR has been deemed harmful to corporate Japan’s global prospects.

The term has been used frequently in the Japanese media recently, according to Masahiro Kotosaka, an ex McKinsey consultant now at Ritsumeikan University. In a recent article in Nikkei Business Online he points out that the recent appointments as President of Takuya Hirano at Microsoft Japan, Tatsuo Yasunaga at Mitsui & Co, Koji Arima at Denso, Tatsuya Tanaka at Fujitsu and Takahiro Hachigo at Honda have all been described as plucking burdock roots, as they are in their 40s or 50s, younger than normal for Presidents in corporate Japan. The average age of Japanese Presidents was 62 in 2014 (up from 61 in 2013), around 10 years higher than the global average.

The older age is of course partly explained by the continuation of seniority based pay and promotion in Japan – although Panasonic, Sony and Hitachi have all recently announced they are abolishing or looking to abolish this system.

The average age in Japan for a “kacho” (section head, the first managerial position in Japanese companies) is 38.6 and 44 for a “bucho” (department head, or General Manager) according to Recruitworks. In India, China or Thailand, the average is 9 years lower for kacho and 10 years lower for bucho. Even the US average is 5 years lower for both positions.

Kotosaka asserts that Japanese companies need to start pulling out younger burdock roots, people who might be future executives, and making sure they have early leadership experience. If this does not happen, the younger generations of Japanese will soon feel a big gap with their overseas peers.

Already Kotosaka has heard (as I have) from Japanese companies that they feel the utilisation of non-Japanese or external executives has increased and the presence of Japanese executives has faded.

The most notable example is of course Christophe Weber, President of Takeda Pharma, and his team of 16 executives, of whom 8 are non-Japanese and have come from outside the company and two are non-Japanese who joined through being executives in a Takeda acquisition. Weber had his first leadership experience at the age of 29 when he became a country manager at GSK. Carlos Ghosn of Nissan also became head of a factory at the age of 27.

My former employer Mitsubishi Corporation is mentioned as an honourable exception to the lack of experience given to juniors, along with gaishi (foreign owned) consulting companies and private equity firms. For such companies, people are the main asset, and it’s true I suppose that trading companies such as Mitsubishi that have now moved more towards acquisitions rather than trading, do afford ample opportunity for younger Japanese to take up management positions abroad. In practice though, I have seen many instances where the acquisition is left to manage itself, and the Japanese expat director mostly stays in the regional headquarters, processing paperwork to send back to Japan HQ, rather than hands on managing the business.

Takeda’s first year of global openness, after 230 years as a ‘closed country’

I proposed last August that “a charm offensive on the Nikkei group of publications might be advisable” to help new Takeda’s first ever non-Japanese President Christophe Weber gain support, and The Nikkei Business’s recent voluminous special features on Takeda Pharmaceuticals’ globalization in its online and print editions shows I was not the only one thinking this.

The Nikkei’s stance seems broadly favourable, and can be summed up as “this might happen to you too – so you might as well be positive about it”. There will be plenty more cases where a globalizing Japanese company realizes that to expand overseas, they will need executives who have produced results in doing business in other cultures, rather than executives who are well versed on the internal workings of the company but know nothing of the world outside, says the Nikkei.

The key point here is not just “overseas experience” but actually having produced results. And this is going to be a difficult requirement to fulfil for the current upcoming generation of Japanese executives in major Japanese corporations, many of whom, even if they have overseas experience, have mainly been in caretaker and liaison roles, rather than growing new businesses.

The special feature articles go into some interesting detail on the key personalities and what has actually happened at Takeda over the past few years. At the heart of it is Tachi Yamada, brought in by President Hasegawa in 2009 as a member of one of the executive committees and then to head up the R&D function. Tachi Yamada has dual US Japan citizenship and is a well known name in the pharmaceutical industry, latterly heading up the Global Health Program at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. He has also been a board member at GlaxoSmithKline, and it is his network that led Hasegawa to Weber and others.

Yamada saw the need to find new drugs as the Takeda pipeline was thin and many of its drugs were going off patent. So he completely overhauled the structure of the organisation and embarked on some acquisitions. Another key person brought in by Hasegawa was Paul Chapman, also ex GSK, who has taken Japanese citizenship (and has a Japanese wife) and changed his name to Tetsuyuki Maruyama.

Maruyama interviewed each of the Japanese executives asking them why they thought they were suited to the role. As a result of this, 35 younger researchers were promoted to management, including 10 women where previously there had been none. 60 managers left the research function including one of the founding Takeda family members. Of the 6 Drug Discovery Units, 5 are headed by non-Japanese.

Yamada will retire this year at the age of 70 and his successor as Chief Scientific and Medical Officer will also be a non-Japanese outsider – Andrew Plump from Sanofi. Of course, this is causing disquiet amongst the Japanese staff – “Japanese can’t get promoted, if more and more foreigners are appointed. And they are earning many times our salary. It seems like just being Japanese is a minus in Takeda now”.

To counter this, one of the Japanese executives, Shinji Honda, who had been seen as a candidate for next president instead of Weber is now heading up a global leader programme for Japanese employees. “I want them to experience overseas business 5 or 10 years earlier than I did”, says Honda, “then they can be the next leader or the next leader after that, to succeed Weber. This is my last big job.”

But as Akie Iriyama of Waseda Business School points out, another area that will need to be addressed is for non-Japanese to join the company at middle management or lower levels too, and to bring more of the employees of overseas acquisitions to come and work in Japan, otherwise there will be too big a gulf between the non-Japanese executives and other levels of the organisation.

We will transform Takeda into a global company within 5 years

Christophe Weber, President and COO of Japanese pharmaceuticals company Takeda, responds to “7 Questions” in the Nikkei Business magazine:

1. You announced your new strategy in October?

I spent the past 8 months since I joined Takeda [from GlaxoSmithKline] talking to various employees, from which I have reached an understanding of Takeda’s strengths and weaknesses. The strategy is to support Takeda in becoming a global, R&D led company. The structure needs to be changed to become more effective, and to develop global minded human resources.

2. How long is needed for this transformation?

I am expecting it to take 5 years. We will focus the structure on the 4 disease areas of R&D strength in Takeda such as oncology and gastroenterology and also vaccines. We will join up the R&D functions which are distributed across various countries, and strengthen their links to improve their efficiency at the same time , as well as their agility.

3. Doesn’t globalization go against becoming more agile?

It’s true that globalization can cause the organisation to become more complex. However each R&D region will be given responsibility and decision making powers. Sales channels will also be delegated more decision making authority. This should enable them to have a degree of agility and for us to grow as a global company.

4. To be a truly global company, you need to expand in developing markets?

We bought the Swiss company Nycomed in 2011. Nycomed has strong sales channels in Russia, China and Brazil. We will develop these further, to sell drugs that we have been selling in Europe and North America. Developing markets are reforming their healthcare, and this will grow rapidly in the next decade.

5. The majority of your management team come from outside Takeda. Why are so few executives from within Takeda?

I expect to hire people from outside Takeda only when there are no suitable candidates within. If there are too many external hires, it gives the impression that we are not developing our own people sufficiently. Takeda currently lacks people with global experience. We are currently thinking how to develop more globally minded people.

6. You attracted a lot of attention as a foreign executive when you were appointed President in June?

It is still rare for a non-Japanese to run a Japanese company and it is a difficult job. However, when Chairman Hasegawa called me to talk to me about this, I thought it was a challenge I wanted to take up. Mr Hasegawa has a strong will to take on the world. I felt he was a fellow spirit.

7. There was some opposition to you as a foreign President from shareholders?

There were many opinions expressed, and I listened to them with respect. It is to be expected that there will be some negative reactions when a foreigner takes on this big a reform. History will judge whether this reform is correct. I was at my previous company for more than 20 years, so I am different from other foreign CEOs who change companies every few years. I have a similar character to the Japanese in that I value stability.

“Japan is different, but other countries are different, too” – Takeda’s Weber

Japan’s annual shareholders’ meeting season at the end of June went relatively smoothly for most companies, as their results had improved, in part due to the impact of a cheaper yen. Takeda was one of the exceptions, however, with the new President, Christophe Weber, facing protests from a 100 or so shareholders, more than half of whom were ex-Takeda employees.

Their 7 point letter claimed that the acquisition of Nycomed and Millennium Pharmaceuticals were failures, that the way Takeda was globalizing and the low morale of scientists in Japan called into question management effectiveness, that the way Weber was appointed as Hasegawa’s successor was questionable, that the focus on the executive management committee, largely peopled by “foreigners” was causing the board meetings to become a mere formality, that it was not clear why high dividends should be paid out when the financials were worsening, and finally that responsibility was not clear for the fine of $6bn in the US for concealing the risks for Actos, a diabetes drug.

Diamond Online analyses why Takeda is being criticised “from within”. Takeda was at a high point in 2006, but in decline since then, as four of its blockbuster drugs came off patent in the US. The search for new hit drugs led down the path of M&A. Takeda was the dominant Osaka pharmaceutical company, squaring up against Sankyo the Tokyo-based pharmaceutical giant. Behind the scenes, however, there were merger talks between the two. In the end Sankyo chose to team up with Daiichi.

So Takeda embarked on overseas acquisitions – Denmark’s Novo Nordisk and then Millennium in the USA in 2008, and finaly Nycomed in 2011. These acquisitions required substantial post merger restructuring, however there was noone capable of this in Takeda. The management layer below Hasegawa was “thin” ( a problem common to many Japanese companies, who cut back hiring of that cohort during the first oil shock). Hasegawa appeared isolated, and reliant on foreign executives and Japanese executives who had worked in foreign companies (in other words, not including the indigenous Japanese within Takeda)

Weber’s recent interview in the Japan Times, in which he emphasises that Takeda will remain “Japanese” is an attempt to reassure the Takeda founding family and domestic Japanese management, but whether an interview in English in Japan Times (an English language daily) is sufficient is doubtful. A charm offensive on the Nikkei group of publications might be advisable.

First non-Japanese CEO in Takeda’s 230 year history

Takeda, Asia’s largest pharmaceutical company, caused a sensation in November when it announced that it intended to appoint Christophe Weber, a French 47 year old outsider from GlaxoSmithKline, as its next CEO, subject to board approval. Not only is he not Japanese, but he is much younger than the average Japanese President, and he is the 20 year old veteran of another rival company.

He was not unknown to Takeda however, as he was key member in the collaboration between Takeda and GSK on a vaccine joint venture. However, when I discussed this appointment with the President of a Japanese start up company in the same healthcare sector he was not impressed – “a paucity of management” on the current CEO Yasukichi Hasegawa’s part, he harrumphed.

Hasegawa himself had been appointed by Kunio Takeda, scion of the founding family, in 2003, with Takeda stating “I’ve reached the limit of what I can do to globalize the company”. Hasegawa took up the baton, acquiring US cancer R&D company Millennium Pharmaceutical in 2008 and Swiss biotech company Nycomed in 2011. He tried to retain many of Millennium’s executives such as CEO Deborah Dunsire, who also joined Takeda’s unusually “diverse” board which includes Japanese American “Tachi” Yamada, President of Global Health at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Frank Morich, ex Bayer. However she resigned in 2013 as a result of the restructuring that Hasegawa pushed through, to integrate Millennium more fully into Takeda and streamline operations.

Apparently, a couple of years’ ago, Hasegawa said he wanted to have a Japanese person succeed him. He felt that diversifying the structure and bringing in non-Japanese was going to take time to show results, and he would have to pass the baton on before then.

Although my healthcare industry CEO used “paucity” to describe Hasegawa’s management capability, it seems from this that there is a paucity of internationally capable management within the Takeda home country organisation to carry on and support the bold moves that are being made – a situation many globalizing Japanese companies are facing.

Last updated by Pernille Rudlin at 2022-12-10.

Takeda

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