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Which Japanese companies to work for in Europe

We’ve been publishing our top 30 Japanese companies in Europe intermittently for 5 years now. We regularly receive enquiries for recommendations on which Japanese companies to approach as potential employers. We’re not a recruitment consultancy so we don’t have any inside track on what jobs are available (please talk to our friends at Centre People Appointments for more practical assistance), but I would say that size in Europe and growth are important factors to consider.

Relative size in Europe is a key factor

If the European operations of a Japanese company represent a substantial part of their business, then it’s more likely that Europeans will have some influence within the organisation. There will also be more promotion opportunities and career paths than working for a smaller organisation in Europe. For that reason, it’s worth trying to join the organisation in the European/EMEA headquarters.

Companies with a relatively high proportion of their employees in EMEA (25%+) include NSG (Pilkington), Asahi (brewery company recently acquired Grolsch, Peroni, Pilsner Urquell etc brands), NTT Data, Toyota Tsusho (acquired French company CFAO with a big presence in Africa), Asahi Glass, JT International, Konica Minolta.

Has the company been growing?

Not only are growing companies more likely to have job openings, but they are more fun to work for. Japanese companies are still growing their operations in Europe overall. However some have been undergoing substantial restructuring, which has resulted in significant headcount reductions in some countries, and significant growth in others. For example Fujitsu is reducing headcount in the UK and Germany, but growing rapidly in Poland and Portugal.

Companies that have grown the most rapidly in Europe (more than doubling) over the past five years are Nidec, NTT Data and Panasonic.

Working for an acquired company

The rapidly growing companies have mostly expanded through acquisition – for example Dentsu, Nidec, Panasonic (Ficosa, Zetes) and NEC (Northgate Public Services), Toyota Industries (Vanderlande), Hitachi (Ansaldo). Working in those acquired companies might also be an attractive option, as there will be more autonomy, and less domination by Japanese management layers than Japanese subsidiaries which have grown organically.

Companies who score highly in terms of growth and significant European presence are NTT Data (third largest company in Europe) and Dentsu (8th).

In terms of sectoral growth – as well as IT companies that are moving into services and solutions like NTT Data, Konica Minolta and Panasonic – Daikin (# 27) and Mitsubishi Electric (#30) have both grown substantially recently, probably due to expansion of their eco friendly air conditioning businesses.

For new graduates, many of the top 30 have graduate trainee schemes, which would be worth considering if you are looking for a chance to be seconded to Japan.

Top 3 largest Japanese employers in Europe, Middle East and Africa:

1. Sumitomo Electric Wiring

Large numbers of employees in manufacturing, as making automotive wire harnesses is still a fairly manual job. Manufacturing jobs will tend to be in North Africa and Eastern Europe. There are plenty of jobs in design engineering and sales as well, and will be future proof as apparently electric vehicles also require complex wire harnesses to operate.

EMEA headquarters: UK (SEWS-E), Italy (CABIND), Germany (Bordnetze)

No graduate trainee scheme, but this page gives a flavour of the jobs available in the region for SEWS-E https://www.sews-e.com/current-vacancies/

2. Yazaki

Very similar to Sumitomo Electric Wiring in terms of business and jobs but privately owned, so more of a family style corporate culture. Has a YEA!cademy (Yazaki Europe training academy) https://www.yazaki-europe.com/career.html

EMEA headquarters: Germany

3. NTT Data

Owned by Japan’s NTT (formerly Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, now partly privatised). NTT Data has acquired various companies in Europe and elsewhere such as itelligence, Cirquent, Value Team, Intelligroup, and Keane. NTT is in the middle of restructuring and have put a new global headquarters, NTT Limited, in London. NTT Data will be kept as a separate organisation, however.

Lots of training and chances to go to Japan, however recruitment seems more by country/company than centralised and as you can see here https://www.nttdata.com/global/en/careers

EMEA headquarters: UK

If you would like a consultation on working for a Japanese company, then you can book an hour with Pernille Rudlin here.

We also recommend doing the e-learning modules from the leading global intercultural training firm focused on Japanese business – Japan Intercultural Consulting – on working in a Japanese company – each module comes with a certificate – proof that you know what you’re letting yourself in for!

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It’s not over yet for Honda in the UK

“Don’t be ordinary, Honda” urges a 20 page special feature in Nikkei Business magazine. It points out that Honda occupies a similar space to Sony in Japanese people’s hearts. They both had maverick founders, produced quirky, innovative products for decades, lost their edge and then had to undergo deep restructuring to survive.

The loss of face for Swindon

Part 1 of the special feature starts in Swindon, lamenting that it has come to a point where Honda, “the face of Swindon”, is having to shut down. “Falling European sales and the chaos of Brexit are not the only reasons”. Honda says it is because of the need to respond to the rise of electric vehicles, a recognition that it had not set up the necessary structure in Europe to deal with the EU’s strict environmental regulations and supply electric and hybrid vehicles.

Going it alone made it difficult to innovate

This lack of preparedness may have been because Honda was going it alone, in contrast to Toyota working with Mazda, Suzuki, Subaru and Daihatsu and Nissan’s alliance with Mitsubishi and Renault. Even adding in Honda suppliers like TS Tech, Keihin, Showa, Musashi and Nisshin, its total supply chain sales amount to a tenth of Toyota’s. Toyota’s supply chain includes other large multinationals like Denso, Aisin, Toyota Industries, JTEKT and Toyota Boshoku. R&D expenditure is similarly tiny compared to Toyota’s spend.

Honda is not in Boston Consulting Group’s Top 50 most innovative companies of the world – whereas Toyota is at #37. It’s not even in the top 50 of Japan’s own ranking of most innovative domestic companies. Toyota is at #2, Honda at #105.

Only 70% of Honda’s sales are 4 wheel vehicles however – 13% are motorbikes, 2.2% power products like lawnmower engines and 14.9% is financial services. Honda has been innovating in these areas as well as becoming active in Mobility as a Service, investing in electric vehicle charging, including in the UK and Sweden.

Honda still has roots in the UK

In fact it’s not over for Honda in the UK by any means. Nikkei Business’s special feature takes a nostalgic look at whether Honda can grab back the “speed” and “challenge” spirit that Honda showed in the Isle of Man TT races, illustrated by a headline from the Daily Mirror in 1961 “The Japs are Laps in Front”. It described the 3 times Honda has left Formula One, only to come back again. Honda R&D and Honda Motor Europe are still based in the UK, and Honda has mainly supplied engines to UK based Formula One teams over the years – most recently to Red Bull in Milton Keynes.

The special feature finishes with an interview with Honda’s President Hachigo Takahiro – who was himself posted to the UK during his career. He shows no interest in merging with Toyota or Nissan in order to achieve scale. “We are not thinking about making a bid for Nissan…We are innovative when we face challenges, like we did with Formula One. As for Toyota, we won’t get very friendly, we will have a fight occasionally. Otherwise the Japanese car industry would be very dull. We have different personalities. We should be good rivals, and help Japan rise up. We have no intention of taking Toyota’s money.”

Even if Honda is shutting down its manufacturing in the UK, the hope seems to be that the UK can play a part in recharging its innovative spirit.

How a failed merger led Tokyo Electron to a world class HR system

Tokyo Electron originally sold car radios when it was founded in the 1960s, but reinvented itself as a manufacturer of semi conductor making equipment in the 1980s. A failed merger (following objections from anti trust regulators in the US) has led it to reinvent itself again. This time, the reinvention is just as much around management as it is product lines.

In 2013 Tokyo Electron spent a year planning a merger with the US’s Applied Materials. They even had a new name and were planning to put their global headquarters in the Netherlands.

To prepare for the merger, Tokyo Electron reduced its stake in an affiliated trading company, Tokyo Electron Device, and withdrew from the solar cell business. This renewed focus on the core business has led to increased profits and turnover.

Role not potential

One area on which it proved difficult to reach agreement with Applied Materials was how the HR system should be configured. Tokyo Electron was still focused on having lifetime employment and salary boundaries based on potential (the untranslatable Japanese word nouryoku) with actual performance influencing take home pay upwards or downwards each year. This was very different from Applied Materials system of having a transparent relationship between actual job roles and compensation and ensuring the appropriate person was assigned to that role, without much thought for maintaining long term employment.

Howevever when younger Tokyo Electron employees heard about the Applied Materials HR system they had high expectations as they felt frustrated by the traditional Japanese system. Tokyo Electron realised it would have to change its HR system to motivate its younger staff. They recognised, however, that there was a big difference between Japan and the USA, where people job hop frequently in their career.

The new system was introduced worldwide in 2017-8. 6 role categories which were applicable globally were introduced – operations, engineering, sales and marketing, business support, management and executive management – up from three previously: the untranslatable sougoushoku (generalist management), ippanshoku (generalist administration – usually for women) and technical. The number of levels increased from 7 to 20 and they applied to all categories (apart from executive). So someone in a senior business support role at level 8 could be considered to be “doing a highly complex job, with a strong influence over the results of their department” just as much as someone in engineering or sales and marketing.

This might seem vague, but Tsuchii Nobuhito, HR General Manager, justifies it by saying that as the semi conductor business is fast changing, roles need to be kept flexible.

Further changes included making it possible to be promoted in consecutive years. Previously Tokyo Electron employees had to stay in one grade for three years before being considered for the next promotion. Before, the criteria for a job role were evaluated relatively but now there are evaluated by an absolute standard. This is intended to make it more transparent to people where their job role and grade sit within the whole organisation and what their future career path might be.

Inevitable changes as the semiconductor industry globalizes

These changes were inevitable, says Nikkei Business. Japan’s semi conductor industry has hollowed out and most of the customers are overseas. 80% of Tokyo Electron’s sales are outside of Japan and 40% of its employees are overseas. Only around 500 employees in Europe and the Middle East out of 12,500 total. Unsurprisingly, Asia has the largest number – around 2,800. Japan headquarters also has more Asian employees. Nikkei Business interviews one Korean employee in Japan who says she was surprised to have stayed so long. She started as a Chinese/Japanese translator but enjoyed the challenges in her job and stayed on.

Higher than average salaries probably also helped. Tokyo Electron pays an average Y12.7m a year (around US$115K) compared to the industry average of around US$60K. As a result of the new HR system 90% of staff had a pay rise – mainly the younger and middle ranking employees.

Global employee communication

President Kawai has been careful to communicate company strategy and objectives as clearly as possible around the world. He has held 35 employee meetings around the world and also holds smaller discussion meetings with staff to talk about the direction of the semi conductor industry, or whether to continue with M&A activities. He asks them whether the strategic direction is getting through to people, and if it is appropriate for their workplaces.

There are still some issues – how far it is possible to be objective in evaluations, for example. “It will take another 3-5 years before the system really beds in” says Tsuchii. Kawai has set some ambitious targets and is confident there is room for further growth. Whether Tokyo Electron can continue to motivate its staff will be key, says Nikkei Business.

Their website certainly reflects the brand values they aspire to – clear and transparent, with an emphasis on “people, technology, commitment” – although just like every other Japanese technology company, their mission pretty much boils down to “contributing to society through innovative technology”, with added “reliable service and support”.

One of the puzzles of Japanese HR is how employee engagement is so low and yet the employees seem so dedicated and diligent. Kawai at least seems to have found a solution – transparent career paths.

Rudlin Consulting has assisted many European companies acquired by a Japanese parent. Please contact Pernille Rudlin for further details.

3 keys to success in overseas post merger integration according to Suntory

Suntory acquired US company Beam in 2014, since which it jointly developed and launched new gins and whiskeys. Overseas sales are now 42.7% of Suntory’s turnover, compared to 25.2% in 2013 and the merger is generally thought to have been a success, according to the Nikkei Business magazine.

Suntory took on a mountain of debt to buy Beam. Suntory President Niinami Takeshi felt in 2014 that Beam’s attitude was complacent, considering the pressures Suntory was under. They were making personnel decisions without any regard to Suntory’s wishes. Beam may have felt that as Suntory’s spirits business was folded into the new Beam Suntory, this meant Beam had the right to do as it pleased.

The three elements Suntory’s President Niinami felt were crucial to post merger integration were:

1. Parent company should make personnel decisions

Niinami transferred the authority to nominate directors of Beam Suntory to Japan HQ, set up a new compensation committee which he chaired, and sent an internal auditor from Suntory to Beam. The CEO of Beam Suntory at the time, Matt Shattock, was not pleased, but Niinami was firm, saying “we are the owners”. Niinami says this was the biggest reason for the successful merger. He made sure that he also listened to Beam executives and ultimately replaced Shattock with Albert Baladi, seeing him as someone who could drive Beam Suntory’s growth in Asia (and indeed they have just announced they will be making whiskey in India soon).

2. Be based near the customer

Baladi clearly won over Niinami by understanding the importance of the Gemba – the shopfloor, the coalface. Beam Suntory’s headquarters was moved to central Chicago, in a district full of bars and restaurants, from a suburb an hour outside the city. Again, this did not thrill the then CEO Matt Shattock, whose 15 minute drive into work by car turned into a 1.5 hour commute. “It took 2 years to persuade him”, says Niinami.

Being focused on the gemba was not just about the headquarters. Beam previously had frowned upon inefficiencies such as visiting retail outlets frequently to understand what products most matched them. Its emphasis was on short term profits. Niinami changed this by sending several experienced Suntory sales and marketing people to Beam Suntory. One was Takeuchi Jun, who insisted on visiting high class bars and restaurants in Chicago, introducing Beam Suntory products, to increase the fanbase. He was adamant to local employees that sales for home consumption would increase as a result.

Usually, hearing that sales and marketing people from Japan headquarters are coming to an overseas subsidiaries to change the way Western marketing works would make me nervous. Sales and marketing (if it exists at all) are very different in Japan to Western countries, but it seems to have worked. For example, Suntory was able to successfully introduce the Highball Tower machine to bars in the USA – which makes a cocktail of whiskey (in this case Suntory’s Toki) and sparkling water.

3. Return to craftsmanship

Along with gemba, Suntory introduced the Japanese concept of monozukuri. Niinami was shocked that when he visited Jim Beam’s main distillery in Kentucky in 2016, to see that the workers were on strike, angry with management based in the headquarters an hour’s flight away. Bourbon sales were doing well globally, and the management asked the distillery to increase production without anything being changed at the distillery. Temporary staff were taken on with employment terms which the existing workers were unhappy with.

Niinami thought this “monitoring from above” approach was misguided, and removed the factory chief, bringing in the production director from Japan. Distilling space and warehousing were increased with a $500m investment in one year.

Suntory also encouraged joint development of new drinks such as Legent. I noticed in Europe the sake-like gin Roku from Suntory was launched in 2017 (and I’m a big fan). Will they also be moving Beam Suntory in the UK from suburban Uxbridge to somewhere with a night life like Soho?

Rudlin Consulting has assisted many European companies acquired by a Japanese parent. Please contact Pernille Rudlin for further details.

Brexit and Japanese jobs in the UK – growing by acquisition or “new” jobs?

Those looking for “despite Brexit” good news may be reassured that employment in the UK by the biggest Japanese companies has grown by 22% since 2014/5, right in line with the growth in Japanese jobs across Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA). About a quarter of the 750,000 people we estimate work for Japanese companies in the region are working in the UK, and so far there is no obvious divergence between the UK and the rest of EMEA in terms of overall job growth.

Big ticket acquisitions are the main driver of Japanese growth in the UK

But as we pointed out in previous posts looking at the trends across Europe, a distinction needs to be made between “new jobs” created in EMEA by Japanese greenfield investment, and investments which are acquisitions of existing jobs. Eastern Europe is the beneficiary of the former, particularly for the automotive sector, whereas the UK has been the target of the latter with big ticket acquisitions like SoftBank acquiring ARM, Mitsui Sumitomo acquiring Amlin, Sumitomo Rubber acquiring Micheldever, and NEC acquiring Northgate Public Services as well as Outsourcing acquiring various staffing and outsourcing companies.

Where are the “new jobs”?

These acquisitions account for the new entrants to the Top 30 ranking we have compiled below. They push out Fujifilm, Sumitomo Corporation, Japan Tobacco (who shut their factory in Northern Ireland last year) and Toshiba. The original Top 30 in 2014/5 have grown a more modest 10% if the acquisitive newcomers are not included. One of the highest climbers from the original 2014/5 ranking is the main Japanese creator of new jobs in the UK- Hitachi – in particular via their rail manufacturing and assembly plant at Newton Aycliffe.

There has not been a decline in automotive sector jobs in the UK – yet – however. In fact quite the reverse – there has been some growth in jobs in all three of the big Japanese car companies. But the trend is clear, as pointed out in previous posts, that even without Brexit, the drift of investment and jobs in the automotive sector is eastwards and to Africa. It’s easy to see how British people in those areas where Japanese automotive supply chains are active could blame the EU for job losses. Even though there actually weren’t that many EU grants enabling Japanese companies to transfer production from the UK to Eastern Europe – despite the rumours – merely by being members of the Single Market, and having lower labour costs, Eastern European countries are an obvious destination for new manufacturing investment.

Will Japan’s investment in the UK services sector be Brexit proof?

The investment in the UK by Japanese companies over the past three years has largely been through acquisitions in the services sector. This is not surprising, as services are 80% of the UK’s GDP and the UK’s comparative advantage in the region. It is also relatively Brexit proof in the sense that services sector investment will not be directly affected by any supply chain disruptions. Clearly if the UK economy takes a hit from Brexit, however, this will dampen demand for services. There has also been a shift of regional headquarters away from the UK by Panasonic and Sony and others, and of financial services companies, but as yet this has not hit UK jobs.

Eastern Europe has also been attractive to Japanese companies for business process outsourcing. Although Fujitsu is still – just – the top employer in the UK, employee numbers have dropped 29% – and there are now 13,000 people working for its service centres in Poland. NTT and its subsidiary NTT Data has also shot up the Top 30 both for the UK and the EMEA region – again through acquisitions – and has decided to base its new global ex-Japan headquarters in the UK.

Infrastructure, energy, transport should be the future for Japanese jobs in the UK

The UK’s strength as a global services provider will not disappear overnight, however hard the Brexit. But it’s hard to imagine how the kinds of secure, high quality automotive manufacturing jobs that those who voted for Brexit might have wanted to see return to the UK will come back, however soft the Brexit. The potential sunlit upland is in infrastructure – energy and transport. These sectors were needing investment regardless of whether the UK is in or out of the EU and are not so reliant on just in time supply chains across the region. Transport, environment and energy are areas where cooperation and financing on an EU-wide basis makes business and environmental sense though. But unfortunately Brexit has provided a distraction that has resulted in Hitachi freezing its Horizon nuclear power projects in Wales and Gloucestershire from lack of government financial support, and the recently called review of HS2 must also be giving Hitachi’s rail business and other Japanese executives cause for concern. Risk averse Japanese companies are not going to want to make multi million investments in infrastructure projects in a country which is politically unstable and unreliable.

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Is Sharp still a Japanese treasure?

Sharp Corporation Chairman and President Tai Jeng-wu was the second in command at Taiwan’s Hon Hai when it acquired Sharp in 2016. His cost cutting organisational reforms have turned the company’s results around in a “V” shaped recovery. He is now hurrying ahead with restructuring the business portfolio. In an interview with Nikkei Business he says Sharp is “Japan’s treasure” and is at pains to point out how influenced he has been by Japanese teachers in the past. Japan and Taiwan continue to have good relations (reinforced by a common threat of China, hinted at in this interview with the dig at unfair competition from state owned companies), and many Taiwanese speak excellent Japanese.

He says that unlike Carlos Ghosn, he did not arrive at Sharp with a posse of executives. He feels that the reforms are still only half way but he wants to work alongside Sharp employees – rather than a top down imposed change.

Asked what was the problem at Sharp, he said “it is not for me to say, but I suppose the crisis occurred when there were problems with management in the 2010s – when people who have only had experience in one particular technical area or business become president. You need to have a general overview to be a top executive, so when there was a crisis they were unable to respond. How I fixed the $2.5bn loss was to cut costs by around $1.7bn and then cut back investments and with some transient profits, we were back in the black.”

Don’t be a big fish

“You have to develop people step by step. When I started at Sharp, I said when announcing my strategy that “Sharp should not be a big fish, but should aim to be a fast swimming fish”. So I kept asking every day for things to speed up. I set some rules for developing successors. I lowered the limit requiring presidential approval to Y3m ($27,000). That was to ensure I would be aware of all the company’s problems. I then increased the limit to Y20m ($184,000) in 2018 when I put the CEO structure in place and this year I increased the limit to Y100m.”

“I will stay on as chairman of Sharp until March 2022. My wife and family want me back in Taiwan though. All the time from 2016 I have been looking for a successor. I even asked a Japanese consultant to help, but I cannot find one. I want the successor to be Japanese – it doesn’t matter if it’s an internal or external appointment. Maybe it could be someone from Hon Hai even. They should be able to manage in the current harsh environment, covering a wide range of businesses and find synergy with Hon Hai. It is the second criterion that makes finding the right person difficult.”

Japanese managers became bureaucrats

“It used to be that Japanese management of factories and businesses were strong, and my teachers were all Japanese. But then Japan went into a recession and the founder managers all disappeared, and managers became bureaucrats. That is why management strength declined. Japan is now only strong in parts and materials. ”

Sharp’s employee levels are back to the same as before the management crisis. “There were two early retirement drives during the crisis, and a lot of good people left. Those who remained when I joined the company in 2016 were one of three types – highly capable and loyal, those who couldn’t find another place to go and those where were waiting to be pushed. I actually never cut employees. In fact we need to increase our employees – we had some influxes from when we took over Toshiba’s PC business and other M&A.”

“I am not a god, I just improved everything step by step”

“I renegotiated the contracts for solar battery procurement and saved around $100m. I have also brought the Sharp brand back in house for the US TV production business. A brand is like a person’s name. Selling it is wrong. During the crisis Sharp sold off its precious buildings for $188m and then spent $30m on out of date computing. I am not a god, I just improved everything step by step. I was taught to do Horenso (keeping bosses in the loop) and check everything thoroughly, not just sign off easily by Japanese teachers.”

I am now promoting management based on data, and a shift to B2B (business to business). B2C (consumer) business is currently 65% of our turnover, I want to make it 50/50. The structure of trade in B2C is unfair – companies like ours in a free trade country have to compete with state owned companies who don’t have to invest or write off so much. That is why Japan’s IT/electronic companies’ share is falling – it’s a structural problem. In B2B it is a fairer fight. W have built a good ecosysytem over many years, so we have a good chance.

A Rising Sun Alliance of Japanese electronics companies

“I think there should be a Rising Sun Alliance of Japanese companies. There are a lot of Japanese electronics manufacturers but I don’t see that they will merge -t here is too much pride. I do have to be careful as Hon Hai is not a Japanese company. I am reflecting every day on how to manage employees. If I am criticised, it is not just my, but Taiwan’s pride at stake.”

“Sharp will last over 100 years. It is a treasure of Japan. I would like the brand to last another 100 years. I come to the office every day before 7:00am and give a bow to the statues of the founders in the front entrance. Sharp is a treasure to me too.”

Nikkei Business comments that there is no doubting his sincerity and dedication – apparently he lives in a single man’s dormitory and walks round the factory at 5am in the morning thinking about Sharp. He is at pains to seem almost more Japanese than the Japanese in this. But, the Nikkei wonders, will this be enough to succeed in the new territory for him and Sharp of B2B platform business.

The successes and failures of Japan’s era of big overseas acquisitions

The era of Japan’s big overseas acquisitions began with domestic mega M&As in the 1990s according to Nikkei Business magazine. Following the bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in 1990, a wave of M&As happened in the financial sector, giving birth to Mizuho from Fuji Bank, Daiichi Kangyo and the Industrial Bank of Japan and Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank producing SMBC. In the steel sector with NKK merging with Kawasaki Steel and becoming JFE and in the pharmaceuticals sector with Yamanouchi and Fujisawa merged to become Astellas.

The key concept for these M&As in the 1990s was “restructuring” – to rationalise the back office and integrate R&D. Then in the second half of the 2000s came a wave of overseas acquisitions, to counter the business impact of the shrinking, ageing population of Japan by growing overseas but also to benefit from further restructuring and rationalisation.

Mega overseas acquisitions of the 2000s

In 2007 Japan Tobacco acquired the UK’s Gallaher from RJR, becoming the third biggest tobacco company in the world. In 2006 SoftBank acquired Vodafone Japan and then the US company Sprint Nextel, then British ARM Holdings in 2016. Takeda acquired US Millennium Pharmaceuticals in 2008, then Swiss Nycomed in 2011, with the biggest M&A ever by a Japanese company, acquiring Ireland’s Shire in 2019.

“Growing overseas means the development of our human resources has become an urgent necessity” said the President of Takeda in 2006, Yasuchika Hasegawa. Hasegawa was seen as “an alien from outerspace” for his dry, rational management style, arising from many years working in the USA. Although Takeda had been the biggest pharmaceutical company in Japan for some years, it only ranked around 17 in the world before its acquisition spree and urgently needed to find new drug development sources. It felt it was lagging competitors.

The need for global management skills

Hasegawa decided to globalise the company internally by recruiting a foreign successor to himself in 2014 – Christophe Weber from GlaxoSmithKline. Three out of the seven current Takeda directors are not Japanese.

Japan Tobacco‘s managers sent overseas after the Gallaher acquisition found themselves caught between overseas executives determined to defend their patch with rational, logical arguments about productivity, logistics and profitability. After years of painful discussion, it was agreed to close the factory in Northern Ireland. Even now, says Masamichi Terabatake, the current President of Japan Tobacco, a Japan based executive needs to be prepared to travel around the world regularly to discuss strategy with local executives. “You need to keep global staff motivated. Investment and marketing cannot be left vague, they have to be quantitative so they can be transparently discussed. That’s probably why executives in the West are a bit younger!” he says.

NSG acquired UK’s Pilkington in 2006, becoming heavily indebted to do so. From being very domestic, it became a company whose sales were 80% overseas. Unfortunately this proved to be terrible timing as the automotive and architectural glass market crashed after the Lehman Shock.

Many of the acquirers also struggled because they did not have managers with experience of managing overseas businesses. As Nikkei Business magazine says, mega M&A means mega complexity for which plenty of preparation and a high level of management know-how, with the ability to spread this know-how horizontally and vertically is needed for success. It’s still not clear how far Japanese companies have progressed in this.

Rudlin Consulting has assisted many European companies acquired by a Japanese parent. Please contact Pernille Rudlin for further details.

The enduring Japanese family firm

I attended a Japan Society talk last month on shinise (Japanese family firms) – given by academics Innan Sasaki and Davide Ravasi. Sasaki and Ravasi argued that shinise have survived over 100 years, by keeping small and focused on traditional crafts like sweet making, sake brewing, and textiles. They are very much embedded in the society and community in which they operate – the highest concentration is in Japan’s old capital, Kyoto. In return for their commitment to the local community, they gain a social status and support from the community. They are meant to have a higher moral purpose than pure profit and therefore do not seek to take risks and grow much beyond their current geography and sector – which means they are more resilient to external economic shocks. When downturns happen locally, they survive through the strength of local support. This contrasts with what Sasaki and Ravasi call “instrumental” firms, who exist for a purely economic purpose.

Even large Japanese multinationals behave like Kyoto shinise

Listening to their descriptions of shinise‘s motivations and behaviours, I realised they were very similar to the way I describe bigger, multinational Japanese firms in my seminars. Even though Japanese multinationals have taken the risk to expand overseas, and are often no longer owned by the founding family, the ethos of having a higher moral purpose than shareholder value, of corporate contribution to society and strong risk aversion to ensure longevity still endures.

And like the shinise, the darker side is the sacrifices needed to be regarded as a proper member of the family firm and the difficulty of becoming a senior manager if you were not born into it – or at least recruited straight from university like Japanese headquarter permanent staff.

Nikkei Business magazine had a feature last month on family firms in Japan showcasing research that family owned firms in Japan perform better than non-family owned firms in terms of Return on Assets. “They don’t hold on to unnecessary assets” says Professor Yasuhiro Ochiai of Shizuoka University.

Japanese family owned multinationals that have performed well

DMG Mori is still owned by the Mori family and has been particularly active recently in M&A overseas since the current Mori took over as President in 1999, most notably in their merger with German machine tool manufacturer DMG. Apparently quite a few of DMG Mori’s employees come from the wider “family” of customers and suppliers.

Of course the most famous Japanese company still managed by a founding family member is Toyota. However the current President Akio Toyoda is adamant that the company name is Toyota, the family name is Toyoda, and Toyota is not a Toyoda family company, “it’s everyone’s company.”

Those that are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and also active in Europe were:

Suntory (Torii family – founded by Shinjiro Torii in 1899) – chairman is from the founding family.
Aisin (automotive parts maker in the Toyota group founded in 1949 – chairman is part of the Toyoda founding family)
Shimano (Founded 1921, president is a Shimano)
DIC (Dainippon Ink) founded in 1908 by Kijiro Kawamura, a Kawamura is on the board of directors

And how to avoid toxic family rows

It’s not all joy in a family of course. Nikkei Business also looks at the family rows that have affected the performance of companies like Idemitsu (petroleum company) founding family shareholders fighting a merger with Showa Shell and the rebellion against founding family member Yoichiro Ushioda and chairman by executives of LIXIL (owners of German bathroom fittings company Grohe).

Nikkei Business’s prescription for avoiding trouble is:

Frequent communication between family members
Treat family members who are employees the same way as other employees in terms of company regulations
Don’t withhold information for family only, be transparent in management
Don’t appoint a successor from the family if there is noone suitable
Keep family assets and company assets separate
When there is a generation changeover, keep criticisms to yourself
Avoid too many family members as employees
Ensure a structure is in place to stop family members going rogue

For more on what being a “family” means for Japanese firms and the non-Japanese employees that work for them, this was one of my most popular articles in recent years.

Murata – reinjecting enjoyment into corporate philosophy

Murata is one of Japan’s most quietly successful companies, with a 40% share of global sales of the tiny ceramic capacitors that are essential to the electronics industry.

Tsuneo Murata, 3rd president from the founding family, says in an interview in Nikkei Business that the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001 was a turning point for the corporate culture. They had become too arrogant during the IT bubble of the 1990s and had stopped listening to customers. They did not recover as quickly in the early 2000s as rivals did. Tsuneo Murata, who was then EVP, asked board members and employees for their views on the company culture and what was preventing recovery. He was told the company had become conservative, cautious, inflexible, bureaucratic and slow.

So he set up an organisational cultural reform committee It was tasked with ensuring that the culture became one which adapted rapidly to a changing environment, where the genba (shopfloor) had autonomy and people could freely discuss, create and challenge.

The need for persistence in cultural reforms

Murata became President in 2007. Even with the Lehman Shock walloping profits shortly after, he insisted on continuing with cultural reforms. He went back to the founding philosophy of Akira Murata, to rediscover the sense of freedom that Murata used to have. Actually the philosophy does not mention freedom. In translation it says pretty much what many Japanese corporate philosophies say – contributing to society through innovative technology, building trust, working in partnership, etc. The one part that isn’t translated into English is the word “yorokobi“, meaning to enjoy. To me that’s the most important bit – a lot of Japanese companies have lost their sense of fun since the 2000s.

It sounds like the success of Murata is as much to do with Tsuneo Murata’s personality. Since becoming President he continues to eat in the same canteen as workers in the headquarters in Kyoto and does not use the executive elevator (unless in an emergency). “I don’t think there’s a single employee that does not like him” says one employee.

He is asked by Nikkei Business how he ensures a common understanding of corporate culture when Murata acquires other companies – for example, IPDiA in France in 2016. “It takes time, especially when it’s a foreign acquisition, because generally overseas employees are not as loyal to their companies as in Japan anyway. But if we introduce our corporate philosophy to them, they have empathy with it. I think it’s important to communicate it thoroughly.”

“Let’s be lovers first” is a high risk approach for Japanese overseas acquisitions

Most Japanese companies assume overseas acquisitions are high risk – and yet continue to acquire in pursuit of growth. But according to research from Daiki Tanaka (formerly of McKinsey and now running his own consultancy) Japanese overseas acquisitions of companies in the same industry from 1996 to 2018 had a lower failure rate (2.8%) than domestic Japanese acquisitions where the acquiring company is “jumping” into new sectors (3.4%).

The money at stake is are far bigger however for overseas takeovers. The average price tag of an overseas acquisition is Y24.5bn (over $200m), whereas the average domestic acquisition in Japan is around Y1bn (over $9m). This would be partly skewed by recent mega acquisitions such as Takeda acquiring Shire for $62bn and SoftBank acquiring ARM for $32bn.

Tanaka also concludes from his research that a “let’s be lovers first” approach is actually a higher risk strategy for overseas acquisitions. Taking a minority stake and then gradually raising it to full ownership/marriage can mean that due diligence is insufficient and the minority shareholder has not been able to participate fully in corporate governance.

Tanaka expects Japanese companies to continue to acquire overseas companies from the same industrial sector, because lower risk domestic acquisitions will not necessarily help to access higher growth overseas markets. If they want to escape the low growth, ageing Japanese market, acquiring overseas is the obvious quick route out. It would seem that a virgin marriage is recommended however.

Rudlin Consulting has assisted many European companies acquired by a Japanese parent. Please contact Pernille Rudlin for further details.