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Japan’s lost three decades – what are the causes?

The 1990s were called the Lost Decade in Japan, and then as the economy seemed to stagnate in the 2000s, it became the Lost Two Decades. Now the Nikkei Business in a recent special series seems to be saying it has been a lost three decades. Turnover and profitability were growing through to around 1990 when the economic bubble burst. Then profits fell – although since 2010 they have been growing again. The total revenues of Japanese companies (excluding financial services) has been static, with only a small bump upwards around 2005-2008.

Nikkei Business says the lack of growth in turnover is the key problem. Even sales overseas, which were meant to be the growth driver, have not shown much of an upward trend. According to Nikkei Business the root causes of this lack of growth are:

low investment (1991 capital investment as a percentage of cashflow was 133%, compared to 82.2% in 2018)
low wages (106.5 in 1990 indexed against 100 in 2015, down to 99.6 in 2019)
low efficiency (return on assets was 4.3% in 1990, down to 3.8% in 2018)

It cites Panasonic as an example of #1. Every time profits rose, Panasonic increased its investment, but every time profits shrank, it cut investment back, since 2001. As for #2, Nikkei Business lists all the major restructurings since 1999 with major Japanese companies, which makes for sobering reading for a country famed for lifetime employment:

1999 – Nissan plan to cut 21,000 from its workforce, closing 5 factories
2008 – Sony announced it would reduced its electronics workforce by 16,000
2009 – Panasonic announced it would cut 15,000 people and 27 factories. Pioneer axed 10,000 jobs.
2010 – All Nippon Airways proposed reducing its workforce by 16,000 as part of its revival plan
2011 – Ricoh announced a mid term plan aiming at reducing its workforce by 10,000
2012 – NEC announced a workforce reduction programme of 10,000 job cuts
2013 – Fujitsu announced it that by axing its semi-conductor business, it would remove 5,000 jobs.
2015 – Toshiba announce it would erduce its workforce by 15,0000
2017 – Mizuho Financial Group announced an administrative work reduction programme targetting 19,000 roles.
2019 – Nissan restructuring to impact 12,500 personnel

The low efficiency seems to be in the service sector, where there has been a lack of economies of scale. The number of Japanese companies with turnover of over Y100bn/$1bn doubled from around 40 to 80 from 1980 to 1991, but has not risen much since – apart from a blip in 2008 – after the birth of Japan Post, and is still heavily manufacturing oriented.

I will cover the analysis and suggestions from the rest of series for how Japan can “wake up” in my next blog posts.

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Japanese overseas subsidiaries in Europe: M&A boom equals more employees, less capital investment?

Recent statistics on Japanese companies’ activities in Europe show an overall positive picture – growth in employee numbers but declines in capital investment. Could this be a reflection of the ongoing Japanese overseas acquisition boom?

Sales of Japanese overseas subsidiaries in the 1st quarter of 2017 were up 7.9% overall on the previous year and at similar levels in Europe, but growth in North America was 4.3% up on the previous year. Asia represents nearly 50% of Japanese subsidiaries abroad, and sales grew 8.8% on the previous year, according to figures from Japan’s Ministry of Economy Trade, and Industry.

However capital investment declined again, by 13.6% (12 consecutive quarters of decreases) particularly in Europe (40.9% decline – the first decrease in 5 quarters) and ASEAN countries. Capital investment in North America was only down 0.8% but even this was the first decrease for three quarters.

Nonetheless, the number of employees increased 1.9% globally, and by 4.9% in Europe, the 15th consecutive quarterly increase. Growth was less in Asia (1.3%) and North America 2.9%).

This may reflect a long term shift of Japanese companies in Europe towards more service oriented, and therefore people intensive businesses, away from capital intensive manufacturing.

However, figures from the Japan Automobile Manufacturers’ Association show that automakers in Europe are still expanding production (by 7%), although below the peak levels of 2007 and 2008. 17% more cars were imported from Japan than the previous year, but Japanese car manufacturers also purchased record numbers of EU made components.

Exports of Japanese cars manufactured in Europe fell 17%, representing around 20% of Japanese production in Europe. These exports went (in order of size) to North America (24%), Latin America (10%), Middle East (10%), Africa (8%), Oceania (8%) and Asia (6%) – presumably including Japan, and the Honda Civic that Boris Johnson drove when he recently visited Japan, citing it as an example of “fantastic” British exports to Japan.

Japanese car manufacturers now operate 14 plants in seven EU countries – 4 in the UK, 3 in Spain, 2 in Portugal, 2 in Poland, 1 in Hungary, 1 in France and 1 in the Czech Republic. The major capital investments in 2016 were made by Nissan in the UK and Spain and Toyota in Poland.

Size matters when choosing a Japanese company

Whether you’re looking to work for or supply to a Japanese company, size matters. The most obvious reason being, as bank robber Willie Sutton apparently never said, “that’s where the money is”. That’s why we started our Top 30 Japanese Employers rankings – we’ve found them useful in understanding our customer base and the likely concerns of participants in our seminars.

We use the number of employees as a proxy for size rather than turnover or profit, and although there is a degree of correlation between employee numbers globally and in Europe and overall profit, there are some exceptions.

Toyo Keizai have recently listed up the companies* who made the biggest cumulative profit in the past 10 years and it’s absolutely no surprise that Toyota, one of the biggest companies in Japan and #9 amongst Japanese companies in Europe, made a whopping Y11 trillion ($99bn) cumulative profit from 2007 to 2017, far outstripping NTT and NTT Docomo at #2 and #3 who made less than half that amount. NTT and NTT Docomo are not in our Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe, although another group company, NTT Data, is.

However NTT and NTT Docomo never made a loss, whereas Toyota did go into the red – with a loss of $.8.6bn in 2008/9. Honda, who has had a tough time in Europe (and is #23 in our rankings), has also never made a loss, and accumulated a $36bn profit over the decade. Nissan, who made a loss but was famously turned round by Carlos Ghosn, is 10th largest in Europe in our rankings and has the 6th largest cumulative profit.

I was surprised to see my old employer Mitsubishi Corporation at #5, as they too had some rough patches particularly with losses in the commodity side, but clearly overall the Japanese trading companies have been very profitable, despite their death being heralded every decade – Mitsui is at #9, Itochu at #11, Sumitomo Corp at #14 and Marubeni at #21.

Unsurprisingly, almost none of the Japanese electronics companies feature in the top 30, apart from Canon at #10 and Mitsubishi Electric at #25. Other industries in the top 50 most profitable are automotive (Denso, Bridgestone) and pharmaceutical (Takeda, Astellas) related, and also heavily domestic businesses such as telecommunications (KDDI, SoftBank as well as NTT mentioned above), rail and retail (7&I, Fast Retailing).

Two of the largest Japanese companies in Europe – Fujitsu and Hitachi – are at #69 and #70 – Hitachi’s cumulative profit was heavily dented by the historic loss of $8bn in 2008/9. The largest company in the Europe and Africa region – Sumitomo Electric Industries (due to its labour intensive automotive manufacturing operations) is at #38, with a $6bn cumulative profit.

*Excludes banks, insurance and other financial services companies

The story of Japanese companies in the UK continues to be the story of the UK economy overall in 2016

The number of people employed in the UK by the biggest Japanese companies in the UK rose by around 1% to 76,103 in 2016 – representing over half of the 140,000 or so the Japanese Embassy to the UK estimates are employed overall in the UK by Japanese companies.

Just as 80% of the UK economy is services, so too with Japanese companies in the UK. Although Nissan, Toyota and Honda attract most of the headlines thanks to Brexit – understandably as they represent around 15,000 of the 76,000 jobs – the vast majority of the rest are in the services sector.

Even Sony has only one small factory left in the UK, making high end audio visual equipment and employing less than 100 people. The rest of 3000 or so jobs are in Sony Interactive Entertainment, music and film & TV or in marketing.

Fujitsu is still the biggest Japanese employer in the UK but the gap with Nissan at #2 is narrowing, as Fujitsu have reduced their headcount by over 15% in the past year or so. Although Fujitsu is still seen as an IT & telecomms manufacturer in Japan, in the UK it is largely an IT services company.

Trading company Itochu may be a surprise at #3, but this is largely due to its ownership of tyre fitting chain KwikFit.

The Hitachi group of companies (#7) has grown by 17% over the year – thanks in part to expansion at Hitachi Rail and Horizon Nuclear Power – but the bulk of its employees continue to be at consumer loans company Hitachi Capital.

Dentsu Aegis Network, part of the Dentsu advertising agency, has continued to acquire across the UK and Europe, resulting in a 21% increase in headcount. Other notable increases thanks to acquisitions include Mitsui Sumitomo & Aioi Nissay Dowa acquiring Lloyds underwriters Amlin and of course Softbank, a new entrant to the top 30, with its acquisition of ARM.

The story of Japanese companies in the UK continues to be the story of the UK economy overall – a trend which will no doubt continue in 2017, with Japanese banks already strengthening and relocating to their other European Union based operations, or threatening to do so.

Customised reports, profiles and other research on the Top 30 largest Japanese companies in Europe, Middle East and Africa are available – please contact pernillerudlinrudlinconsultingcom for further details.

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Why Nissan matters more to the UK than the UK matters to Nissan

It will be interesting to see how far Ghosn’s well documented ruthlessness and unsentimentality which he demonstrated in turning around Nissan in Japan will come to the fore in next month’s decision about where to invest for the new Qashqai, because really, to Nissan, the UK is not as important as a market or a manufacturing base as the UK might like to think. Plus, Ghosn has now got Mitsubishi Motors to worry about as well.

Here’s some figures to illustrate:

UK based employees represent around 5% of Nissan’s global workforce
UK based production represents around 10% of Nissan’s global production and around 70% of its European production (the rest is manufactured in Spain and Russia).
Car sales in the UK market represent around 3% of Nissan’s total units sold worldwide. Europe & Russia represent around 15% of total units sold. So the UK market is about 20% of Nissan’s Europe & Russia regional sales.

From the UK perspective:

Nissan is the third largest Japanese employer in the UK, with around 8000 employees – not only in the Sunderland factory but also several hundred working in design at Nissan Technical Centre Europe in Cranfield (ultimately registered in Belgium so that should make a quick getaway easier) and a design centre in London
Nissan is the 8th largest Japanese employer in Europe – around 16,000 employees in total – so around half are in the UK. However the European regional headquarters is in Switzerland, to which the UK factory sells all its production. The operational headquarters and holding company for the rest of Europe is based in France.
Nissan Sunderland’s plant accounts for nearly 1/3 of the UK’s car production. 80% of it is ultimately exported, 76% to Europe.

And of course there’s the supply chain and the jobs it provides – the UK car industry likes to say it supports around 800,000 jobs.

Calsonic Kansei is a supplier to Nissan, and is also in our Top 30 Japanese companies in the UK, employing over 1300 people – with factories in Llanelli and Sunderland – and Spain. Nissan has a substantial stake in Calsonic Kansei, but the cosy mutually supportive supply chains of 20 years’ ago have long disappeared, thanks in part to Ghosn. So it’s not hard to see Calsonic Kansei and others responding as quickly as they can to any shifts in location of demand.

It’s legendary in Japan that when a Nissan employee went to Ghosn to beg him not to axe one of the suppliers totally dependent on Nissan because it was headed up by a member of their own family, Ghosn responded “which is it to be? That Nissan collapses or your uncle’s company collapses?”

For how complex and tough life is these days in the global automotive supply chain, this comment in the Financial Times recently was very revealing:

“We manufacture part of one component for the Nissan Qashqai. We purchase raw materials from Taiwan, we manufacture in the UK in a Japanese owned factory. Our customer is in Germany, where our product is bonded together with products from other countries. Our customer’s customer is in France, where the bonded component is integrated into a car component. The component is shipped to Sunderland and becomes a part of a “British” car.

How Mrs May and her merry band are going to sort this mess out is beyond me, and I suspect beyond them.

The development time lines for the most basic of automotive components is two to three years, which means that we are already “post Brexit” for new business development. How do I persuade customers to invest in new product development with us when nobody has a clue on what basis I might sell eventually sell my product to them, and given rules of origin, in some cases on what basis they might sell their product to their customer. We have good relationships with our customers, but at the end of the day they are running their business for their benefit and may well decide its just not worth the uncertainty and risk.”

Carlos Ghosn is “reassured” by Theresa May saying that the British government would be “extremely cautious” in maintaining Nissan’s Sunderland UK factory’s competitiveness. But he may nonetheless think some rebalancing is in order.

Japanese companies move into sort-of reassurance mode re Brexit

Both Nomura and Toyota have moved to reassure their employees their jobs in the UK are safe – for the time being. The devil is in the detail of course – Toyota says plans through to 6 or 7 years from now have already been made, after which, no one can predict anyway, and Nomura’s new COO says London will remain the main brokerage in Europe and there are no plans to move jobs to elsewhere in Europe in the next two years.

Both companies are in our Top 30 Japanese companies in the UK, employing around 5,500 between them. Toyo Keizai magazine’s recent article on whether Japanese companies will move away from the UK has helped us update the ranking further, and we can now say just under 100,000 people are employed by the Top 30. The article goes on to speculate what Hitachi might do about its rail business if the UK was to leave the single market and default to tariffs of 10%. The global headquarters were moved to the UK in 2014 and a factory has been built in Newton Aycliffe. Hitachi is competing with Bombardier (Canada), Siemens (Germany) and Alsthom (France) – the latter two being in the European Union and the eurozone of course.

“Japanese car manufacturers underpin the UK automotive industry”, says Toyo Keizai. Honda, Nissan and Toyota represent half of the 1,590,000 cars that were produced in the UK in 2015, with Nissan being the second largest manufacturer in the UK after Jaguar Land Rover. Around 80% of Nissan’s cars, manufactured in Sunderland, are exported to the EU and elsewhere. NIssan directly employs around 8000 people across the UK, and indirectly a further 32,000.

Yet 61% of Sunderland voters supported Leave, despite the fact that if access to the EU market is restricted, they are likely to lose their jobs. For Honda and Toyota, the UK only represents 2% of their total production, compared to 10% for Nissan. As the utilisation of Nissan partner Renault’s factories is not high, it’s likely production will shift to France.

However it takes time to shift production. “What sort of deal Carlos Ghosn can get from the UK government will influence how the rest of the Japanese car manufacturers will view production in the UK” says Takaki Nakanishi of the Nakanishi Research Institute.

Other issues for Japanese companies are whether the UK retains financial passporting, and for Takeda and other pharmaceutical companies, whether the European Medicines Agency stays in the UK or not.

Japanese companies in the UK

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Mitsubishi Motors & Nissan – Is Ghosn prepared to try to nail jelly to the wall?

When it comes to the Mitsubishi group of companies (keiretsu), I did almost literally write the book (A History of Mitsubishi Corporation in London: 1915 to Present Day), although my focus was more on the way the pre-war Mitsubishi Goshi evolved into Mitsubishi Corporation, the trading company, and more specifically, its London office.

It’s generally perceived in Japan that the Mitsubishi keiretsu has been the most cohesive and robust of all the keiretsu (Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo being the other main ones) but as you might imagine, the current Mitsubishi Motors fuel economy data manipulation scandal has put this to the test.

According to Nikkei Business magazine (April 22^nd edition, not available online), the cracks are appearing. Whereas in the previous Mitsubishi Motors crises (recalls for various defects in the 2000s) Mitsubishi Heavy, Mitsubishi Corporation and Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ all stepped in and financial support came from Tokio Marine, Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Materials as well, this time seems different.

Even now, having been hit by the commodity price slump, the automotive sector remains an important profit generator for Mitsubishi Corporation as it is involved in the sale and financing of vehicles in Asia and Europe as well as engine manufacture. Mitsubishi Corporation also seconds quite a few employees to Mitsubishi Motors, including the current Chairman and CEO Osamu Masuko.

Other Mitsubishi companies do not have such ties. Even though Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings supplies products to the automotive sector, its main customers are Toyota and Nissan. Mitsubishi Paper also said “we are busy with our own affairs”.

It’s not just about whether the companies have business together, points out the Nikkei. It’s also an issue of corporate governance. The Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group has been reducing cross shareholdings, where appropriate. Mitsubishi Corporation is also checking shareholdings regularly for rationale and yield and disposing of them as necessary. Presumably it is hard to justify “Protecting the Three Diamonds” as the sole reason for support, to external directors and shareholders.

The Nikkei sees this as a chance for the Mitsubishi group to embark on a delayed restructure [the article was written before Nissan stepped in to acquire a 34% share]. In previous restructurings, there was a discussion about selling off the largely domestic ‘mini-car’ business, so this might be finally realised.

A more recent article in the Nikkei Asian Review points out that a key question is whether Nissan’s CEO Carlos Ghosn’s aggressive brand of reform will suit the corporate culture at Mitsubishi Motors “where change is not exactly a buzzword”. The question I have is what the corporate culture of Mitsubishi Motors actually is, other than a reluctance to change. The lack of a clear definition of values and vision may indeed be one of the causes of the repeated scandals. There are the Mitsubishi Three Principles, but not all Mitsubishi companies showcase them, and they lack the strong philosophy and toolkit of something like the Toyota Way.

Along with my official book on Mitsubishi in London I wrote a further unpublishable chapter, called “The Vague Company”. It talked about the benefits and difficulties of having a vague, unspoken corporate culture. Employees can enjoy the sense of being treated like adults, to work out for themselves what the right “way” is, but it makes global expansion – particularly post-merger integration – highly frustrating, when new, hybrid cultures need to develop. As one frustrated American employee at another Mitsubishi group company said to me the other day “I can’t get a handle on what the Mitsubishi Way is”. It is, as we say in British English, like trying to nail jelly to a wall. I suspect Ghosn may quickly tire of this and use his hammer in more brutally effective ways.

For more on Mitsubishi Motors’ future, I recommend this blog post by my old friend and former head of corporate communications at Mitsubishi Motors in the Daimler Chrysler days, Jochen Legewie: http://www.cnc-communications.com/blog/the-future-of-mitsubishi-motors/

For more on Mitsubishi corporate culture, I have gathered some resources on Pinterest here

Octopus balls to Tokyo – why it matters where your company is from in Japan

Most countries have rival cities – usually the official capital city versus other cities which consider themselves to be the real business, historical or cultural heart of the country – think London versus Manchester or Birmingham, Berlin versus Dusseldorf or Frankfurt, Rome versus Milan, Madrid versus Barcelona. Japan is no exception and the rivalries go way back into history.

Kyoto used to be the capital of Japan, before Tokyo (or Edo as it was then) began to usurp it in the 17th century. If you ask Japanese people today about Kyoto, they joke that Kyotoites still think Kyoto is the real capital of Japan, and the Emperor is just temporarily visiting Tokyo (he moved there in 1868, when Tokyo became the official capital) – and will return one day.

Tokyo literally means the Eastern Capital and is part of the Kanto region, where the ruling feudal Tokugawa shogunate was based from the 17th century. Kanto means East of the Barrier (usually considered to be the Hakone checkpoint) and Kansai – the region where Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto are based – means the West of the Barrier (originally the Osaka Tollgate).

Before Kyoto’s reign as capital for a 1000 years, Nara (also in the Kansai region) was the capital and seat of the Emperor but is now a quiet backwater, more visited by tourists than business people. Kobe is the other main city in the Kansai region – a port with a strongly cosmopolitan feel and very close to Osaka geographically. Whilst Kyoto remains aloof and quietly superior (and has some very successful high tech companies of its own such as Kyocera and Nidec), the real battle now in business culture is between Osaka and Tokyo.

Osakans see Tokyo as standardizing, dull and full of bureaucrats and view Osaka (which historically had very few samurai but plenty of merchants) as the real money maker, with vastly superior food. Many of Japan’s celebrities, comedians and musicians come from the Kansai region too.

So what does this mean for corporate cultures? Osaka companies often have merchant roots – the joke goes, when you meet an Osakan, you don’t ask “how are you” (ogenki desuka) but “how’s business” (moukarimakka). To which the correct response is “bochi bochi denna” – a wonderfully vague way of giving nothing away, like saying “plodding along nicely thank you”. Osaka companies are brash, tough negotiators and mean with the money. “They’d skin the fleece off a gnat” said one British engineer to me, describing his colleagues in the Osaka HQ of a consumer electronics company.

Tokyo companies are gentlemanly but at the same time highly political. You need to have a good understanding of their organisation, the factions and the individual relationships to understand how to get things done. Mitsui and Mitsubishi, both Tokyo based corporate groups, are distinguished by the saying “Mitsui is people – Mitsubishi is the organisation”. It’s hard sometimes to understand how exactly this is different, but it seems to boil down to the idea that if an individual is powerful enough at a Mitsui group company, they can get things done, whereas at a Mitsubishi group company, the whole organisation has to support an action.

The other main corporate groups, Sumitomo and Itochu, are Kansai based companies. Both have strong “mercantile” roots – Sumitomo in metals trading, hard-nut, conservative and domestically focused and Itochu – strong in fashion and consumer goods, and seen as the more maverick, progressive and international in outlook. The regional cultural differences don’t seem to have been that strong between Sumitomo and Mitsui as various mergers have taken place between their respective member companies, particularly in financial services. However regional cultural differences have definitely had an impact on Astellas Pharma, the product of a merger between Yamanouchi (Tokyo) and Fujisawa (Osaka). Apparently many Fujisawa employees were horrified that Yamanouchi was going to be the dominant partner in the merger. Fujisawa had a strong tradition of innovation and had regarded Yamanouchi as “Mane-nouchi” (Mane = imitation) – a bunch of play-safe Tokyo bureaucrats.

Those who know Japan well will have spotted that there is an important region missing from this analysis – Chubu. Literally and metaphorically this is the midlands of Japan. Just like the Midlands in the UK it is the historic heart of the car industry. Nagoya is the main city, and teased just as Birmingham in the UK is for being ugly and soullessly modern. The area has the last laugh though, as it is the most wealthy in Japan – thanks to the enduring success of Toyota (so mighty their home town was renamed Toyota City) and its corporate group of suppliers such as Denso.

So, where are the top 30 Japanese companies in Europe from?

Kanto/Tokyo based companies:

• Asahi Glass
• Astellas (but Fujisawa originally Osaka)
• Canon
• Daiichi Sankyo
• Fujifilm
• Fujitsu
• Hitachi
• Honda
• Kao Corporation
• Mitsubishi group
• Mitsui group
• Nissan
• Nomura (but was Osaka originally)
• NTT group
• NYK group
• Olympus
• Ricoh
• Sony
• Toshiba

Kansai based companies:
• Horiba (Kyoto)
• Nidec (Kyoto)
• Nippon Sheet Glass (Sumitomo Group)
• Omron (Kyoto)
• Panasonic (Osaka)
• Sharp (Osaka)
• Sumitomo group (Osaka)
• Takeda Pharma (Osaka)

Chubu based companies:
• Denso
• Seiko Epson
• Toyota

Chugoku (Hiroshima etc) based companies:

• Fast Retailing/Uniqlo

Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe 2021

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Japanese companies need to pull up younger burdock roots if they really want to grow globally

Along with “tako tsubo” (octopus pot), another Japanese concept “gobou nuki” (plucking out burdock roots) used in HR has been deemed harmful to corporate Japan’s global prospects.

The term has been used frequently in the Japanese media recently, according to Masahiro Kotosaka, an ex McKinsey consultant now at Ritsumeikan University. In a recent article in Nikkei Business Online he points out that the recent appointments as President of Takuya Hirano at Microsoft Japan, Tatsuo Yasunaga at Mitsui & Co, Koji Arima at Denso, Tatsuya Tanaka at Fujitsu and Takahiro Hachigo at Honda have all been described as plucking burdock roots, as they are in their 40s or 50s, younger than normal for Presidents in corporate Japan. The average age of Japanese Presidents was 62 in 2014 (up from 61 in 2013), around 10 years higher than the global average.

The older age is of course partly explained by the continuation of seniority based pay and promotion in Japan – although Panasonic, Sony and Hitachi have all recently announced they are abolishing or looking to abolish this system.

The average age in Japan for a “kacho” (section head, the first managerial position in Japanese companies) is 38.6 and 44 for a “bucho” (department head, or General Manager) according to Recruitworks. In India, China or Thailand, the average is 9 years lower for kacho and 10 years lower for bucho. Even the US average is 5 years lower for both positions.

Kotosaka asserts that Japanese companies need to start pulling out younger burdock roots, people who might be future executives, and making sure they have early leadership experience. If this does not happen, the younger generations of Japanese will soon feel a big gap with their overseas peers.

Already Kotosaka has heard (as I have) from Japanese companies that they feel the utilisation of non-Japanese or external executives has increased and the presence of Japanese executives has faded.

The most notable example is of course Christophe Weber, President of Takeda Pharma, and his team of 16 executives, of whom 8 are non-Japanese and have come from outside the company and two are non-Japanese who joined through being executives in a Takeda acquisition. Weber had his first leadership experience at the age of 29 when he became a country manager at GSK. Carlos Ghosn of Nissan also became head of a factory at the age of 27.

My former employer Mitsubishi Corporation is mentioned as an honourable exception to the lack of experience given to juniors, along with gaishi (foreign owned) consulting companies and private equity firms. For such companies, people are the main asset, and it’s true I suppose that trading companies such as Mitsubishi that have now moved more towards acquisitions rather than trading, do afford ample opportunity for younger Japanese to take up management positions abroad. In practice though, I have seen many instances where the acquisition is left to manage itself, and the Japanese expat director mostly stays in the regional headquarters, processing paperwork to send back to Japan HQ, rather than hands on managing the business.

Japan and the legacy of Margaret Thatcher

I suspect it is hard for people in Japan to understand why Margaret Thatcher’s death has aroused such strong feelings of hatred and adulation amongst British people, even 23 years after she ceased to be prime minister.

My generation (people born in the 1960s) is sometimes labelled “Thatcher’s children” – because we grew up under her. We remember 1971, when she was education minister and abolished free school milk for seven to eleven year old school children. Actually many children, myself included, really disliked the free school milk, which was lukewarm and smelly by the time we were given it to drink at morning break each day.

We had already moved to Japan by the time I was seven. I did not escape, however, as we had to drink milk at my Japanese school too, which was even worse tasting, in my opinion, because it was homogenised rather than pasteurised.

People thought we were crazy to move to somewhere as foreign as Japan, but England in 1972 did not feel like a comfortable place to be either – there had been miners’ and dockers’ strikes, followed by declarations of a state of emergency. Wage and price freezes had been announced and unemployment went over 1 million for the first time since the 1930s.

There were economic problems in Japan too – I remember the toilet paper panic buying because of the oil crisis – but as is now well known, the crisis was the trigger for Japan to start innovating in car manufacturing. Just before we left the UK, Honda had started importing cars to the UK, and when we returned to the UK in 1977, we decided to buy a Datsun Sunny 120Y.

My grandparents were horrified. They still had strong memories of the war and had opposed us moving to Japan. They could not understand why we did not buy a British car, like the Triumph Dolomite they owned. It was manufactured by British Leyland, which was then being crippled by a series of strikes.

Margaret Thatcher was extremely patriotic too – but she was happy to welcome any foreign investor who shared her ethic of hard work. While my generation was busy hating her for destroying mining communities, cutting education spending and warmongering, her government encouraged Nissan to open its first factory, in Sunderland, an area in desperate need of jobs thanks to the closure of mines and shipyards.

Thirty years later, there are no British owned volume car producers, but nearly 1.5 million vehicles were produced in the UK last year, closing in on the 2 million peak of 1970, and 86% of production is exported. Only 195,000 people are directly employed by the car industry, however, compared to 850,000 in 1970. The North of England remains a high unemployment, depressed region. This explains the depth of feelings about Mrs Thatcher’s legacy – she was right, from a business perspective, but there was a human cost which was not addressed.

This article by Pernille Rudlin originally appeared in Japanese in the May 15th 2013 edition of the Teikoku Databank News and also appears in Pernille Rudlin’s book “Shinrai: Japanese Corporate Integrity in a Disintegrating Europe” – available as a paperback and Kindle ebook on Amazon.

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Last updated by Pernille Rudlin at 2021-10-19.

Tag: nissan