Tag: daiichi sankyo

Why work for a Japanese company? (#1) Corporate Social Responsibility

For most Japanese companies, despite recent changes to corporate governance and the occasional scandal, the main motivation is the long term survival of the firm, not shareholder value maximisation.

Obviously you have to make some money to invest back into the company to survive, but above all longevity means being a good citizen in the environment and communities you operate in. There are some exceptions to this of course, but by and large, Japanese companies are pretty sincere about corporate social responsibility, to the point where I used to joke when I worked in corporate communications in a Japanese IT company, that if we didn’t watch out, our mission statement would be identical to every other Japanese technology company’s mission statement as it could be summarised as “contributing to society through innovation”.

So if you are looking to work for a company that will be supportive of your wish to make a positive contribution to society, then you may find Japanese companies congenial places to work.

Some are more active in CSR than others, so when Toyo Keizai has published its latest rankings by industry, we matched these to our Top 30 Europe, UK and Germany largest Japanese employers rankings and put them in rank order as below.

As Toyo Keizai points out, it is easier for manufacturers to score highly in their CSR rankings, which is why they dominate the top 50 overall, and also why Toyo Keizai publishes rankings by industry, to ensure like for like comparisons are made.  Banking and financial services are not included in their analysis. Toyo Keizai explains its scoring system (in Japanese) here.  It has around 150 criteria, across the categories of diversity (gender, age, disability), environment, corporate governance and social contribution.

  • Fujifilm – #1 overall and #1 in pulp/paper/chemicals
  • Canon #4 overall and #1 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Denso #8 overall and #1 in automotive
  • Ricoh #9 overall and #3 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Konica Minolta #12 overall and #4 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Honda #14 overall and #2 in automotive
  • Nissan #17 overall and #3 in automotive
  • Daiichi Sankyo #25 overall and #1 in pharmaceuticals
  • Toyota #28 overall and #4 in automotive
  • Fujitsu #30 overall and #9 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Astellas #34 overall and #2 in pharmaceuticals
  • Sumitomo Rubber 36th overall and #2 in oil/rubber/glass/ceramics
  • Mitsubishi Corporation #42 overall and #1 among trading companies
  • Lixil 44th overall and #1 in metal products
  • Sony #45 overall and #12 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Nidec #49 overall and #13 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Takeda #50 overall and #4 in pharmaceuticals
  • Sumitomo Electric Industries #52 overall and #2 in metal products
  • Itochu #55 overall and #2 among trading companies
  • Panasonic #57 overall and #15 in electronics and fine engineering
  • NYK #58 overall and #1 in logistics
  • Japan Tobacco 60th overall, 3rd amongst food companies
  • Brother Industries #71 overall and #16 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Sumitomo Corporation – #73 overall and #3 amongst trading companies
  • NTT Data #75 overall and #4 in telecommunications
  • Olympus #84 overall and #17 in electronics and fine engineering
  • Dentsu #95 overall and #2 out of service sector companies
  • Sumitomo Heavy Industries #138 overall and #11 amongst machinery companies
  • Calsonic Kansei #138 overall and #18 in automotive
  • Fast Retailing (Uniqlo) #531 overall and #19 out of 20 amongst retailers

 

 

 

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Dramatic headcount reductions in Japan and Europe for Japanese electronics companies

Over 300,000 permanent staff worldwide, representing around 20% of total headcount have been “let go” at Panasonic, Sony, Sharp, Toshiba and other Japanese electronics companies over the past five years, according to analysis by Toyo Keizai.

Panasonic, Sony, Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu, Toshiba and Sharp are all represented in the 10 companies who lost the most employees globally and the only company that isn’t electronics related amongst those 10 is Daiichi Sankyo – because of acquiring and then selling off Ranbaxy, the Indian generics drug manufacturer.  The other companies making up the 10 are Renesas and Mabuchi Motors – both B2B electronics companies.

Panasonic lost nearly a third of its employees -117,417.  Their turnover also shrank (but not by a third) over the same period and they reduced the number of consolidated companies (subsidiaries) from 633 to 474.  Only around 4% (10,000 – of which around 700 in UK, 3000 in Germany) of its employees are based in Europe anyway, so it’s clear the bulk of the reduction happened in Japan and China.

Sony was second, with a reduction of 42,900 employees, representing around 26% of employees in 2010/11.  This was largely through restructuring its electronics business in Japan and North America, with the film, music and finance segments remaining stable.  Sony has also restructured its electronics business in Europe, losing around 40% (2,000) of its headcount (UK & Ireland = 22% reduction from 1,386 to 1,061, Western Europe 50% reduction from 3,271 to 1,635 and Eastern Europe only 11% down, from 423 to 376) The total of Sony’s employees in Europe including film, music and computer entertainment represents around 10% of the global total of 125,300.

Renesas – the semi-conductor manufacturer which was formed out of bits of NEC, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric has lost over half its employees – 27,470.  Headcount is now 19,160 with the bulk of its European employees being located in the UK (805 employees in 2012, now down to 633) and Germany (831 employees).

Hitachi‘s headcount reduction was only 7%, but as it was 7% of over 350,000 people, this still put it in the top 10.  In the UK and Europe by contrast, Hitachi has grown due to acquisitions and expansion of their rail, consulting, finance and nuclear power businesses.

NEC cut its employees by 15% (17,114) and Fujitsu by 9% (15,821).  Fujitsu’s employee numbers in the UK (where it remains the largest Japanese employer) over the past 5 years rose from 10,030 in 2012 to 11,765 in 2015, but a further restructuring has led to headcount dipping below 10,000 in 2016.  The pattern across Fujitsu’s EMEA (or now EMEIA) region is similar – having been 31,000 five years’ ago, then reduced, then expanded again, and now another restructuring since 2015/6 to the current total of 28,707.

Toshiba has only cut 7% (14,829) of its headcount so far but this will change with the spin off of Toshiba Medical Systems to Canon and household appliances to Midea as well as the controversial sale of its chip business.  There have been cuts to other businesses in Europe, with employee numbers dropping around 10% 2015/6.

Sharp, owned by Taiwanese company Foxconn/Hon Hai as of last year, cut 22% of its employees (12,069) over the five year period.  Much of its consumer electronics business has been licensed to other manufacturers, resulting in the closure of Sharp Electronics UK and a new company, Sharp Business Systems being set up with its headquarters in the UK and business units headquartered in London (information systems), Hamburg (energy solutions) and Munich (visual solutions).

Brexit looks to accelerate these trends – companies such as Sharp, which were restructuring anyway, are using Brexit as a further stimulus. To ensure “maximum supply chain efficiency” Sharp has  already transferred its European stock and logistics operations from the UK to its subsidiary in France (to be managed by its German subsidiary) in September 2016.  At the same time it sold its energy solutions business in the UK  to its German subsidiary and closed down Sharp Telecommunications UK (22 employees).  Overall Sharp’s employees in the UK look to drop from 617 in 2015 to 553 in 2017, plus the factory in Wales which manufactures microwave ovens – licensed to Turkish company Vestel.

 

 

 

 

 

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Fewer women on the boards of Japanese companies in Europe than in Japan

We’ve revised our Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe again.  Where possible we have updated the number of employees, which means the Suntory Group is now in the Top 30 along with Konica Minolta (and Kao and Daiichi Sankyo are out).  This time we wanted to take a look at the gender and nationality diversity on boards, both in Japan and Europe, and have discovered that there are actually fewer women on the boards of Japanese companies in Europe than in Japan.

Only two out of 19 (10%) of European headquarter boards of Japanese companies have women on them – Astellas and Suntory (the latter including Makiko Ono, an executive in Suntory Japan) and only 3 of the 14 (21%) UK based Japanese companies we looked at (in cases where the European HQ was not in the UK or there were separate European and UK companies in the UK) had women members – Lucite (subsidiary of Mitsubishi Chemical Holding/Mitsubishi Rayon), Komatsu and NTT Data.  Komatsu UK’s female director is Keiko Fujiwara, who is the CEO of Komatsu Europe, in Belgium.  This contrasts with 13 (43%) out of the Top 30 companies’ boards in Japan  having women directors.  In case you were wondering, only 6% of FTSE250 companies have no women on them.

  • 4% of the Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe’s board members in Europe and/or the UK are female
  • 6% of the Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe’s board members in Japan are female
  • 8% of the Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe’s board members in Japan are non-Japanese
  • 16% of the board members of the Top 100 listed Japanese companies in Japan are female
  • 19.6% of FTSE250 board members are female

Around 62% of the members of European and UK boards of of the Top 30 Japanese companies are European, on average.  Companies whose boards in the UK and Europe only had Japanese directors were Toshiba, Fast Retailing (Uniqlo), Fujifilm and Sharp. Sharp and Toshiba’s troubles are well known.  Fast Retailing recently reported struggles in the US market and falling profits in Europe for Uniqlo, Comptoir des Cotonniers and Princess Tam Tam. Fujifilm has made a remarkable transformation from a B2C camera film to a B2B imaging company but the last set of quarterly results, issued last month were deemed “mixed”.

(Note: only main boards, not executive or supervisory boards were analysed, and company secretaries were excluded)

The full chart is here (highlighted means “above average) and can be downloaded here :Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe board diversity Nov 3 2015

Top 30 Japanese companies in Europe board diversity Nov 3 2015

 

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Octopus balls to Tokyo – why it matters where your company is from in Japan
shutterstock_245909455

Takoyaki (octopus balls) are typical Osaka street food

Most countries have rival cities – usually the official capital city versus other cities which consider themselves to be the real business, historical or cultural heart of the country – think London versus Manchester or Birmingham, Berlin versus Dusseldorf or Frankfurt, Rome versus Milan, Madrid versus Barcelona.  Japan is no exception and the rivalries go way back into history.

Kyoto used to be the capital of Japan, before Tokyo (or Edo as it was then) began to usurp it in the 17th century.  If you ask Japanese people today about Kyoto, they joke that Kyotoites still think Kyoto is the real capital of Japan, and the Emperor is just temporarily visiting Tokyo (he moved there in 1868, when Tokyo became the official capital) – and will return one day.

Tokyo literally means the Eastern Capital and is part of the Kanto region, where the ruling feudal Tokugawa shogunate was based from the 17th century.  Kanto means East of the Barrier (usually considered to be the Hakone checkpoint) and Kansai – the region where Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto are based – means the West of the Barrier (originally the Osaka Tollgate).

Before Kyoto’s reign as capital for a 1000 years, Nara (also in the Kansai region) was the capital and seat of the Emperor but is now a quiet backwater, more visited by tourists than business people.  Kobe is the other main city in the Kansai region – a port with a strongly cosmopolitan feel and very close to Osaka geographically.  Whilst Kyoto remains aloof and quietly superior (and has some very successful high tech companies of its own such as Kyocera and Nidec), the real battle now in business culture is between Osaka and Tokyo.

Osakans see Tokyo as standardizing, dull and full of bureaucrats and view Osaka (which historically had very few samurai but plenty of merchants) as the real money maker, with vastly superior food.  Many of Japan’s celebrities, comedians and musicians come from the Kansai region too.

So what does this mean for corporate cultures?  Osaka companies often have merchant roots – the joke goes, when you meet an Osakan, you don’t ask “how are you” (ogenki desuka) but “how’s business” (moukarimakka).  To which the correct response is “bochi bochi denna” – a wonderfully vague way of giving nothing away, like saying “plodding along nicely thank you”.  Osaka companies are brash, tough negotiators and mean with the money.  “They’d skin the fleece off a gnat” said one British engineer to me, describing his colleagues in the Osaka HQ of a consumer electronics company.

Tokyo companies are gentlemanly but at the same time highly political.  You need to have a good understanding of their organisation, the factions and the individual relationships to understand how to get things done.  Mitsui and Mitsubishi, both Tokyo based corporate groups, are distinguished by the saying “Mitsui  is people – Mitsubishi is the organisation”.  It’s hard sometimes to understand how exactly this is different, but it seems to boil down to the idea that if an individual is powerful enough at a Mitsui group company, they can get things done, whereas at a Mitsubishi group company, the whole organisation has to support an action.

The other main corporate groups, Sumitomo and Itochu, are Kansai based companies.  Both have strong “mercantile” roots – Sumitomo in metals trading, hard-nut, conservative and domestically focused and Itochu – strong in fashion and consumer goods, and seen as the more maverick, progressive and international in outlook.  The regional cultural differences don’t seem to have been that strong between Sumitomo and Mitsui as various mergers have taken place between their respective member companies, particularly in financial services.   However regional cultural differences have definitely had an impact on Astellas Pharma, the product of a merger between Yamanouchi (Tokyo) and Fujisawa (Osaka).  Apparently many Fujisawa employees were horrified that Yamanouchi was going to be the dominant partner in the merger.  Fujisawa had a strong tradition of innovation and had regarded Yamanouchi as “Mane-nouchi” (Mane = imitation) – a bunch of play-safe Tokyo bureaucrats.

Those who know Japan well will have spotted that there is an important region missing from this analysis – Chubu.  Literally and metaphorically this is the midlands of Japan.  Just like the Midlands in the UK it is the historic heart of the car industry.  Nagoya is the main city, and teased just as Birmingham in the UK is for being ugly and soullessly modern.  The area has the last laugh though, as it is the most wealthy in Japan – thanks to the enduring success of Toyota (so mighty their home town was renamed Toyota City) and its corporate group of suppliers such as Denso.

So, where are the top 30 Japanese companies in Europe from?

Kanto/Tokyo based companies:

• Asahi Glass
• Astellas (but Fujisawa originally Osaka)
• Canon
• Daiichi Sankyoshutterstock_36509791
• Fujifilm
• Fujitsu
• Hitachi
• Honda
• Kao Corporation
• Mitsubishi group
• Mitsui group
• Nissan
• Nomura (but was Osaka originally)
• NTT group
• NYK group
• Olympus
• Ricoh
• Sony
• Toshiba

Kansai based companies:
• Horiba (Kyoto)
• Nidec (Kyoto)
• Nippon Sheet Glass (Sumitomo Group)
• Omron (Kyoto)
• Panasonic (Osaka)
• Sharp (Osaka)
• Sumitomo group (Osaka)
• Takeda Pharma (Osaka)

Chubu based companies:
• Denso
• Seiko Epson
• Toyota

Chugoku (Hiroshima etc) based companies:

• Fast Retailing/Uniqlo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reports, profiles and other research on the Top 30 largest Japanese companies in Europe, Middle East and Africa are available to subscribers to our premium, paid newsletter – subscriptions are available here.

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Successes and failures of Japanese cross border M&A (2 – Daiichi Sankyo and Ranbaxy)

In September 2013 the US Federal Drug Agency issued an import alert, prohibiting further manufacture of FDA regulated drugs at one of Ranbaxy Laboratories’ Indian factories, causing shockwaves at Daiichi Sankyo, who had bought 64% of Ranbaxy in 2008.  This was the second time an alert had been issued in the past 5 years.

Nikkei Business, in their series on Japanese cross border M&As, draws parallels with the NSG/Pilkington case blogged previously  saying that the same mistakes had been made by the Japanese acquiring company, in failing to do enough analysis beforehand.

Daiichi Sankyo thought it had fixed the quality problems which were exposed by the FDA in 2009, by firing the Ranbaxy former owner and CEO and sending a director from Japan as well as a quality control officer from the US subsidiary.

Daiichi Sankyo has not disclosed to the Nikkei the cause of the quality problems – apparently this is not even shared widely within the company.  The Nikkei supposes that Daiichi Sankyo lacked understanding of Ranbaxy’s organisational structure and corporate culture.  A supplier to Ranbaxy explains that “Indian companies do not work in a team the way Japanese companies do.  There is a lack of solidarity, and a lack of trust between the boss and subordinates.  There is just the hierarchical link between directors and employees.  Orders from above are obeyed unquestioningly, and even if juniors sense there are problems, they do not say anything.”

Another comments “Employees in Indian companies are different from Japanese companies in that if they are asked for data and documentation from the authorities, they do not put the information together very thoroughly.  There is also not the atmosphere where issues can be openly disclosed.”

If this is the case, it is therefore difficult to understand what is going on from the outside, and the word of the people on the ground cannot be 100% relied on, notes the Nikkei.  What is needed for successful M&A is a strengthening of governance – management must be given the structures to understand exactly what is going on on the shopfloor.

As the Nikkei concludes, another failing of Japanese cross border M&As often lies in not being able to appoint a trusted person who also has the necessary local and industry expertise.  The Indian executive, Atul Sobti, whom Daiichi Sankyo appointed in 2009 to replace the CEO/owner had previously been an executive at Japanese car companies, only lasted a year. In my experience, it is often the case that Japanese companies rate familiarity with Japanese corporate cultures over  industry expertise when hiring local senior management.  However Daiichi Sankyo seem to have changed their mind on this, as the successor to Sobti, Arun Sawnhey, is a pharmaceutical industry veteran.

One reason Japanese companies often give for not interfering too heavily in the newly acquired subsidiary is that they are anxious to retain the existing senior management, recognising that they do not have executives in the Japan headquarters they can despatch who have sufficient local and global industry experience and expertise.  At the same time, judging by both the Ranbaxy and Pilkington cases, the local executives complain of a lack of access, support and influence in relation to the Japan HQ to carry out their jobs, and leave, or conversely, are quickly got rid of when problems arise or financial targets are not met.

A better balance has to be found between implementing the necessary changes to governance and strengthening oversight, whilst also ensuring that the senior local executives are given the support and integrated into the network back in Japan HQ to allow them to perform their roles effectively.  Japanese executives are too ready to keep non-Japanese executives at arm’s length, so that if there are any problems, Japanese executive hands are clean.

 

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